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Abstract 
 
Societies coming out of civil wars find themselves in a “conflict trap” as they are 
left with a striking legacy of instability and violence. Out of the 144 civil wars that have 
ended since 1945, 77 had relapsed by the end of 2004. Even when civil wars end, human 
casualties, destruction of lives and infrastructures, and huge economic costs combine to 
produce crippling and destabilizing effects that transcend state boundaries and the span of 
any particular war. War-time memories turn into social capital that is used and abused to 
mobilize support for extremist and conflictual policies. Nevertheless, peace after civil 
wars does happen and why it takes hold in some societies but not in others is an 
important and intriguing question—one that has motivated this study.  
Looking at all post-civil war cases since 1945, I analyze the effects of political 
power sharing institutions, particularly those associated with consociationalism, on the 
stability of peace. I find that commonly prescribed consociational models of government 
conflate two different political institutions, territorial decentralization and veto rights, 
which provide rivals with conflicting incentives, producing opposite effects on the 
consolidation of post-civil war peace. From various duration models decentralization 
emerges as the only political institution included in the study that reduces the hazard rate 
of post-civil war cases.  
I also compare results from the dataset I compiled with those using two 
alternative datasets. The comparison illustrates the implications of employing different 
rules for case selection and dependent variable operationalization. I argue that the dataset 
I introduce in this study overcomes selection biases that have been commonly committed 
in the field. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
How do groups of people who have been killing one another with considerable 
enthusiasm and success come together to form a common government? How can you 
work together, politically and economically, with the people who killed your parents, 
your children, your friends or lovers? On the surface it seems impossible, even grotesque 
(Licklider 1993, 4).  
 
Societies coming out of civil wars find themselves in a “conflict trap” as they are left 
with a striking legacy of instability and violence (Collier et al. 2003). Out of the 144 civil 
wars that have ended since 1945, 77 had relapsed by the end of 2004 (see Appendix 1). 
During this period, both the number of active civil wars and the proportion of countries 
with ongoing wars have steadily gone up (Fearon and Laitin 2003, 77),1 claiming the 
lives of approximately 20 million people and displacing 67 million others throughout the 
world (Sambanis 2004, 259). Even when civil wars end, human casualties, destruction of 
lives and infrastructures, and huge economic costs combine to produce crippling and 
destabilizing effects that transcend state boundaries and the span of any particular war. 
“Civil wars kill and maim people, long after the shooting stops” (Ghobarah, Huth, and 
Russett 2003). War-time memories turn into social capital2 that is used and abused to 
mobilize support for extremist and conflictual policies. Nevertheless, peace after civil 
                                                 
1 Fearon and Laitin find that there has been no significant upward trend in the rate of war outbreak; instead, 
the difference between the rate of civil war onset and the rate of termination explain the increase in the 
number of ongoing civil wars (2.31 outbreaks as opposed to 1.85 terminations per year) (2003, 77). 
2 Wintrobe introduces the concept of “ethnic capital” which can be used as a means of reducing transaction 
costs—“as a capital good that reduces obstacles to both political and market exchange” (1998, 18).  
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wars does happen and why it takes hold in some societies but not in others is an 
important and intriguing question—one that has motivated this study.  
 Political power sharing institutions, particularly those associated with 
consociationalism (Lijphart 1969; 1977; 1999), are being increasingly promoted as 
prescriptions for peace for societies embroiled in civil wars—whether it is to stop the 
violence in Darfur or Iraq; to establish the final status of Kosovo; or to break the 
deadlock that has plagued Cyprus for decades. Due to their distributional consequences, 
political institutions take center stage when rivals negotiate settlements and, once 
established, they play an important role in determining whether players stick to the new 
system or opt once again for the battlefield. After all, power distribution is the primary 
concern of civil war rivals: “That is, ultimately, what the war has been about. People are 
willing to fight and die over it because they know it will determine their future and that of 
their children” (Licklider 2001, 706). The question for political scientists, then, is 
whether certain political arrangements really fare better than others in terminating, if not 
preventing, civil wars and sustaining peace once it is established. Can we identify certain 
institutions that promote cooperation and make peace an attractive strategy? If so, 
institutional engineering can provide the way for sustainable peace in societies that might 
otherwise be prone to instability and violence.  
 A pervasive limitation of studies that have addressed the role of political 
institutions in conflict-ridden societies is the missing link between the macro-level 
political outcomes they observe (such as war and peace) and the micro-level incentives 
established by certain institutions. With this study, I try to bridge that gap by situating the 
motivating question at the nexus of two bodies of literature: the rational choice school of 
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contentious politics and rational choice institutionalism. The former counters the 
grievance or emotion driven explanations of collective dissent by showing how relative 
deprivation vis-à-vis other groups does not automatically lead to organized rebellions 
since participation in such movements are costly and the benefits sought are non-
excludable public goods. “At least ninety-five percent of aggrieved people, at least 
ninety-percent of the time, in at least ninety-give percent of the places” do not rebel 
(Lichbach 1995, 12); in most cases, potential insurgents choose to free-ride, giving rise to 
the Rebel’s Dilemma.  
Combining rational choice institutionalism with this approach, I envisage 
institutions as “humanly devised constraints” (North 1990) on the behavior of key 
players—state actors and (potential) insurgents. Using case studies built around a 
proposed formal institutional bargaining model on the one hand, and a macro-level 
statistical analysis on the other, I treat institutions as both exogenous and endogenous 
variables. According to Weingast (2002, 661),  
These approaches provide both a method for analyzing the effects of institutions and 
social and political interactions and a means for understanding the long-term evolution 
and survival of particular institutional forms. The study of endogenous institutions yields 
a distinctive theory about their instability, form, and survival. In contrast to approaches 
that take institutions as given, this approach allows scholars to study how actors attempt 
to affect the institutions as conditions change. 
Civil war terminations present a particularly suitable context to apply this approach. As 
the case studies in Chapters 3 and 4 illustrate, the institutions endorsed by different 
players change as conditions on the battlefield, and hence players’ expectations from 
continued fighting, are transformed. This observation supports the model of institutional 
bargaining I present in Chapter 2.  
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The main assumption driving this study is that the control of state resources—
political, economic, military, and social—is the primary motive that fuels civil conflicts. 
Sub-state identities and feelings of hatred and mistrust towards “others” dominate 
political discourse in societies going through or coming out of such conflicts. In most 
cases, however, these are simply tools of mobilization employed, if not fabricated, by 
opportunistic leaders. They are, in other words, what Lichbach identified as “community 
solutions” to the Rebel’s Dilemma (1998). As more and more scholars have recently 
recognized, civil wars are best perceived “not as a distinct phenomenon, but rather as one 
phase in a cycle of violence” (Sambanis 2004, 259; also see Lichbach, Davenport, and 
Armstrong 2004). The underlying causes of civil wars are, therefore, not significantly 
different from insurgencies which for one reason or another fail to sustain systematic 
violent opposition at civil-war levels. 
The factors that explain which countries have been at risk for civil war are not their 
ethnic or religious characteristics but rather the conditions that favor insurgency. … 
Financially, organizationally, and politically weak central governments [proxied by a low 
per capita income] render insurgency more feasible and attractive due to weak local 
policing or inept and corrupt counterinsurgency practices (Fearon and Laitin 2003, 75). 
 
Oppositions, however, do not automatically turn violent whenever the state is perceived 
to be too weak or incompetent to repress. Certain political institutions—those that 
provide the opposition with the prospects of winning a share of power and state 
resources—can make the existing system potentially too valuable to forego given the 
risks and the costs that come with civil wars. 
 Every society is faced with limited resources, whether it is natural resources, 
economic opportunities, public sector jobs and funds, or government positions. How 
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these resources get to be distributed and shared is at the core of politics, which is by 
definition the process by which scarce resources are authoritatively allocated (i.e. who 
gets what, when, and how).3 If some players perceive that the political system is not 
allowing them access to the share they feel they are entitled to and they have the means 
to mobilize sub-state groups against each other, in many cases with the promise of 
dominating and excluding other groups, politics can turn ugly and violent: “if some of us 
can form a group that gains hegemony over our society, we can extract a disproportionate 
share of total resources for members of our group” (Hardin 1997, 142). On the other 
hand, if political institutions are engineered in a way that all relevant players find it in 
their own interests to continue to compete within the bounds of the given system (as 
opposed to taking the very costly route of insurgency and war), vulnerability to political 
violence will be significantly reduced. Political institutions could play a crucial role also 
in signaling credible commitments to peace, without which fears of attack, subjugation, 
and annihilation could create a “security dilemma” (Walter and Snyder 1999), 
encouraging preemptive defections. “One need not [even] hate members of another 
group, but one might still fear their potential hatred or even merely their threat;” such 
fears could instigate violence following a simple rationale—“I can improve my prospects 
of surviving the conflict if I preemptively suppress those with whom I am in conflict” 
(Hardin 1997, 143, 144).  
Journalistic accounts tend to blame historical or ethnic hatreds, grudges, and 
grievances for causing civil wars. They also suggest the inevitability of conflict in diverse 
societies where distinct groups have been pitted against each other—short of total 
                                                 
3 This definition is rooted in David Easton’s definition of politics as the “authoritative allocation of values” 
(1953) and it has been adopted by many political scientists ever since.  
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subjugation or cleansing of all but one group, or the presence of a ruthless Leviathan, 
nothing can bring stability and peace. This is perhaps best exemplified in the writings of 
Robert Kaplan who argues, for instance, that the people of the Balkans “hate one another 
with primitive ferocity” and that for decades the Tito regime simply delayed the 
inevitable explosion of what amounted to a ticking time bomb (1993, 30). According to a 
very different account of the wars in the Balkans, however,  
These were spawned not so much by the convulsive surging of ancient hatreds or by 
frenzies whipped up by demagogic politicians and the media as by the ministrations of 
small—sometimes very small—bands of opportunistic marauders recruited by political 
leaders and operating under their general guidance. Many of these participants were 
drawn from street gangs or from bands of soccer hooligans (Mueller 2000, 42).  
 
Once systematic violence takes hold in one’s community, it might become impossible to 
remain neutral as with that often comes the label of “traitor”—another deliberate 
strategy—which makes one vulnerable to attacks not only by other groups but also by its 
own. A young member of a brutal Croat paramilitary that terrorized Mostar during the 
war in Bosnia explains, for instance, how he wanted to stay out of the war but the 
“situation in Mostar caught up with him, labeled him, and made him choose: stay with 
your own or leave your city like a dog and a traitor” (Hardin 1997, 148).4  
Regardless of whether some primordial differences or feelings have anything to 
do with the initiation of any civil war, once societies experience the horrors that come 
with such conflicts, recent memories augment the capital that can be invested for the 
mobilization of insurgents or fighters—now traumatized, unemployed, and in many cases 
                                                 
4 Hardin quotes from another source. 
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still holding onto their guns.5 In order for the civil war to have occurred, rebels must have 
already overcome the big hurdle of collective action. This makes post-civil war 
environments especially prone to political violence and instability. “Civil wars generate a 
conflict trap. Hatred and other rebellion-specific capital accumulate during war, making 
further conflict more likely” (Collier and Sambanis 2002, 5). Just like “lagged values of 
protest and repression are consistently among the strongest predictors of subsequent 
conflict activity” (Lichbach, Davenport, and Armstrong 2004, 6) 6, so are past civil wars 
good predictors of subsequent rebellions and civil wars. Yet, this obviously is not an 
unavoidable vicious cycle. In Roy Licklider’s (1993, 4) words, “on the surface it seems 
impossible, even grotesque” that people who have been killing each other “with 
considerable enthusiasm and success” can lay down their arms, live in peace side-by-side, 
and possibly work together in common governments. One of the earlier influential works 
on politics in diverse societies had arrived at a similarly grim conclusion: “We ask,” 
wrote Rabushka and Shepsle, “is the resolution of intense but conflicting preferences in 
the plural society manageable in a democratic framework? We think not” (1972, 217). 
However, empirical evidence shows that the “conflict trap” can be broken and peace after 
civil wars can emerge and be consolidated. What makes this possible in some cases but 
not in others? 
 Recent literature on civil war resolutions stresses the positive role various power 
sharing institutions, such as proportional representation (PR) electoral systems, quotas for 
                                                 
5 These divisive memories and feelings can be used and manipulated to mobilize electoral support as well, 
hence rendering post-war societies vulnerable to centrifugal party systems.  
6 This is the “inherency” approach of Lichbach et al., who argue that “civil war is not derivative of structure 
[as the “contingency” theorists contend] but, rather, it is part of a self-generative process whereby the 
dynamics of lower-level conflict behavior mobilize contending actors into civil war” (Lichbach, Davenport, 
and Armstrong 2004, 1).  
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representation, and decentralization, can play in preventing relapse into large-scale 
violence (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003; Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild 2001; Kaufmann 
1996; Lake and Rothchild 1996; Licklider 1995; Walter 1999; 2002). This focus 
emanates from a body of literature which attributes to such institutions the success of 
ethnically diverse democracies in promoting cooperation and preventing intra-state 
conflict (Cohen 1997; Horowitz 1985; Krain 1998; Lijphart 1969; Nordlinger 1972; 
Lijphart 1999; Sisk 1996; Saideman et al. 2002). These studies did not deal with post-war 
contexts in particular. However, provided that the problem of credible commitment is 
resolved—newly established institutions and players who have been trying to kill one 
another until recently combine to create a very difficult environment for trust and 
cooperation—prospects of some share of power and state resources should provide 
similar incentives for collaboration following civil wars as they would in established 
democracies. 
 Two types of power sharing are typically discussed: The consociational approach, 
which is associated primarily with Arend Lijphart (1969; 1977; 1999), advocates 
arrangements that recognize different identity groups as building blocks of a society and 
promote cooperation among these distinct groups. The integrative approach, identified 
most closely with Donald L. Horowitz (1985), on the other hand, calls for institutions that 
are supposed to motivate actors to transcend such group cleavages and share power 
through alternative alliances. Although they seem to aspire for substantially different 
political outcomes—albeit with the same ultimate result of peaceful coexistence—these 
two are in fact quite similar in the types of institutions they prescribe, such as 
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decentralization and proportionality of representation in government, legislature, and 
bureaucracies.7  
 It is not realistic to expect societies emerging from civil wars to quickly abandon 
war-time group loyalties, whether they are ethnic, religious, partisan, or ideological. 
Neither is the persistence of sub-state identities, and the prominence of ethnically 
organized political parties for instance, a good indicator of post-war success or failure. 
Some would even argue that the absence of war does not constitute peace. My goal, 
however, is to explore which factors, particularly what types of political institutions, are 
most conducive to stopping the killing in the long term; as long as people cooperate and 
continue to want to do so, how they self-identify and what they think of or how they feel 
towards each other are irrelevant. Because of its prominence among international policy 
makers involved in mediating and/or imposing solutions to civil conflicts around the 
world, I focus predominantly on consociational power sharing and the particular 
institutions that are most likely to give rise to it.  
Most practitioners and policy makers involved in conflict resolution and 
management around the world have recognized the need to accept existing cleavages and 
to encourage coordination and cooperation among them as a precondition to breaking the 
cycle of violence. The Dayton Framework in Bosnia-Hercegovina, the SPLA-government 
peace deal in Sudan, the new constitution in Iraq, and the Ohrid Agreement in Macedonia 
are only a few examples. The manipulation of many variables that potentially influence 
the propensity to experience civil war (re)occurrence is very difficult (e.g. the level of 
economic development or dependence on natural resources) and may even be morally 
objectionable (e.g. ethnic diversity). Formal institutions, on the other hand, can be 
                                                 
7 The most prominent institutional difference—the electoral system—is discussed below. 
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designed to induce voluntary compliance and cooperation by taking into account the 
different preference structures of each society; they interact with given individual 
preferences, including those that might reflect prominent social cleavages (e.g. ethnic, 
religious, tribal identities), to determine individual behaviors and social outcomes. It is 
my argument that ultimately actors make the decision to either take part in the new social 
order or stick with the struggle on the battlefield depending on the share of state 
resources they each expect to get given the political institutional arrangements.  
In order for the promise or the prospect of sharing to even play into the decision-
making of relevant players, they must first perceive each others’ commitments to lay 
down arms and share power as credible. This problem of credible commitment—how to 
bind players to their commitments—is central to any agreement or contract; it is more 
pronounced and difficult to solve in post-war contexts where feelings of mistrust and 
hatred reign supreme. In the aftermath of negotiated settlements, the fact that the 
adversaries are still organized and have military capabilities only exacerbates the 
problem. 
To be successful, a civil war peace settlement must consolidate the previously warring 
factions into a single state, create a new government capable of accommodating their 
interests, and build a new national, nonpartisan military force. This means that 
adversaries who want to settle their war off the battlefield must at some point demobilize, 
disengage, and disarm their separate militaries. They must then surrender whatever 
remaining power they have to a single administration, not necessarily their own. These 
requirements, however, create two tempting opportunities for post-treaty exploitation, 
and both sides know this. Once groups have sent their soldiers home, laid down their 
weapons, and surrendered occupied territory, they become extremely vulnerable to a 
surprise attack. Furthermore, once they have surrendered their assets, the make it easy for 
their opponent to set up a one-party state [regardless of the terms of the settlement] 
(Walter 1999, 129). 
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Consider Avner Grief’s (1998) account of the Genoese’s adoption of the 
institution of the Podesta. Realizing that fighting among the two major clans had 
immense costs and caused the whole society to lag behind its trading rivals, the Genoese 
set out to establish a system that would allow them to divert their resources once again 
into lucrative uses. Ending the fighting was in the interest of both, but because the 
potential cost of demobilizing if the other one cheated was too high (i.e. the stakes were 
too high), the dominant strategy for both was to keep fighting unless their cooperation 
could somehow be enforced—systematically monitored and defections punished. 
Consequently, the two adversaries created the post of the Podesta and employed a 
foreigner for the position, giving him the necessary resources and authority to side with 
the honest party if either of them cheated and attacked the other one. This would make 
defection costly since an alliance of the Podesta and the attacked clan would be more 
powerful—more likely to win on the battlefield—than the cheater.8 By agreeing to this 
arrangement, each clan assured the other of the credibility of its commitment to 
cooperation. The institution was designed such that cheating by the Podesta, whose goal 
was to maximize its own power and resources, was also discouraged: if it allied with the 
cheater, the latter would no longer have any use for the position of the Podesta (the 
resources allocated to which was not extensive enough to dominate either clan by itself) 
once it defeated the vulnerable clan.   
Similarly, external peacekeepers or guarantors are typically recruited to enforce 
compliance at least through the initial demobilization stages following civil war 
terminations. However, this is not a viable long-term solution, especially if international 
                                                 
8 The distribution of power among the two clans was initially symmetrical. 
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involvement extends beyond the role traditionally played by international peacekeepers, 
as is the case with the Office of the High Representative in Bosnia and Hercegovina. 
Furthermore, any outside actor cannot be expected to be extensively and permanently 
involved without regard for its own interests, which might or might not coincide with 
those of the post-war society in question. Compliance and credible commitments, 
therefore, need to be established without reliance on outside actors at least once the initial 
hurdles are overcome. 
Commitments can be credible in two ways: the motivational and the imperative 
(North 1993). They are motivationally credible if compliance is compatible with 
individual incentives and, hence, it is self-enforcing; players want to continue to honor 
their commitments. When this is not the case, given the particular institutional framework 
and the structure of interests, compliance can be secured with coercion by an external 
enforcer, in which case commitment becomes “imperative”. In the latter case, what 
makes players stick to the game and what makes them believe in the commitments of 
others is the knowledge that non-compliance will be punished in a way that the net value 
of compliance outweighs that of defection. Democracy, however, is by definition a 
system where no entity stands above the will of the people, which makes the 
“imperative” solution ideologically problematic. Peace, therefore, needs in the end to be 
compatible with the incentives of relevant players; they must prefer peace within a given 
institutional framework to war, which brings with it huge risks but also some probability 
of winning a larger share of power and resources.  
An important sign of the credibility of commitments in the long-term is the 
institutionalization of mechanisms or constraints that make changing the rules of the 
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game difficult. This is exactly why provisions of “mutual veto” are crucial for 
consociational power sharing: “Participation in a grand coalition offers important 
political protection for minority segments, but no absolute and foolproof protection. . . 
.[T]hough the minority’s presence in the coalition does give it a chance to present its case 
as forcefully as possible to its coalition partners, it may nevertheless be outvoted by the 
majority” (Lijphart 1977, 36). While provision of extensive veto rights on every policy 
issue will probably be detrimental to the system, because of the rigidity it will create in 
decision-making, requiring concurrent majorities or some form of super-majority on 
significant issues—constitutional amendments—will signal to former rivals, particularly 
the minorities, that their opponents are credibly committed to the new system. A political 
system’s veto structure (Tsebelis 2002) is, then, a good indicator of rivals’ commitments 
to share power: provision of veto rights not only constitutes sharing of political power on 
its own but also signals that the majority does not intend to use its advantage in numbers 
to change the rules of the game once demobilization takes place and/or third-party 
enforcers leave. 
Veto structures are key components of the theoretical model I develop; they 
determine whether and how disgruntled parties could manipulate the institutional 
framework, and hence the distribution of power and resources, without returning to 
widespread insurgency, massacre, or war. In the empirical analyses, in addition to a 
model with the traditional institutional variables—parliamentary vs. presidential, 
proportional vs. plurality elections, unitary vs. federal—I also test a model of post-civil 
war peace duration with the number of veto points as the main explanatory variable. 
Tsebelis’ model of veto players provides an alternative way of specifying political 
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institutions (Tsebelis 1995; 2002). The veto player structure—the number, congruence, 
and internal cohesion of players whose cooperation is necessary to change a policy or 
institution—replaces with a single interval-level variable the conventional dichotomous 
institutional variables, which embody somewhat arbitrary and problematic distinctions, 
given the prevalence of semi-presidentialism, mixed electoral systems, and different 
levels and forms of decentralization. A number of studies have questioned the value of 
these commonly used dichotomous conceptualizations as predictors of policy outcomes 
and regime consolidation (Cheibub and Limongi 2002; Eaton 2000; Power and 
Gasiorowski 1997). I use this alternative operationalization to investigate the effects of 
political institutions on post-civil war consolidation.  
Studies that explored effects of political institutions on post-civil war 
environments have focused almost exclusively on negotiated settlements (Hartzell, 
Hoddie, and Rothchild 2001; Hartzell and Hoddie 2003; Walter 1999; 2002). I include 
military victories as well as negotiated settlements in my empirical analyses. I control for 
the mode of war termination, which allows me to test the effect of this variable on peace: 
While some scholars argue that negotiated settlements are far more likely to backslide 
into civil wars than military victories, even though the latter are more likely to be 
followed by genocides (Licklider 1995; Wagner 1993), others find negotiated treaties to 
be positively correlated with post-civil war peace (Doyle and Sambanis 2000). It also 
allows me to take into account the variation in the political institutions established 
following military victories; as long as a victory does not eradicate all potential 
opposition, the winner might still choose to share some power with remaining potential 
insurgents, simply diverting resources it would have otherwise spent on repression to the 
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co-optation of prospective rebels. While military victories might create circumstances 
that are a lot less conducive to the mobilization of rebels, they in no way guarantee that 
peace will not be disturbed. Victories that destroy the potential for effective military 
opposition make unilateral state-led violence—massacre, genocide, ethnic cleansing—an 
even more attractive strategy. The role political institutions can play in inducing 
cooperative political behavior and peace is, therefore, not any less relevant after military 
victories than it is following negotiated settlements.    
 I define success or failure of a given institutional framework in terms of post-civil 
war system consolidation, the inception of a self-enforcing equilibrium from which no 
player has the incentive to deviate unilaterally. More specifically, I investigate how 
power sharing and different institutions associated with it impede or facilitate the 
development of self-enforcing peace, regardless of the quality of governance or the 
persistence of war-time group loyalties. I use peace duration as a proxy for consolidation9 
and employ duration modeling to explore the effects of power sharing institutions on the 
risk of relapse (e.g. renewed civil war, massacres, genocides) at any given point after 
civil wars are terminated one way or another. This is a major improvement over the non-
dynamic methods traditionally used in the study of post-civil war politics, which typically 
treat post-war stability as a dichotomous variable—success if peace survives for more 
than an arbitrary number of years and failure if not (Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Licklider 
1995; Walter 2002).10
 
                                                 
9 Duration is in fact necessary but not sufficient for consolidation. 
10 A major exception to this approach is that of Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild (2001) and Hartzell and 
Hoddie (2003), who employ survival analysis to study how key variables affect the duration of negotiated 
settlements, thereby working with only 38 cases; with the inclusion of terminations by victory, my dataset 
includes 144 that experienced civil wars that were initiated and terminated during 1945-2004.  
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Power Sharing vs. Majoritarian Democracy 
What makes democracy attractive as a form of government is the fact that it is a system 
of “organized uncertainty” (Przeworski 1991, 13). Outcomes are uncertain in the sense 
that winners are not pre-determined and every player or group has some chance of 
winning at some point, thus giving all relevant actors a stake in preserving the system. 
The uncertainty is organized, on the other hand, as it is bound by the rules of the system; 
it is not arbitrary rule, anarchy or chaos. In order to evoke voluntary compliance and to be 
consolidated, democratic institutions need to convince political forces that they will be 
better off sticking with the system even if they lose this or that election or competition: 
“Either they must have a fair chance to win or they must believe that losing will not be 
that bad” (Przeworski 1991, 33). Otherwise, the rational response for incumbents who 
lose elections would be to not relinquish power. In case of societies coming out of civil 
wars, the expected behavior would be to not even demobilize. 
When majoritarian democracy—where political power tends to be amassed in the 
hands of a single party that enjoys plurality or majority of political support at a given 
period (determined typically by single-member district plurality type elections)—is 
installed in a society that is deeply divided between a majority and one or more 
minorities (in terms of population), outcomes are no longer “uncertain”; they are almost 
pre-determined. Once different identity groups are pitted against each other on the 
battlefield, these identities effectively become strong determinants of political 
preferences, creating cumulative and particularly divisive social cleavages; majoritarian 
democracies translate essentially into the tyranny of permanent majorities, leaving 
minorities with no incentives to agree to or comply with the rules of this system. Regular 
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free and fair elections, in other words, are not adequate to provide all players with a “fair 
chance” in certain societies, particularly those where the memories and fears of a civil 
war are still fresh.  
How to control the government so that it does not prey on its people is not a 
concern specific to post-civil war societies or those that are socially and politically 
divided. It has in fact long bedeviled theorists of democracy: how can the government, 
electoral winners, be prevented from evolving into an unaccountable and uncontrollable 
Leviathan? Recognizing that transitive social preferences—the will of the people—might 
not exist, since the same set of individual preferences could produce equally legitimate 
but very different political outcomes under different sets of rules and circumstances 
(Arrow 1970), social choice theorists have traditionally defined democracy in terms of 
avoiding tyranny, best exemplified in Riker’s Liberalism Against Populism (1982). This 
can be done, according to Ordeshook (2002, 5), by “giving political elites countervailing 
motives [and] by guaranteeing citizens the right to replace one set of leaders with 
another.” Constitutional restraints on government power, accountability through regular 
free and fair elections, and inter-branch checks and balances are the major institutional 
mechanisms that supposedly protect against tyrannical governments. These are not, 
however, sufficient guarantees against what is effectively an “elective dictatorship” 
(Lijphart 1999, 12) when the individual preference structures that characterize a given 
society will always bring the same political group to power; the same party will always 
control the government, the legislature, the military, and all other state bodies, with no 
incentive to change the institutions to produce a different outcome.  
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Consistent with the arguments in favor of Madisonian or liberalist democracy, 
Rothchild and Roeder (2005) have recently juxtaposed what they called “power dividing” 
against power sharing in post-civil war contexts. They concluded that there was a 
“dilemma of power sharing:” provisions of power sharing “could provide an attractive 
basis to end a conflict in an ethnically divided country” but the same institutions are also 
“likely to hinder the consolidation of peace and democracy over the long term” (6). The 
primary reason for this instability would be the empowerment of existing ethnic 
cleavages, which would result in “ethnification of all policy disputes” and “the 
concentration of institutional weapons in the hands of ethnopoliticians” (Roeder 2005, 
56). 
They argued that “the power dividing arrangements that we associate with the 
U.S. Constitution,” on the other hand, “limits majorities not by empowering minority 
groups with parts of the government’s power, but by expanding individual liberties and 
rights at the expense of government and by empowering different majorities in 
independent organs of government.” Without realizing the significance of the assumption 
they implicitly make—that the society is composed of cross-cutting cleavages such that 
an individual aligned with the minority on some issues will identify with the majority on 
others—they qualify their argument by asserting that such institutions “distribute those 
responsibilities left to government among separate, independent organs that represent 
alternative, crosscutting majorities” (Roeder 2005, 15). But, the different state organs 
under majoritarian systems will almost never represent alternative majorities in post-civil 
war societies! The assumption they make is too restrictive for theorizing about politics 
after civil wars. As they themselves point out, 
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When there are no significant issues where members of minority ethnic groups are 
members of the political majority and members of an ethnic majority are members of the 
political minority, this may be evidence that there is no nation that unites the ethnic 
groups. Here political cleavages are unidimensional, recurring, and cumulative. These are 
conditions in which partition [which is one level of consociational decentralization] is 
most likely to be a better solution than power dividing democracy (19). 
 
Yet, they go on to propose majoritarian systems as a global prescription.  
Not surprisingly, their primary empirical analyses turn out to be flawed. Roeder 
uses logit analysis to estimate the probability of escalation to “ethnonational crises” (i.e. 
not necessarily civil wars) in all ethnonational dyads (for which data is available) for nine 
successive five-year periods from 1955 to 1999. He admits, without realizing or 
discussing its implications, that “not all groups in this data set are at risk; the list is close 
to a complete listing of ethnic groups that cross the size threshold—whether they were at 
risk or not” (2005, 69). However, the very defining characteristic of post-civil war 
contexts, particularly those that did not end with military victories, is that the motives for 
insurgency and war were already present at some point and the adversaries were already 
mobilized with military capabilities. Incentive structures present in such circumstances 
are significantly different from those where the problem of collective action may or may 
not be overcome even if motives for insurgency were present. When the hurdle of 
mobilization is already overcome in a society with cumulative cleavages, majoritarian 
institutions are particularly unlikely to induce cooperation; power sharing arrangements, 
on the other hand, could provide all relevant parties with a stake in peace.  
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Consociational Power Sharing 
In response to what he terms “a well-established proposition in political science,” that it 
is difficult to create stable democratic systems in diverse societies, Lijphart identified and 
proposed “consociational democracy” as a system that could counteract “the centrifugal 
tendencies inherent in a plural society” (1977, 3).11 Many scholars and practitioners have 
since followed Lijphart’s footsteps in prescribing consociationalism as a medicine in 
preventing deadly conflicts in divided societies. Although he asserts that the essential 
feature of this system is “not so much any particular institutional arrangement as the 
deliberate joint effort by the elites to stabilize the system,” it is the institutional 
framework that shapes the incentives of elites and masses alike. It is, therefore, the 
crucial first step to identity the types of institutions that are most likely to motivate 
political behaviors compatible with consociationalism.  
“Consociational theory is plagued by serious conceptual problems … [and] the 
problem lies both in Lijphart’s empirical typology of democracies and in the presence of 
a complementary but incongruent normative typology,” Bogaards argued; the concept 
was originally proposed merely as a type of democracy based on what Lijphart observed 
in the Netherlands, but it was soon prescribed as the best type of democracy for divided 
societies without going through “proper concept formation” (Bogaards 2000, 395). The 
source of the problem, I argue, has been the failure to systematically identify 
consociational democracy or consociationalism as a specific set of institutions. Through 
theoretical modeling as well as empirical analyses, I illustrate how different political 
                                                 
11 Lijphart explains that he uses the term “plural” society to refer to societies that are divided by what Harry 
Eckstein identified as “segmental cleavages.” These cleavages may be religious, ideological, regional, 
linguistic, racial, ethnic, etc. in nature, and political and social groups tend to organize along whichever of 
these lines are salient in a society. This is basically what I refer to as cumulative cleavages.  
20  
 
  
institutions which provide rivals with contradictory incentives—power sharing 
institutions and veto points—have traditionally been conflated under the single concept 
of consociationalism. 
Lijphart identifies four principles as the core of consociationalism: (1) 
government by a grand coalition, (2) mutual veto, (3) proportionality, and (4) segmental 
autonomy (1977, 25-52). He also categorizes the major differences between majoritarian 
and consociational democracies along two main dimensions—executive-parties 
dimension and federal-unitary dimension (1999). He fails, however, to identify the 
institutions that can create these principles and the system qualities associated with them; 
he conflates formal institutions with their organizational outcomes.  
Grand coalition, which Lijphart identifies as the primary characteristic of 
consociationalism, refers to the inclusion in the governing coalition political leaders of all 
“significant” groups in a society. This is a crucial component of making parties feel that 
politics is not necessarily a zero-sum game, whereby the winner takes all and the loser 
ends up with his livelihood and security threatened—with no incentive to stick with the 
system and off the battlefield. Certain institutions enable and encourage governing in 
broad-based coalitions. A multiparty system and a parliament where no single party tends 
to control the majority of seats, as opposed to an effectively single- or two-party system, 
are primary preconditions. Following Duverger’s ‘Law’ that simple-majority elections 
favor two-party systems and the accompanying hypothesis that proportional 
representation (PR) elections favor multiparty systems (Duverger 1954), PR emerges as 
an important component of consociationalism. Also, parliamentary systems are more 
conducive of coalitions then systems with directly elected executives; governing cabinets 
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in the former need to be inclusive enough to guarantee support of the majority of the 
legislatures, while presidential systems in essence concentrate administrative power in 
the hands of a single person.12
Lijphart’s proportionality refers not only to the electoral system but also to the 
allocation of civil service appointments and public funds. According to this principle all 
segments are not only represented, but they are represented proportionally given their 
population shares; some variations promote even overrepresentation of minorities. All 
groups are given access to other state resources—jobs, military positions, and 
development funds, for instance—also in a proportional manner. This principle is a 
safeguard against the tyranny of the majority, which could in the absence of these 
measures monopolize government power and state resources, now only stripping other 
groups of any stakes in the given system but also rendering them totally vulnerable to 
abuse, if not worse, by those in power. While I do not specifically focus on 
proportionality and power sharing in arenas other than politics, Hartzell and Hoddie 
(2003) analyze effects of power sharing along four different dimensions—political, 
territorial, military and economic. They find that inclusion of power sharing along more 
dimensions decreases the likelihood of return to civil war; however, they do not go into 
the specifics of any one of these dimensions. 
There are two different mechanisms, with potentially different effects on war 
termination and post-war consolidation, through which proportionality could be achieved. 
Proportionality in political representation, which would bring coalition governments with 
it, is in many cases attained by instituting certain electoral rules that would encourage the 
                                                 
12 Exceptions to this rule occur when constitutions dictate collective presidencies, as was the case in the 
1960 constitution of Cyprus and has been in Bosnia-Hercegovina based on the Dayton Framework. 
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proliferation of small parties and the distribution of power among them. This would then 
play into the decisions of players regarding war versus the political system in question 
provided that they know how the electoral system will influence the distribution of seats. 
Institution of group quotas, on the other hand, has an effect on the distribution of power 
and proportionality that is a lot more direct, certain, and transparent. This could prove to 
be a significant difference particularly when political leaders need to convey to the 
masses the distributional effects of a proposed or existing political system.  
Provision of mutual veto rights, or requiring simultaneous majorities from all 
relevant segments in a society, further ensures that the preferences of the minority groups 
will not be overridden by majorities. These veto rights or super-majorities are required 
typically to legislate constitutional amendments—changes to the rules of the game. 
However, it is difficult to systematically code such provisions across different political 
systems since different states tend to have veto provisions and/or require different forms 
of super-majorities on different issues. I use the veto player structure, which is a more 
general measure of the number of players whose approvals are required for instituting 
policy or institutional changes, as a proxy for this provision. 
Finally, segmental autonomy refers to “the delegation of rule-making and rule-
application powers to the segments, together with the proportional allocation of 
government funds to each segment” (Lijphart 1977, 41). In other words, major groups in 
the society are given the right and the means to make and enforce the rules that deal with 
them specifically and exclusively, while issues of national importance—foreign policies, 
for instance—are handled by national authorities. This is similar to Daniel J. Elazar’s 
notion of federalism: “self-rule plus shared rule” (1987, 12). However, Lijphart’s idea of 
23  
 
  
segmental autonomy seems to extend beyond the traditional concept of federalism; it 
could include confederalism, with an even looser central control, as well as provisions for 
territorial autonomy, whereby the autonomous entities are only nominally linked to the 
central government. This is the most extreme case of power sharing; the whole state is in 
a way carved up, providing the different group with almost total control of their 
respective areas. 
 
Horowitz’s “Alternative” 
The most prominent opposition to Lijphart’s consociationalism has come from Donald 
Horowitz, who advanced his own alternative—the integrative approach—for dealing with 
ethnic conflict in democracies (Horowitz 1985). His contention lies primarily on a 
distinction he makes between elite-based and constituency-based approaches to conflict 
and moderation. He would argue that “consociationalism overestimates the deference 
communal groups pay to their leaders and underestimates the power and role of popular 
dissatisfaction with intergroup compromise” (Sisk 1996, 41). While Lijphart himself 
might have committed this fallacy, this does not necessarily render consociationalism—if 
appropriately defined and operationalized—useless. In the end, elites and their 
preferences are central to politics and political outcomes since they are instrumental in 
overcoming problems of collective action, whether it is for voting or for taking up arms. 
In order to focus on elite preferences and behavior, therefore, one need not assume that 
leaders represent the wishes of the members of their groups or that groups are unitary 
actors.  
24  
 
  
 Horowitz argues that institutions should induce “integration” across different 
segments or identity group rather than imposing institutional constraints, such as mutual 
vetoes. For this end, he proposes electoral systems that would reward moderate 
politicians who appeal across dominant cleavages. Regardless of how different the two 
approaches are made to sound, the only clear institutional difference relates to the 
electoral system. He promotes the alternative-vote and the single-transferable-vote 
systems, where voters rank all candidates running in single-member districts and multi-
member districts respectively, for providing motives for vote pooling—forming pre-
electoral alliances across different groups. Lijphart responds, however, by arguing that 
even if vote pooling is the answer to non-cooperative relations in diverse societies, 
variants of the PR system could also encourage vote pooling while providing minorities a 
good chance of independent representation at the same time (Lijphart 1991; also see Sisk 
1996, 61): candidates can form “electoral alliances” and join together in lists, or lists can 
join together in cartels—“apparentement” (Cox 1997, 41).  
 As I have previously argued, it is problematic to treat the saliency of certain social 
cleavages as a real indication of success or failure of conflict management, particularly if 
it is conceptualized in terms of peace duration or consolidation into a self-enforcing 
equilibrium. Ordeshook makes a similar point when he writes “Constitutions are 
necessarily limited documents, and to use them as a tool of social (as opposed to 
political) engineering can threaten their role as coordinating devices” (2002, 16). Given 
existing social cleavages and preference structures, in other words, constitutions or peace 
agreements can help players reach an equilibrium point where they are all better off than 
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fighting;13 they need not, and perhaps cannot, alter the cleavages and preferences. Who 
cares if Bosnians are still voting along ethnic lines as long as they manage to compete 
and settle their differences peacefully anyway?  
After all, in order to convince rivals to get off the battlefield any institutional 
framework must first satisfy the interests of those who still have the means to fight; 
otherwise, they would rather continue fighting until they either become victorious or are 
provided with better terms. This means that the institutions that are established need to 
empower existing divisions, groups, and leaders. The selection of institutions is 
unavoidably an endogenous process and only those institutions that provide good 
prospects of power for relevant war-time actors can garner the consent of warring parties 
and overcome the initial hurdles of credible commitment. The electoral system, which 
determines how political power will be distributed in the absence of independent quotas, 
plays a critical role as “the decisions by regime and rebel leaders alike to seek a 
democratic ‘exit’ from a conflict are based upon rational calculations of the possibilities 
and limitations inherent in playing the competitive electoral game versus continuing the 
armed conflict” (Shugart 1992, 121).   
 
Veto Players 
… [M]ost of the differences between regimes discussed in the traditional literature can be 
studied as differences in the number, ideological distances, and cohesion of the 
corresponding veto players as well as identity, preferences, and institutional powers of 
agenda setters (Tsebelis 2002, 67). 
 
                                                 
13 How institutions can help solve the problems of cooperation (as in the Prisoner’s Dilemma) and 
coordination (as in the Battle of the Sexes) is discussed in the next chapter.  
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Veto players, according to Tsebelis (2002, 2), are actors whose approval is needed to 
change a given policy; the power of these players could arise from institutional (such as 
the constitutional rights and obligations of executives or legislatures) as well partisan 
(different parties comprising a coalition government in a parliamentary system) factors. 
The identification of effective veto players comprises not just the counting of potential 
vetoers but also their ideological positions: if the same party controls both the presidency 
and legislature in a presidential system, for instance, these two potential veto players 
effectively become a single veto player, particularly if party discipline is strong.  
The overall configuration of veto players affect the size and composition of the 
set of outcomes that can replace the status quo—the winset of the status quo—and 
thereby the level of policy stability.14 Tsebelis (2002) hypothesizes that the larger the 
number of effective veto players, the smaller will be the winset, hence less likely it will 
be to change the status-quo.15 Following this logic, it can also be argued that 
constitutional rigidity, which can result from having too many veto players, can lead to 
regime instability. On the other hand, following the consociational approach as suggested 
by Lijphart, one would expect to find a positive relationship between the number of veto 
players—indicating more power sharing and a smaller probability for future institutional 
change—and post-civil war stability.  
                                                 
14 Tsebelis also emphasizes the importance of agenda-setters—“the specific veto players that present ‘take 
it or leave it’ proposals to the other veto players” (Tsebelis 2002, 2). The ultimate power to manipulate 
outcomes lies in the hands of the veto player who gets to propose legislation (i.e. agenda-setter)—the 
executive/the cabinet in parliamentary systems, and the legislature in presidential systems. 
15 One potentially major theoretical problem in Tsebelis’ study is his treatment of collective actors—
political parties, one-party cabinets, etc.—as individual actors. Based on Arrow’s Theorem, we know that a 
group of rational individual actors do not necessarily make rational (transitive and consistent) social 
choices. Tsebelis’ whole theory, however, is based on the assumption of rational political actors (he deals 
with this issue in Chapter 3 of this book). Given the critical role group leaders play in mobilizing collective 
action (i.e. insurgencies and war) in post-civil war politics, and that the individual preferences of group 
members start to reflect deep social cleavages invoked and manipulated by those leaders, Tsebelis’ 
treatment should not pose any fundamental problems, particularly for this study.   
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The Plan 
Given that one of the key contributions of this research is the bridging of the gap between 
the microfoundations and the macro-political phenomena of civil war and peace, a formal 
model of institutional bargaining among civil war rivals immediately follows this 
introduction. With this model, I illustrate how and why political institutions figure into 
the strategic decision making of players when they are faced with a choice between a 
negotiated settlement, which would in essence mean compromise, and continued fighting. 
This approach reveals a major flaw in the concept of consociationalism as it was defined 
by Lijphart and endorsed by many others ever since: It conflates different political 
institutions—power sharing institutions and veto points—that provide players with 
conflicting incentives. This theoretical finding is confirmed with the results of the 
duration analyses I present in Chapter 6. 
 Chapter 3 presents a detailed account of the dynamics of war and settlement 
negotiations in Bosnia-Hercegovina. The primary goal of this case study is to illustrate 
the empirical validity of my theoretical model. It captures a unique point in time when 
compromise on a mutually acceptable set of political institutions had to be reached, not 
only to stop the violence but also to keep the internationally recognized state intact. It 
confirms the importance of power sharing and veto power guarantees in appeasing a 
minority that is capable of waging an effective armed opposition. Perhaps more 
importantly, however, it reveals that the acceptability of any given arrangement is not 
independent of the particular context at the time (i.e. the situation on the battlefield and 
the political costs each player expects to incur if it agrees to a settlement). This 
conclusion is also supported by the account of negotiations and conflict in Macedonia: in 
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both cases, institutional frameworks that failed to stop the conflict at certain points in 
time later became mutually acceptable as conditions and expectations from continued 
conflict changed.  
 Chapter 4 includes accounts of institutional bargaining and conflict in Kosovo and 
Macedonia, as well as a comparative analysis of these two cases and Bosnia-
Hercegovina. The underlying cause driving conflict in all three of these cases was the 
same: fear by minority groups of being permanently disadvantaged once the authoritarian 
power sharing mechanisms imposed under Tito were taken away. Therefore, while the 
extent of minority demands were different, power sharing, minority veto rights, and 
decentralization—albeit in different formats and degrees—quickly emerged as critical 
components of any proposal that even had the change of reaching the negotiation table in 
all three cases. In addition to the legacy of Yugoslavia, they shared similarities in 
structural and contextual characteristics, such as ethnic diversity and economic 
conditions. Nevertheless, the results of negotiations differed significantly, leading to an 
intriguing puzzle: Why was it possible to forestall war in Macedonia with an agreement 
that was much less generous to the minority than the Dayton Peace Accords in Bosnia, 
while no level of power sharing could be found to simultaneously satisfy both rivals at 
any point during the conflict in Kosovo?      
 In designing the case studies, I follow the Analytical Narratives approach (Bates 
et al. 1998) in that an underlying theoretical model motivates my analyses and shapes the 
accounts I present. The narratives of how the game is played in different cases with 
largely similar contextual characteristics then provide critical insights, which lead me to 
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refine the statistical models I use for empirical testing, confirming the following 
argument: 
At least in the world of strategic behavior, we have learned, theory with narrative is 
stronger than theory alone. And narrative with theory is more powerful than narrative 
alone. Analytic narratives offer a method for moving from context-rich world of events 
and cases to explanations that are logically rigorous, illuminating and insightful, and, if 
handled with care, subject to empirical testing (Bates et al. 1998, 236). 
In the absence of a systematically applied theoretical framework, these insights would 
have been lost in the wealth of information available for each of these stories.   
 In Chapter 5, I discuss the merits of duration modeling as the optimal method of 
quantitative analysis for the question under investigation in this study. Given that it has 
only recently found a place in political science research, I provide the reader with a fairly 
detailed introduction to the method, with further references when necessary. In describing 
the dataset, I also emphasize issues of case selection and dependent variable 
operationlization, both of which are typically overlooked in quantitative, large-N studies. 
This discussion on the key decisions researchers make—in choosing the method of 
analysis, the cases to study, and the operationalization of variables of interest—and the 
implications of these decisions, which I test and report in Chapter 6, are important 
contributions of this study. 
 Finally, Chapter 6 presents the results of the survival analyses I ran on all post-
civil war cases since 1945. These findings represent the exogenous institutions 
component of this research, and the complement my conclusions from the cases studies, 
which focus more on why and what types of institutions are most likely to be established 
and sustained in diverse, conflict-ridden societies. I arrive at two main conclusions 
regarding the effects of certain political institutions: while territorial decentralization of 
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political power emerges as the only form of power sharing that reduces the risk of failure 
once a civil war is terminated, the number of veto points in the post-war system is 
significantly and positively proportional to the hazard rate. Although it contradicts 
expectations from the consociationalist perspective, this latter point is in fact congruent 
with the predictions I extend following the theoretical model presented in Chapter 2.        
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2. Theoretical Framework: Unraveling Consociational Democracy 
 
For societies embroiled in civil wars, an effective post-conflict political system must 
convince rivals to not only stop fighting but also stay off the battlefield and committed to 
peace once they demobilize. Consolidation of peace requires that all relevant players 
have a stake in its preservation, particularly when juxtaposed with their expectations from 
continued or renewed fighting. Power sharing institutions do just that. When a society is 
divided into a majority and one or more minority groups, and this division is politically 
salient, which is always the case following civil wars that pit these groups against each 
other, majoritarian democracy poses the threat of permanent exclusion and subjugation 
for minorities. It no longer is a system of “organized uncertainty” (Przeworski 1991); 
instead, it threatens to create “elective dictatorships” (Lijphart 1999, 12). Ex-ante 
guarantees of a share of the pie, on the other hand, can provide all players, particularly 
the minorities, with the motivation to lay down arms and stay loyal to the system.  
Power sharing institutions have received the attention of many scholars studying 
the termination of civil wars and post-civil war stability (Hartzell et al. 2001; Hartzell and 
Hoddie 2003; Lake and Rothchild 1996; Licklider 1993; Walter 1999, 2002). After all, 
the distribution of power and state resources is at the heart of civil conflicts: “That is, 
ultimately, what the war has been about. People are willing to fight and die over it 
because they know it will determine their future and that of their children” (Licklider 
2001, 706). Consociationalism—conceived by Lijphart back in 1960s and endorsed by 
many scholars and practitioners ever since—is a specific form of power sharing which is 
supposed to work particularly well in post-civil war environments, where political 
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preferences tend to strictly follow rigid social cleavages along which the war was fought. 
Consociational power sharing recognizes rival sub-national groups (e.g. ethnic, religious, 
tribal, ideological) as the building blocks of a society and promotes cooperation and 
power sharing among them. Political institutions that are conducive to such co-existence 
range from certain electoral systems (such as proportional representation—PR), which 
merely facilitate the representation of all relevant groups, to those that require ex-ante 
that all groups are represented in different state bodies according to given formulas (such 
as ethnic quotas for legislative seats). This is in contrast to Horowitz’ approach, which 
advocates institutions (such as the alternative vote system) that would ideally induce 
“integration” across different groups and shift alliances, rather than impose constraints 
based on existing cleavages.  
Despite the attention it has attracted, the concept of consociational power sharing 
has been poorly developed. The problem goes back to Lijphart, who initially introduced 
the concept as a descriptive type of democracy—“deviant cases of fragmented but stable 
democracies will be called ‘consociational democracies’” (1969, 211)—and argued that 
“the essential characteristic of consociational democracy is not so much any particular 
institutional arrangement as the deliberate joint effort by the elites to stabilize the system” 
(213).  However, institutions interact with given individual preferences, including those 
that might reflect prominent social cleavages (i.e. ethnic/religious/tribal identities), to 
determine individual behavior and social outcomes. Lijphart further presupposed that the 
key to consociational power sharing would be “a willingness on the part of elites to 
cooperate” (218), in essence making the tautological argument that countries such as the 
Netherlands, Belgium, and Switzerland were able to establish sustainable democracies 
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despite being fragmented because elites wanted to cooperate. The ultimate question is 
why they wanted to cooperate. In his later work he did explore institutional 
commonalities in such democracies (1999) but failed to distinguish between formal 
institutions on the one hand and their behavioral and organizational results on the other.  
As the formal model below and the empirical analyses in the following chapters 
illustrate, consociationalism as Lijphart defined it conflates in a single concept different 
political institutions—power sharing institutions and veto points—that provide players 
with divergent incentives. The veto player structure (Tsebelis 2002) determines how and 
in what direction the initial power distribution rivals agree to can be altered through 
legitimate mechanisms once the systems takes hold.16 Players recognize the extent to 
which the rules of the game are malleable and they take this possibility into account when 
estimating their future payoffs. In the end, therefore, what determines the overall value of 
peace is a combination of the initial power distribution and how that can later be 
manipulated without resorting to war. For example, the easier and more likely it is to 
change the system (i.e. the smaller the number of veto points) to the disadvantage of a 
given group, the more insistent it will be on securing the highest possible share at the 
start and the more favorably it will consider alternative methods (i.e. insurgency or war) 
for preserving, if not furthering, its share of power after the system is established. 
                                                 
16 Note the lengthy discussion on Tsebelis’ veto players model in Chapter 1. The veto player structure 
provides an alternative form of classification for different types of political systems—alternative to the 
traditional, and mostly problematic, dichotomies of parliamentary vs. presidential, two-party vs. multiparty, 
etc. In my quantitative analysis, I use the number of veto points/players to specify political systems in an 
alternative model; I also use the number of veto points as a proxy for veto rights prescribed by Lijphart. It 
should be noted, however, that the two are not synonymous; although Lijphart’s veto rights would by 
definition translate into Tsebelis’ veto players—those actors whose approval is required to enact a 
policy/institutional change—not every veto player would constitute a minority veto (a critical component of 
mutual veto) as Lijphart (1977) originally envisaged. In his later work, however, Lijphart (1999) 
generalized this veto concept into what he called “constitutional rigidity,” which corresponds directly with 
Tsebelis’ veto structure—the higher the number of veto points, the more constitutional rigidity there will 
be.   
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Similarly, a player might more readily accept limited power sharing if it is accompanied 
with extensive veto rights, knowing that whatever it secures as a precondition for leaving 
the battlefield will not be easily taken away.  
Regardless of the exact form or extent of power sharing, how can parties ever 
trust rivals, whom they have been fighting, to lay down arms and honor their so-called 
guarantees or promises to share power? If war is to stop short of total victory by one side, 
adversaries must at some point demobilize and disarm, or merge their forces under joint 
control, which makes those who genuinely demobilize totally vulnerable to those who 
might choose to exploit the compliance of their rivals. This kind of opportunistic 
behavior can be effectively avoided by deploying third-party enforcers (e.g. 
peacekeepers) through the initial stages. 
To end a civil war through a negotiated settlement, the combatants must clear a much 
higher hurdle: designing credible guarantees on the terms of the agreement—a task made 
difficult without outside assistance. . . . The greatest challenge is to design a treaty that 
convinces the combatants to shed their partisan armies and surrender conquered territory 
even though such steps will increase their vulnerability and limits their ability to enforce 
the treaty’s other terms. Groups that obtain third-party security guarantees for the 
treacherous demobilization period following the signing of an agreement, and internal 
political, military, or territorial guarantees, will implement their settlements (Walter 
1999, 128). 
The positive effect of deploying third-party enforcers has been repeatedly confirmed 
through various empirical studies (Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Hartzell and Hoddie 2003; 
Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild 2001; Walter 1997, 1999). 
Reliance on outside enforcement, however, can only be a temporary solution. In the end, 
any post-war arrangement has to be self-enforcing if stability and sustainable coexistence 
are to be attained. In other words, absent external shocks, consolidation of peace requires 
that it be in the interest of all relevant players to stick to the system even after the 
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peacekeepers leave. In order for this to happen, not only must each player have 
something to gain by continuing to play by the rules, but they must also perceive as 
credible the commitments of others to do the same. Internal mechanisms must be 
designed into the post-war institutional framework to convince players of each other’s 
long-term commitments; otherwise, faced with the threat of being stripped of all power, if 
not of the means to survive, the vulnerable party might instead choose to continue 
fighting or initiate a new preemptive civil war. 
 Significant decentralization or territorial autonomy might be one way of internally 
instilling this sense of security. By devolving exclusive authority over certain decision-
making areas to the subunits, the majority can prove to the minority its willingness to 
share power.  
By increasing the influence of policymakers at the subnational level while diminishing 
the powers of policymakers at the center, groups should gain an increased sense that they 
possess a means of protecting themselves from the exercise of central authority. This is 
particularly likely to be true when the powers of the subunits extend to their own 
judiciaries and police forces, for these often serve to augment groups’ feelings of 
autonomous capacity (Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild 2001, 191). 
Similarly, another move that signals credible commitment to peace is the “integration of 
the antagonists’ armed forces or a decentralized and federated command structure for the 
armed forces” (Wantchekon 2000, 346). In other words, either reserve every player a 
significant voice in commanding the coercive capabilities of the state, or institute a 
decentralized command structure that allows each group to preserve its own capabilities 
within certain territorial boundaries. 
The veto structure of a post-war political system plays a crucial role in signaling 
the credibility of commitments, or lack thereof, to the initial arrangement of power 
distribution. Some actors might count on minimal veto points for increasing their 
respective shares in the future; others would see resistance to the institution of veto 
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opportunities (e.g. minority veto rights, super-majority or concurrent majority 
requirements) as signs of intent to later renege on power sharing commitments. In 
particular, the higher the number of veto points, the more credible the majority’s 
commitment will be perceived to be by minorities. Conditions for constitutional 
amendments and decisions concerning “vital interests,” therefore, occupy center stage in 
most settlement negotiations among civil war rivals. Following case study chapters 
confirm this. 
At this point Lijphart’s idea of consociationalism unravels: He associates more 
power sharing (e.g. proportional representation in governing coalitions as well as other 
state bodies) and minority veto rights with consociational democracy, thereby arguing 
that both are positively associated with stability in diverse societies. While maximizing 
both is certainly the ideal scenario for minorities, peace under these terms become an 
inferior outcome for the majority, who tends to view consociationalism as hindrance to 
how democracies should function—“constrained” versus “full” democracy (Rothchild 
and Roeder 2005, 7).  
Majority leaders cannot sell to their constituencies a system which not only 
guarantees their rivals power they would not have had access to under a “full” democracy 
but also makes it infeasible to change these terms in the future. On the other hand, unable 
to count on increasing its shares through regular electoral mechanisms once the system 
takes hold, minorities try to secure the largest possible share at the onset. They also 
perceive the majority’s willingness to consent to a rigid framework (i.e. high number of 
veto points) as an indication of the credibility of the latter’s commitment to share power 
even after the minorities demobilize and the threat of insurgency or war subsides. There 
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has to be a tradeoff, however, as the majority cannot credibly commit to a system that 
both maximizes the minority’s share and minimizes the potential for future change to the 
majority’s advantage—unless the latter was seriously besieged on the battlefield, in 
which case the minority should have no reason to settle anyway.   
 
Model of Institutional Bargaining Among Civil War Rivals 
 
Political institutions, due to their distributional effects, shape individual incentives and, as 
a result, political behavior and outcomes—continued or renewed war versus peace and 
coexistence. They themselves, however, are the products of political and social 
circumstances, particularly the distribution of power on the battlefield, as they are 
strategically chosen by the relevant actors of the time. In other words, institutions are 
endogenously selected.17 “If the relation of forces are known ex ante to be uneven,” for 
instance, “the institutions ratify this relation and are stable only as long as the original 
conditions prevail” (Przeworski 1991, 82); this is why post-war political institutions (e.g. 
the electoral system) tend to favor prominent war-time actors—otherwise, there will be 
problems of credible commitment. Why would any player who dominates on the 
battlefield commit to a settlement that puts it at a permanent disadvantage instead of 
fighting it out? 
                                                 
17 This does not necessarily mean, however, that institutional effects are therefore also endogenous—that 
they exactly and directly reflect the preferences of players who were involved in their design—which 
would render the study of institutions as explanatory variables theoretically problematic. “Institutional 
endogeneity must not be viewed as an overwhelming obstacle to discovering independent institutional 
effects, because, in theory as well as in many instances of practical design, the extent of ex-ante 
manipulability of final outcomes is quite limited” (Shvetsova 2003, 192). The presence of incomplete 
information (which is a reasonable assumption particularly in post-war societies where the whole social 
structure and the state are in a major transition) about the rest of the variables (i.e. the social context), 
which interact with formal rules to determine the macro-political phenomena we could observe, implies 
that the ultimate consequences as well as the players’ preferences over these outcomes will differ from the 
ex-ante preferences reflected in institutional designs (194). 
 38
  
Many institutional proposals prove unacceptable to one or more rivals at the onset 
and are hence eliminated at the selection stage, which makes them and their political 
consequences unobservable in a systematic manner. Developing a formal account of the 
whole process—from the time of war to the consolidation of peace—allows me to 
explicitly model the elimination as well as the adoption of proposed political institutions. 
The case studies in the following chapters help illustrate the differences between 
institutions that won the consent of all relevant players and those that failed to survive 
even the initial stages of institutional selection. They also allow me to establish the 
missing link between the empirical observations of “macro-political phenomena” and 
“the microfoundations” of political behavior (Weingast 2002, 660-692). Earlier studies 
on institutions in post-civil war contexts or diverse societies in general have relied almost 
exclusively on cross-sectional patterns of war and peace to extrapolate the effects of 
particular institutions. 
The model in Figure 1 illustrates a one-shot game of institutional bargaining 
between two civil war rivals at a given point during a war; every different offer and every 
different time point constitute a different game with essentially the same format but 
potentially different preferences. The players have no control over which one dominates 
the area (state) under dispute in terms of the population.18 Demographic distribution is 
determined by the initial move by Nature, the result of which becomes common 
knowledge and it does directly affect how each player assesses the utilities of different  
 
                                                 
18 It is not inconceivable for the distribution to change due to “cleansing” (ethnic or otherwise) as part of 
the war but that is not modeled here, except potentially as part of what the rivals expect to get from 
continued fighting. If the population shares were to change dramatically, preferences would significantly 
change and a new game would emerge. Figure 1 represents a one-shot game that reflects the circumstances 
present at a given point in time.  
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Figure 2.1 Institutional Bargaining Among Two Civil War Rivals 
 
 
 
political systems. Either the majority or the minority can move first to make an offer or to 
respond to one extended by third-parties, making a choice between a power sharing and a 
majoritarian political system,19 leaving the next player with two options—cooperate or 
reject. Power sharing systems might either include institutions that are expected to induce 
power sharing (e.g. PR elections) or specific provisions that guarantee different the 
different groups reserved representation within the state apparatus (e.g. ethnic quotas in 
the executive and the legislature of the state of Bosnia and Hercegovina).   
In representing the rivals as two individual players I assume neither collective 
rationality nor that the rival social groups, two ethnic groups for instance, are unitary 
actors. A and B are the individuals who represent the respective groups at the negotiation 
table. These individuals, who have the last word during negotiations, are usually also the 
leaders who play a critical role in mobilizing their groups.20 Leaders organize, pool 
                                                 
19 Either way I assume that any system negotiated is consistent with electoral democracy. 
20 Excluding representatives of the fighting parties from negotiations or the final decision makes little sense 
since it is those leaders who need to be convinced to lay down arms and demobilize people; commitments 
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resources, enforce contracts, and provide selective incentives (both punishments and side-
payments) to facilitate mobilization; otherwise, groups cannot effectively mobilize to 
participate in collective violence. 
They face a Rebel’s Dilemma. Dissidents seek a public good of either capturing the state 
or forcing the existing authorities to redress their grievances. Rational dissidents will not 
voluntarily contribute to this public good. Unless free riding is overcome, however, the 
rebels are in a Prisoner’s Dilemma. No potential dissident will become an actual 
dissident; none will assist in either overturning the state or forcing the state to redress 
grievances (Lichbach 1995, xii).  
 
These leaders are then typically the ones who make critical decisions that pertain to war 
and peace. They most likely take into account the preferences of their constituencies, 
which they also play a role in shaping; wars provide opportunistic leaders with powerful 
common memories, concerns, and fears, which they invoke to promote in-group loyalties 
to preserve existing alignments and to mobilize fighters or political followers.    
 As shown in the upper half of the game in Figure 1, the subgame that starts with 
A making the initial bargaining move as the majority can end with two different peace 
and two different war outcomes. If A offers or endorses a third-party offer of power 
sharing and B reciprocates with a cooperative move, the war ends and a political system 
                                                                                                                                                 
made by others to do so are simply not credible. One case where this was tried was during the Northern 
Ireland negotiation process, where the rebel leaders and their political representatives were excluded from 
the process for years. Negotiations became meaningful and a comprehensive agreement was reached in 
1998, only after Gerry Adams representing the Sinn Fein, and the IRA indirectly, entered negotiations.  An 
exceptional case where third parties made a conscious and potentially ingenious effort to bypass 
uncompromising leaders was the Cyprus Reunification Referenda of 2004. UN Secretary General Kofi 
Annan had announced during the last phase of negotiations that he would be submitting the comprehensive 
framework he formulated directly to the two communities in separate referenda if no agreement was 
reached between the leaders until a certain deadline. In the end, community leaders failed to cooperate but 
settlement through referenda failed as well: the plan was overwhelmingly approved by the Turkish Cypriot 
community but overwhelmingly rejected by the Greek Cypriot community, confirming the public stances 
of their respective leaders at the time.    
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with power sharing provisions is established.21 If, however, the majority settles for a 
power sharing framework but the minority rejects, the result is continued war—war 
without-face (W1); A loses face before its constituency for capitulating and B loses face 
for turning down an offer which many would see as the best scenario for the minority 
short of unilateral victory.22 On the other hand, if the majority proposes a majoritarian 
institutional framework and the minority rejects this, the outcome is again continued war 
but with different payoffs—war with face (W2); the majority avoids the political cost of 
capitulation by insisting on its ultimate goal, which also saves the minority from 
appearing too uncompromising when it rejects the offer. Finally, the war ends and a 
majoritarian political system (P2) is established if B gives into A’s demands for a 
majoritarian settlement—an outcome with major political costs for B. 
Similarly, four different outcomes are possible when the minority moves first (as 
in the lower subgame that starts with A’s choice node). If A extends or accepts a proposal 
of power sharing and B rejects this offer, continued war is the outcome (war with face, 
W3); both of these moves can be seen as face-saving strategies given that A refuses to 
deviate from the most preferred outcome for its constituency and B chooses not to 
surrender. If B accepts A’s offer, then the outcome is the cessation of hostilities and a 
post-war political system based on a power sharing framework (P3). If A supports a 
majoritarian system to get off the battlefield and B cooperates, the result is peace with 
majoritarian political institutions, which are to permanently disadvantage the minority 
                                                 
21 I assume that the initial problem of credibility of commitment to demobilize is resolved through the 
presence of third-party enforcers and/or simultaneous demobilization and withdrawal by rivals.  
22 Although a constituency supporting continued war as an end in itself is almost certain to be present 
among both groups, any group that rejects what appears to be a good or fair deal, thereby appearing 
responsible for the continuation of war, always faces criticism, and loss of sympathy and 
diplomatic/political support internally and externally; this is the case especially when the other side appears 
to have made a major concession. 
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group (P4); making such an offer carries major political costs—cost of capitulation—for 
A. Both parties lose face if the minority endorses a majoritarian offer and the majority 
still refuses to stop fighting (war without face, W4).   
I assume that war without face (W1 or W4) is the worst possible outcome for both 
players. In addition to the costs of war, they suffer the political cost of appearing either 
too weak (i.e. when the minority endorses a majoriatian system or when the majority 
supports power sharing) or too uncompromising (i.e. when the majority rejects a 
majoritarian offer or when the minority rejects power sharing after the other capitulates). 
The most preferred outcome for the majority is securing the minority’s agreement on a 
majoritarian system, which essentially translates into victory absent the additional costs 
of continued fighting. The outcome with the highest payoff for the minority, on the other 
hand, could either be power sharing peace or continued war with face, depending on the 
specifics of the institutional framework on the table as well as the expected utility it 
associates with war. Even if taking full or partial control of the state apparatus is not the 
minority’s primary motivation per se, if they were demanding a policy change for 
instance, the more chance the group has to directly participate in policymaking, the more 
likely its grievances or demands would be addressed.  
By creating permanent majorities, majoritarian democracies inherently 
disadvantage and exclude minorities (i.e. the group which constitutes majority in terms of 
the population consistently wins). This is particularly true when the social divisions are 
cumulative and salient, which is the case as societies emerge from civil wars that pitted 
the different groups against each other. How much a power sharing system avoids the 
tyranny of the majority depends on the level of sharing envisaged in a particular 
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institutional framework.23 The distributional specifics of any given power sharing 
proposal then determine the utilities different players attach to peace that would be based 
on that system. 
Under what conditions would the rivals reach self-enforcing peace? To answer 
this question, I focus separately on the two major subgames that follow Nature’s move. 
Using the principle of backwards induction, I explore the conditions under which some 
form of peace would constitute Nash equilibrium for each subgame (i.e. no player has an 
incentive to deviate from unilaterally).24 I start at the terminal nodes of peace and 
examine the conditions that would induce B to choose peace over continued war. I then 
work backwards through earlier nodes, which corresponds to A’s decision on which type 
of institutional framework to endorse. Each player is assumed to be capable of predicting 
what the other player will do at subsequent nodes. Hence A knows the can anticipate the 
consequence of each possible move by foreseeing B’s reaction and it acts strategically by 
taking this information into account. 
In order for the rivals to reach and stick to P1, in order for P1 to be subgame 
perfect equilibrium in other words, the expected utility B attaches to peace under those 
power sharing terms must outweigh the net value it attaches to continued fighting: 
( ) ( )BB WEUPEU 11 f      (1) 
A must perceive this to be the case for B as well. Power sharing peace (P1) is not the 
minority’s first preference by default. Every institutional detail embodied in a settlement 
offer could have important distributional consequences, thereby affecting both parties’ 
                                                 
23 A power-sharing system approximates a majoritarian system as the share of resources the minority is 
likely to get approaches 0. 
24 Using backwards induction one can eliminate any Nash equilibria that would not be subgame perfect by 
requiring that players make optimal choices at each node, thereby eliminating threats or other signals that 
are not credible.   
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assessments. In fact, a power sharing system approximates a majoritarian system as the 
share of resources the minority is likely to get approaches 0. The value B attaches to any 
given peace offer then depends on the share it expects to get as well as the costs it 
associates with bargaining and making the deal; since the share it secures can vary 
significantly, there will always be a part of its constituency that demands more and 
challenges the decision to lay down arms in favor of any given institutional framework.  
Generalizing for both players, the expected utility from a given power sharing 
settlement can be represented as follows: 
( ) ( ) ( )iPii PCpxPEU 1.1 −Δ+=      (2) 
where i denotes the player. ( )Δ+ .px is the value a player attaches to the share it gets 
initially  plus any future change to the initial distribution ( )x ( )Δ , which it expects to 
materialize through legitimate channels (e.g. constitutional change) with the probability 
of p. This probability is a direct function of the veto player structure embodied in the 
institutional framework; the change anticipated could be positive or negative.25  
is the political cost (i.e. cost of bargaining/capitulation/surrender) the player attaches to 
this particular settlement.  
( )iPPC 1
In this case, war for both players is war without face. The majority always faces 
political costs when it appears to be giving in by making a power sharing offer; this cost 
is multiplied when this concession is not reciprocated by the minority, who then also 
faces political costs associated with rejecting what could be a good offer. The utility each 
expects to get were B to reject a power sharing offer is: 
                                                 
25 For the mere reason of parsimony, I assume no discounting.  
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y represents the resources each player anticipates to secure after it achieves military 
victory, to which it attaches a probability of q. is the net value of 
resources it expects to accumulate in the meantime (i.e. until the time of victory or the 
next opportunity to settle); G
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F represents the additional gains (e.g. territorial advances, 
arbitrary expropriations of private property or natural resources), while CF stands for the 
costs associated with continued fighting (e.g. financial costs, casualties, destruction of 
property).  is the political cost each player attaches to the situation where A 
makes the power sharing offer and B refuses to settle.  
( iWPC 1
If A anticipates Condition (1) to hold true, it would expect the outcome of 
endorsing a power sharing deal to be P1. Although majoritarian peace (P2) is the most 
preferred outcome for A, if it expects insisting on a majoritarian settlement to result in 
continued fighting (W2), it is essentially faced with a choice between P1 and W2. It 
chooses to support power sharing when its expected utility from P1 exceeds that from 
W2:  
( ) ( )AA WEUPEU 21 f      (4) 
Assuming that continuing the fight remains an option for the minority (given its military 
capabilities and mobilization success) and that assenting to a majoritarian settlement 
constitutes surrender with crippling political costs, P1 becomes subgame perfect 
equilibrium when conditions (1) and (4) are true.  
P2, on the other hand, becomes a self-enforcing outcome only when the minority 
loses capacity to fight and/or it only demands some policy change which the majority can 
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credibly commit to as part of a majoritarian offer. If A as the majority insists on 
establishing a majoritarian system and moves first, leaving B to react to that offer, the 
latter has to make a choice between laying off its arms in favor of a majoritarian political 
system (P2) and continued fighting with the goal of securing a better deal (W2).26 For B, 
cooperating with A in this case not only takes away any chance of getting a share of the 
pie but also incurs major political costs associated with entering an agreement that would 
be seen as total surrender (i.e. cost of capitulation). B can avoid this cost and maintain 
some possibility of victory or a power sharing settlement in the future if it rejects the 
offer and continues to fight.  
The choice B makes when confronted with A’s majoritarian demands depends 
primarily on the probability it attaches to success on the battlefield and the net value of 
resources/costs it expects to accumulate until the time of that success. While civil wars 
are necessarily costly for all parties involved—perhaps for civilians more than the 
leaderships—arbitrary expropriations of private property given the lack of law and order 
is also common.27 In addition to any opportunistic gains, players might count on 
continued fighting to improve their standing on the battlefield, particularly through 
territorial gains, hoping that this will also improve their standing at the negotiating table 
even if they cannot secure a total military victory. Therefore, B takes into account not 
only the costs in terms of human casualties and financial losses, but also the variety of 
benefits it could reap from continued fighting (including the reputation of standing strong 
                                                 
26 A making a majoritarian offer in this case is synonymous to saying “I am not making any concessions; 
either surrender or we will keep fighting.” 
27 Leaderships can also take control of extractable natural resources to fund the war (such as the use of 
diamonds in Angola), as well as to boost their individual wealth. Collier and Hoeffler (2002), and Doyle 
and Sambanis (2000) show that natural resource wealth (of a country) is positively associated with the 
probability of experiencing civil wars; presence of resources that rebel entrepreneurs (Lichbach 2000) can 
easily prey on not only increases the funds they can utilize for mobilizing people but also provides an 
added incentive to incite and continue civil violence. 
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against an uncompromising majority). Because a majoritarian framework offers the 
minority essentially nothing in terms of power and resources and threatens to isolate it 
permanently, B would always reject a majoritarian settlement unless continued fighting is 
too costly and offers little chance of improvement in the near future—unless it is ready to 
unconditionally surrender. 
The payoffs players associate with the different outcomes depend on the first 
move by Nature. If A was to call for a power sharing settlement in the lower subgame, 
for instance, any political cost B attaches to that agreement would be much higher than it 
would be if it represented the minority instead. Hence,  
( ) ( ) ( )BPBB PCrzPEU 3.3 −+= δ     (5) 
and 
( ) ( )BPBP PCPC 13 f       (6) 
However, the most preferred outcome is still majoritarian peace (P4) for the majority (B) 
and it could be either war with face (W3) or power sharing peace (P3) for the minority 
(A).   
When the minority moves first and endorses a majoritarian settlement, it 
anticipates the outcome to be P4 (majority’s first ranked preference), which carries 
enormous political costs of capitulation for A. If it calls for power sharing, on the other 
hand, the outcome could be either P3 or W3 (war with face). The initial choice A makes 
then depends on what it expects B to do given these two options. In order for B to choose 
to cooperate with A’s power sharing offer, it must be the case that 
( ) ( )BB WEUPEU 33 f      (7) 
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where  has the same form as Equation (3). If A anticipated this condition to be 
true, it would certainly choose to endorse that particular power sharing framework over a 
majoritarian settlement since the following are by definition true when A is the minority 
and B is the majority: 
( )BWEU 3
( ) ( )AA PEUPEU 43 f      (8) 
and 
( ) ( )BB WEUPEU 44 f .     (9) 
This also means that A can manipulate the outcome by tweaking the institutional 
details of any offer it brings to the table; either player moving first has the advantage of 
manipulating the distributional consequences and the political costs associated with any 
given settlement proposal, thereby not only anticipating but also affecting the next 
player’s move.  
 
Providing the Minority with a Stake in Peace 
 
Whether some form of peace emerges as an equilibrium outcome from a given round of 
institutional bargaining depends on both the distributional features of the proposed post-
war system and the conditions on the battlefield. A majoritarian system, by definition, 
minimizes for the minority the amount of resources it is promised (i.e. n 
Equation (2) goes to 0) and maximizes the political costs attached to accepting that 
settlement (i.e.  as in Equation (3) is maximized). Therefore, when a majoritarian 
offer is on the table, the minority’s response is determined almost exclusively by what it 
expects to achieve from continued fighting; particular institutional details are mostly 
( )Bpx Δ+ .  i
( BPPC 2 )
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irrelevant. Therefore, holding other things constant, settlements based on power sharing 
are more likely than those based on majoritarian institutions to lead to stable peace. 
 Focusing again on the subgame where A is the majority, and using backwards 
induction from terminal node P1, in order for a power sharing system to become an 
equilibrium point—a self-enforcing outcome—the following must be the case: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( BWvt
t
BtFFBBPB PCCGyqPCpx 1
1
1 .. ∑=
=
−−−−Δ+ f )
)
  (10) 
where the left-hand side represents B’s expected utility from cooperating with A on that 
given power sharing settlement and on the right is B’s expected utility from rejecting that 
offer.  would be a direct function of the institutional framework endorsed by 
A, who can manipulate that value to elicit a certain response from B. The higher the level 
of power sharing envisaged by a system, the higher will be the utility a minority attaches 
to that system—a function of not only a higher 
( Bpx Δ+ .
( )Bpx Δ+ .  but also a lower ( ) . 
Holding everything else constant, this would make it more likely for B to accept and stick 
to a settlement. 
BPPC 1
 If A anticipates Condition (10) to be true for B for a given power sharing offer 
(which may have been introduced by A or by third parties), it would need to choose 
between supporting that particular framework and insisting on a majoritarian system. If it 
expected B to cooperate on a majoritarian settlement offer and choose P2 over W2, 
endorsing power sharing would become an irrelevant strategy since P2 is A’s most 
preferred outcome. Assuming that it expects B to choose W2 over P2, however, it would 
offer to settle for power sharing only if 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( AWvt
t
AtFFAAPA PCCGyqPCpx 2
1
1 .. ∑=
=
−−−−Δ+ f )   (11) 
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The more power sharing is guaranteed or institutionally induced by a system, the lower 
will be the utility A expects from that settlement but higher will be the value B attaches 
to the same settlement. Therefore, although some form of power sharing is required to 
make B choose settlement over continued war, it also needs to be limited enough to 
provide A with an optimal amount of power and resources, as well as minimize the 
political cost of capitulation it stands to suffer.   
 
Power Sharing-Veto Points Tradeoff 
 
When assessing the value of any given power sharing system, players consider not only 
the initial shares they expect to secure as a function of key institutional variables (e.g. 
electoral rules) or are guaranteed ex-ante, but also the probability that this arrangement 
could be changed in the future. Every political system allows for institutional change 
through legitimate mechanisms; the ease by which such change occurs depends on the 
number of veto players—individuals/organizations whose approval is required to institute 
change—embodied in that system. Generalizing Conditions (10) and (11) to any player, 
in order for a power sharing arrangement to be agreed upon as a basis for settlement, the 
following must be the case.28
( ) ( ) ( )iiPi WEUPCpx f1. −Δ+     (12) 
The relevant war alternative for A is W2 and for B is W1. Focusing on the distributional 
and institutional features of a settlement, there has to be a critical value—the minimum 
                                                 
28 Note that while I am only focusing the subgame where A is the majority, the same argument holds for the 
lower subgame, with only the names attached to the minority and the majority reversed. So, Equation (12) 
would need to be the case for P3 as well. 
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acceptable value—each player attaches to the share of resources and power they expect to 
receive from a settlement. 
( ) ( ) ( )iPii PCWEUpx 1*. +=Δ+     (13) 
Holding everything else constant, B agrees to settle if ( )Bpx Δ+ .  associated with 
an offer on the negotiation table is larger than this critical value and chooses to fight 
instead if it is smaller. If A anticipates B to accept a certain settlement, it can either 
extend that offer or insist on a majoritarian system, which would lead to W2 unless A has 
a crashing dominance over B on the battlefield (as the latter would rather continue 
fighting, if it can, to retain some possibility of securing a share of the state apparatus and 
to avoid the political cost of capitulation). A would endorse the settlement if ( )Apx Δ+ .  
also exceeds its own critical utility, given the situation on the battlefield and the political 
costs it expects to suffer were it to settle for power sharing.  
Breaking apart the utility players attach to a given institutional framework into its 
components, I argue that the number of veto points and the extent of power sharing need 
not be simultaneously maximized. To the contrary, increasing one while reducing the 
other might be an effective bargaining strategy to create a settlement acceptable to both 
players. This challenges the concept of consociationalism, which confounds the two 
under a single prescription—maximize power sharing and enable players to veto each 
other in order to induce peaceful coexistence.  
 Looking at Equation (13), which shows the critical value for an acceptable 
institutional framework, if the initial share of resources and power secured by a certain 
player increases, the potential for future positive change it demands goes down and the 
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potential for negative change it tolerates goes up. Rewriting the critical values in terms of 
 and x, we get the following: Δ.p
( ) ( ) ( ) iiPii xPCWEUp −+=Δ 1*.     (13) 
( ) ( ) ( )iiPii pPCWEUx Δ−+= .1*     (14) 
If  is positive, which would mostly be the case for the majority, as x goes up, 
the p it demands would go down, and vice versa (i.e. 
Δ
( ) 0* pxp ∂Δ∂ ). In other words, if 
the player expects to add to its share once the system is established, it will be less 
insistent on maximizing what it gets initially. Following the same logic, the smaller the 
extent of initial power sharing (i.e. the larger the majority’s initial share), the more 
tolerant the majority will be of the minority’s demands for veto rights. On the other hand, 
if it gives into the minority’s demands for power sharing ex-ante, it would try to 
compensate for this by insisting on keeping the number of veto points down in order to 
preserve a good probability of future institutional change to its advantage.  
Rather than counting on future positive change, the minority is in most cases 
concerned with keeping what it can secure at the negotiation table. Contrary to the 
majority, therefore, the minority assesses the probability of negative institutional change 
(i.e. ).  As the initial share it gets increases, the probability of future change it 
tolerates will also go up. Hence, the more extensive the initial power sharing, the less 
persistent the minority will be on maximizing the number of veto points in the post-war 
system. The less it is rewarded at the start, however, the more insistent it will be on veto 
rights so it can hold onto what it gets after it leaves the battlefield. In any given 
settlement offer, therefore, there will be a tradeoff between the extent of initial power 
sharing and the number of veto points for both players.  
0pΔ
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Making War Unattractive 
 
Although my focus is on the institutional features of civil war settlements, conditions on 
the battlefield and post-war coercive capabilities are obviously as critical in determining 
whether rivals choose to end war and stick to peace. Namely, the lower the expected 
utility the rivals attach to continued or renewed fighting, the more likely they will be to 
settle and consolidate peace; as the utility a player expects from war goes down, so does 
the critical value it attaches to acceptable settlement.  
As Equation (3) illustrates, expected utility of war for any player is a function of 
four major components: the probability it attaches to victory, the costs it anticipates to 
incur as a result of continued presence on the battlefield, the benefits it expects to reap 
during the war, and the political costs it expects to result from failure to settle. Change in 
any of these calculations affects the relative values of peace and war, and hence the 
choice between the two, for that player. The same institutional framework, therefore, 
might be acceptable for one or both players at one point but not at another. It is precisely 
for this reason that questions of third-party military interventions are frequently raised as 
attempts are made to mediate civil war settlements.  
The proposition I make, however, is different from the argument that rivals settle 
when they face a “mutually hurting stalemate” on the battlefield—when they “find 
themselves locked in a conflict from which they cannot escalate to victory and this 
deadlock is painful to both of them” (Zartman 2000, 228). Continued war need not be 
“painful” or without a good probability of victory and benefits for both parties. When the 
expected utility one player associates with war is low enough to sufficiently reduce its 
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critical value for an acceptable settlement, the other player—even if still hopeful of 
victory—might be able to provide the former with an adequate share without too much 
compromise.  
 
Failure of Peace    
 
As the statistical analyses in the following chapters further illustrate, civil war relapse is 
not uncommon, particularly following negotiated settlements. In other words, in many 
cases rivals agree to settle but later renege on their commitments to the post-war system; 
peace may or may not be consolidated. What can explain such failure? Why do rivals 
choose to go back to war if they made a choice to settle, and supposedly already 
demobilized, knowing what peace would bring?  
 The single-round game presented in Figure 1 models any instance rivals face an 
opportunity to choose between war and peaceful coexistence. Such instances arise not 
only during wars but also in the aftermath, when the majority gets to choose between 
continued power sharing and demanding a majoritarian change for instance. Relapse will 
be the outcome if it pushes for such a change and the expected utility the minority 
attaches to war, given its capabilities at that point, is larger than that for majoritarian 
peace. Even if it anticipates minority’s response, the majority will push for that change if 
it has exploited the time since the settlement and the resources under its control to 
enhance its military power. A change in military capabilities, therefore, can modify 
players’ preferences and alter the outcome if opportunity arises to reconsider war versus 
peace.  
 55
  
 The rigidity of the institutional framework can also prove to be detrimental to the 
stability of a system. As a result of an external shock, such as change in leadership or 
public opinion, a player might choose to demand institutional change any time after the 
war ends. If this is rendered impossible through legitimate channels due to the presence 
of mutual veto rights or a high number of veto players overall, and war is an acceptable 
option for both players (i.e. the player demanding the change is willing to fight to 
institute those changes and the other player is willing to veto, knowing war would be the 
outcome), the system will fail. The higher the number of veto points, therefore, the more 
vulnerable peace will be. This is very similar to the argument that in the presence of a 
large number of veto points, “as a result of increased policy stability the regime may be 
unable to provide policy changes when needed, which may lead to breakdown” (Tsebelis 
2000, 72). 
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3. Bosnia and Hercegovina: the Fight for Self-Enforcing Peace 
 
The Peace Agreement for Bosnia is the most ambitious document of its kind in modern 
history, perhaps history as a whole. A traditional peace treaty aims at ending a war 
between nations or coalitions of nations, while here it is a question of setting up a state on 
the basis of little more than the ruins and the rivalries of a bitter war. There are often calls 
for a revision of the Peace Agreement, either to break up Bosnia further or to pave the 
way for a more unitary state. Neither of them are realistic, and both are irresponsible in 
view of all the fears that would be unleashed by any attempt to remake the pace, thus in 
effect opening up all the questions of war. The Peace Agreement balances the reality of 
division with the structures of cooperation and integration and is based on the hope that 
over time the imperative of integration in the country and the region will be the dominant 
factor as long as war can be deterred (Bildt 1998, 392). 
 
Characterized by complex and rigid power sharing mechanisms within a highly 
decentralized framework, the Dayton Peace Accords (DPA) has been criticized by many 
as an ineffective peace-building tool—incapable of forging a common Bosnian identity to 
replace polarizing ethnic affiliations. It has also been criticized for creating an 
international protectorate, under the ultimate authority of the High Representative (HR), 
instead of a self-sustaining democratic state. It has been described as “good for ending a 
war, bad for running a state” (Katana and Igrič 2005) and as a “compromise” that now 
needs to be transformed into a state (Woodward 1999). Almost twelve years after the 
signing of the DPA, however, peace in Bosnia and Hercegovina29 (BiH) perseveres. All 
major players have at times challenged the institutional framework, but they have 
                                                 
29 When I use the term Bosnia I would also be referring to Bosnia and Hercegovina, which has been the 
country’s official name since the Dayton Peace Accords. It is typically abbreviated as BiH (Bosna i 
Hercegovina). Prior to 1995, it was the Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina. There is discrepancy in the 
English-language literature on the spelling of Hercegovina (vs. Herzegovina); I chose to use the former 
since there is no “z” in the Bosnian/Croat alphabet or its Serbian cyrillic form and the letter “c” is 
pronounced as “z”. 
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remained within the bounds of the system and utilized legitimate mechanisms they have 
endorsed to bring about change. After the civil war claimed more than 200,000 lives and 
displaced close to 3 million people (Ramet 2006, 466), peace has become the only game 
in town. 30
 Both the history of negotiations leading up to Dayton and the developments 
thereafter in BiH exemplify the dynamic nature of institutional bargaining in transitioning 
societies. As the context changes—developments on the battlefield, transformations in 
the power structure, demographic changes—so do the payoffs players attach to war and 
peace. An institutional framework unacceptable at one point might win the approval of all 
parties at another, and vice versa; a player who finds a given arrangement sufficient to lay 
down arms at one point, given the political context and the (a)symmetry of military 
capabilities at the time, might later denounce it and demand change. What determines the 
stability of peace—not of this or that particular institution or policy—is whether all 
relevant players have some stake in preserving the overall system when confronted with 
the alternative of reverting back to war.  
Institutions of guaranteed power sharing in BiH, such as reserved representation 
within the central government apparatus and the autonomy of mostly homogenous ethnic 
territories, have made it worthwhile for all parties to stick with the system; extensive veto 
opportunities have further guaranteed that no single player or group can take away these 
rights unilaterally. Both of these components were integral parts of all institutional 
                                                 
30 The most serious challenge to the system came in 2001 when the HDZ of Bosnia and Hercegovina under 
the leadership of Ante Jelavić, the then-Croat member of the Bosnian Presidency, declared secession from 
the Federation (ICG 2001). The HR removed Jelavić from his position and by late 2001 HDZ had no option 
but to give up the pursuit of self-government after failing to get sufficient support and following. This also 
resulted in a major decline in the prominence of parallel Croat institutions that had remained within FBiH 
(Bieber 2006, 66).  
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proposals put forth leading to and during the war in Bosnia. What made them agreeable 
in 1995 but not in 1992? As the following overview illustrates, the main point of 
contention during all different attempts to negotiate an end to the war among Bosnian 
Serbs, Croats, and Muslims, was the map: It became obvious early on that a high degree 
of decentralization was the bottom line for the minority Croats and Serbs, hence the only 
way to keep Bosnia a single state. Within which territories each group would have partial 
or complete autonomy then became the primary question. A negotiated settlement 
became possible only after Serbs lost enough territory on the battleground that they no 
longer needed to relinquish a significant amount at the negotiation table, which would 
have carried enormous political costs, to reach a compromise that would be acceptable 
for the other players.  
 
Miniature Yugoslavia: Inevitable Disintegration? 
 
Bosnia-Hercegovina—one of six republics making up the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia—descended into war following unilateral declarations of independence by 
Croatia and Slovenia.31 Unlike the other republics, Bosnia was not home to a single 
“titular” or majority nation; it was like “Yugoslavia in miniature” (Rogel 2004, 27), an 
“unmelted pot” of Muslims, Serbs, and Croats, scattered across the territory in a fashion 
that resembled a “leopard skin” (Bieber 2006, 14; Burg and Shoup 1999, 25) (see Figure 
3.1). According to 1991 census results, the three nations made up 43.5,  
 
 
                                                 
31 Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia were the other republics; Kosovo and Vojvodina were recognized as 
two autonomous provinces within Serbia, the former made up predominantly of Albanians and the latter 
with a large Hungarian population.   
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Figure 3.1 Demographic Distribution in Bosnia and Hercegovina, 1991 
 
Copied from Burg and Shoup (1999, 28). 
 
 
 
 
31.2, and 17.4 percents of the total Bosnian population respectively (Bieber 2006, 15).32 
With the disintegration of the federation, Bosnians were faced with two options: remain 
part of a rump Yugoslavia, which would most likely turn into a Greater Serbia, or declare 
independence. In a referendum they held in November 1991, Bosnian Serbs endorsed the 
first option. Bosnian Croats and Muslims, on the other hand, voted for independence on 
                                                 
32 According to the same census, those identifying themselves as “Yugoslav” made up 5.6 percent of the 
population. Muslims were recognized from 1960s on as one of the constituent nations that constituted 
Yugoslavia, equal to the Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians, and Montenegrins. This was a very 
significant distinction: Groups identified as constituent nations (narod) were given equal status and 
guaranteed representation in federal institutions (and same for the three groups in the republic of Bosnia-
Hercegovina). Groups such as Hungarians and Albanians, who had their respective nation states outside of 
Yugoslavia, were recognized instead as nationalities (narodnost). Finally, another category included groups 
such as the Roma, who were recognized merely as ethnic minorities (ICG 2002, 2). That each constituent 
nation—as opposed to each republic—should have the right to self-determination was the argument used 
by Bosnian Serbs to justify their demands to secede and become part of a Greater Serbia. 
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February 29/March 1, 1992 in a referendum boycotted by the Serb population.33 
Following the independence vote, armed Serbs took to the streets of capital Sarajevo, 
sealing off the predominantly Muslim city center, signaling “the ethnic and political 
powder keg that is the Yugoslav republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina was on the verge of 
explosion”  (Zimonjić 1992).  
 By the time European Community (EC)—the European Union (EU) after January 
1993—granted recognition to Bosnia and Hercegovina (BiH) on 6 April 1992, war was 
already underway across the country, and so was its de-facto disintegration. Various UN 
Security Council resolutions condemning the aggression of parties, particularly the 
involvement of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), 
establishing a “no-fly zone” over BiH, and declaring six major cities as “safe havens” 
under UN protection all failed in slowing down the violence. By the summer of 1992, 
reports of ethnic cleansing and of Serb-run concentration camps—in Keraterm, Omarska, 
Trnopolje, and Manjača—were already flooding the international media (Rogel 2004, 30-
32).  
Following the example of the Serb Autonomous Oblast (SAO) created by the 
Serbs of Krajina, who were fighting for independence from Croatia, SAOs were 
established in Serb-majority areas throughout Bosnia in as early as the fall of 1991; an 
Assembly of the Serb Nation of Bosnia-Hercegovina was created in October and the 
Republika Srpska claiming sovereignty over SAOs was proclaimed in December 1991.  
                                                 
33 Bosnian parliament’s debate on the referendum for independence in January 1992 became the point of no 
return in the contentious relations between Serbs on the one hand and Muslims-Croats on the other. The 
seventeen-hour session ended with the withdrawal of Serb representatives and the adoption of a motion by 
SDA and HDZ representatives to hold the referendum that would address independence but not 
constitutional details (Bieber 2006, 25; Burg and Shoup 1999, 105).  
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Croat autonomous areas were also established in the Sava Valley and Herceg-Bosna 
(Burg and Shoup 1999, 72). 
 Throughout the next four years the Bosnian stage would be crowded with not only 
the local players but also those from the neighboring Croatia and Serbia. In addition to 
President Slobodan Milošević’s Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) forces that operated in 
Bosnia early on, Serbian support for Bosnian Serbs continued throughout the war, most 
noticeably in form of paramilitary forces based in Serbia. The primary example was the 
Tigers led by Željko Raznjatović (better known as Arkan), who became responsible for 
some of the worst massacres, particularly against the Muslims, as they went on a rampage 
of ethnic cleansing in Bosnia.34 Croatian forces, some under the direct authority of 
President Franjo Tuđman, were also involved in the fighting, especially in the Croat-
majority Western Hercegovina (or Herceg-Bosna) along the Croatian border.35 Presidents 
Milošević and Tuđman often even spoke for the Bosnian Serbs and Croats at the 
negotiation table. 
 Most of the contentious bargaining regarding the future of Bosnia took place 
between Bosnian Muslims and Serbs. The Croats, on the other hand, aligned themselves 
with both the Muslims and the Serbs at different times, during negotiations as well as on 
the battlefield. Because the latter two had the more extreme positions, while the Croats 
                                                 
34 Paramilitary leaders such as Arkan and Vojislav Šeselj and their gangs were already involved in 
cleansing of non-Serbs in Krajina and Slavonia (Croatia) in 1991. Šeselj is reported to have said that the 
policy of ethnic cleansing in Croatia and Bosnia was organized and supported by authorities in Belgrade, 
particularly the Serbian Ministry of Interior (Rogel 2004, 32). 
35 Because the arms embargo imposed by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 713, adopted in 
September 1991, applied to all of Yugoslavia, including Bosnia after its independence, and because they 
lacked a motherland that supported their cause, Muslims were the least well-equipped on the battleground. 
It was widely known, however, that they received support in form of both material and volunteer fighters 
from Muslims countries in the Middle East. Towards the later stages of the war, there were also widespread 
reports that the US, after failing to convince Russia to lift the embargo on Bosnia, encouraged, if not 
actively facilitated, arms transfers to Bosnian Muslims (see below). 
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had territorial and institutional demands that fell somewhere in the middle, compromise 
proposals put forth by third parties tended to coincide with Croat positions. In the words 
of the UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali,  
It was recognized from the beginning that the views of the three parties diverged widely 
on the structure of the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina. One of the parties [Muslims] 
initially advocated a centralized, unitary State, arranged into a number of regions 
possessing merely administrative functions. Another party considered that the country 
should be divided into three independent States, respectively for the Muslim, Serb and 
Croat peoples, with each of these States having its own international legal personality, 
which States might form a loose confederation for the purpose of coordinating certain of 
their activities. The third party supported a middle position (UNSC S/24795, 13). 
 
The middle position, the only arrangement simultaneously acceptable for all three 
players, was a highly decentralized Bosnia that would give each of the three national 
units substantial autonomy, as well as guaranteed equal representation and veto rights at 
the central government level.  
 This was the “Yugoslavization” of the new Bosnian state as the formula closely 
paralleled the political institutions established under President Josip Broz Tito, 
particularly with the 1974 constitution, to ease ethnic tensions simmering within the 
federation: Devolution of power to the republics, and the two provinces which were 
practically elevated to the same status, was coupled with guaranteed equal representation 
for all republics and provinces at the federal legislature and collective presidency (Ramet 
2004, 326-8). These institutions quickly became integral to any settlement that would be 
acceptable to Bosnian Serbs and Croats—the minimum common denominator their 
representatives could not forego without committing political suicide. Especially after the 
nationalist parties—the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), the Serb Democratic Party 
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(SDS), and the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ)—agreed to divide up prominent 
government positions among themselves and adopt decisions based on consensus 
following the 1990 elections (Burg and Shoup 1999, 52), any step back would have 
meant capitulation for Serbs and Croats. They saw themselves as minorities who would 
be permanently disadvantaged under a different system. 
In terms of the model presented in Chapter 2, any framework that excluded these 
provisions would deprive these minorities of any stakes in establishing and preserving 
peace; such a system would minimize the amount of resources they are promised (i.e. 
 in Equation 2 goes to 0) and maximize the political costs attached to accepting 
that settlement (i.e. (  as in Equation 2 is maximized). Given the relative weakness 
of the Muslim-dominated Bosnian government on the battlefield, which enhanced the 
probabilities of military success for Croats and Serbs (in terms of both absolute victory 
and increasing territorial control in the meantime), it became apparent early in the game 
that insisting on a centralized and majoritarian system was futile.   
( Bpx Δ+ . )
)BPPC 2
The map that would determine where each group would have territorial control 
became the point of contention that prolonged the war for almost four years. How could 
the territorial autonomy demanded particularly by the Serbs for ethnically defined units 
be granted given the nature of Bosnia’s demographic geography prior to 1992? SDS 
President Radovan Karadžić spoke in no uncertain terms: “The cantonization of the 
Yugoslav republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina is the only way to avoid bloodshed” (BBC 
Summary of World Broadcasts March 2, 1992). Yet, the pre-war distribution of the 
groups would have created non-contiguous territorial units, which would have rendered 
the level of decentralization demanded by the Serbs (e.g. separate armed forces and law 
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enforcement) practically impossible. It was with this recognition and with the intention of 
connecting the Serb-majority areas in northwest Bosnia to Serbia in the east that they set 
out to ethnically cleanse and consolidate Serb control over big chunks of territory 
throughout Bosnia. The dilemma was recognized by the UN Secretary General leading up 
to the war: 
The population of Bosnia and Herzegovina is inextricably intermingled. Thus there 
appears to be no viable way to create three territorially distinct States based on ethnic or 
confessional principles. Any plan to do so would involve incorporating a very large 
number of members of the other ethnic/confessional groups, or consist of a number of 
separate enclaves of each ethnic/confessional group. Such a plan could achieve 
homogeneity and coherent boundaries only by a process of enforced population transfers 
(UNSC S/24795, 13). 
 
Nevertheless, under the mediation of Jose Cutileiro, representing the EC, at a 
meeting in Lisbon, Bosnian parties endorsed the ideas of cantonization, decentralization, 
and guaranteed power sharing: an independent Bosnian state composed of three 
constituent units, which would have equal representation in the upper house and veto 
powers through the three-quarters super-majority requirement on certain issues and 
constitutional amendments. The central government would have authority over the armed 
forces, central bank, and economic transactions involving transport, energy, and water, 
which affect more than one unit. The three groups would be proportionally represented in 
the state’s civil service, judiciary, and armed forces according to their population shares 
(Statement on Principles for New Constitutional Arrangement for BiH 1992, Article C).  
In an interview shortly after the Lisbon Agreement, Izetbegović acknowledged 
the need to reach a compromise and how this agreement accomplished that: 
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An agreement can be reached only through compromise. Compromises are usually     
painful because one often has to abandon some very dear ideas or views or visions on 
how one would organize the republic if one lived in it on his own. However, we are not 
alone in Bosnia-Hercegovina. There are three nations living here. Sometimes they have 
very different views on the organization of Bosnia-Hercegovina. A compromise, a 
compromise formula is the only way out of this kind of situation. This time an attempt 
was made to find a compromise, on the one hand, by satisfying the Muslim people, 
because Bosnia-Hercegovina would be preserved as an integral state, as envisaged by 
Point 1 of the Lisbon agreement. Point 2 would satisfy Croats and Serbs, because we 
would accept the organization of the republic on the basis of nationality. In other words, 
we would create national regions (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts February 28, 
1992).   
 
The location of these regions, however, was the irreconcilable point of contention. 
Cutileiro’s proposal stipulated non-contiguous territories for the units, based on prior 
census results and the existing geographic distribution: “communes where one particular 
nation is clearly a majority are grouped together in the appropriate constituent unit” 
(Article E). The map he produced the following month, based primarily on the 1991 
census results, was swiftly denounced by all three parties. They each responded by 
advancing alternative maps—the difference among which “reflected the conflicting 
territorial ambitions that would soon lead to bloodshed” (Burg and Shoup 1999, 112). A 
comparison of Figures 2 through 4 illustrates the incompatibility of these demands and 
expectations.  
Furthermore, Izetbegović was later pressured by his local constituency to 
denounce even the idea of ethnic/national cantonization or partition endorsed in Lisbon. 
At a news conference in March 1992, the SDA spokesperson declared “We will propose 
to our partners the abandonment of the idea of dividing Bosnia-Hercegovina according to 
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the ethnic principle alone,” otherwise “the SDA would be forced to play this absurd game 
to the end.” Izetbegović, on the other hand, argued that he was forced by the mediators to 
accept “because if we had said no, Bosnia-Hercegovina's international legal 
recognition—our main objective at present—would have been jeopardized” (BBC 
Summary of World Broadcasts March 27, 1992). Although he might have personally 
recognized the inevitability of ethnic partition, his party and the Bosnian Muslim 
community saw that as an unacceptable capitulation at the time. To avoid being sidelined 
by his own community (i.e. to minimize political costs), in an interview to local 
newspapers, Oslobodjenje and Večernje Novine, Izetbegović condemned the document he 
had previously supported: 
I had some very difficult times during these talks. I and my associates spent long hours, 
very long hours in Brussels and Sarajevo trying to prove to the people we were talking to 
that ethnic territorialization was not a solution for Bosnia-Hercegovina, that Bosnia was 
indivisible, that ethnic division did not suit any of our nations, that the Bosnia-
Hercegovina public (its better, better-educated section, that is) rejected this idea, that this 
is not wanted by all those who love Bosnia and who understand us. It was no use, we 
remained isolated (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts March 26, 1992).  
 
Failed Negotiations: Vance-Owen and Owen-Stoltenberg Plans 
 
By the end of January 1993, all three parties had signed a second agreement on the new 
constitutional framework for BiH—not before these issues were separated from the map 
(UN Doc. S/25221, Annex II). Mediated by David Owen (representing the EC) and Cyrus 
Vance (representing the UN) of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia 
(ICFY), this came to be known as the Vance-Owen plan. The institutional arrangements 
satisfied the Croat and Serb delegations by creating a highly decentralized system,  
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Figure 3.2 The Map Demanded by Muslims, March 1992 
 
Copied from Burg and Shoup (1999, 113). 
 
Figure 3.3 Croat Territorial Demands, March 1992 
 
Copied from Burg and Shoup (1999, 114). 
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Figure 3.4 The Map Demanded by the Serbs, March 1992 
 
Copied from Burg and Shoup (1999, 115). 
 
guaranteed representation in all branches of the government, and veto opportunities 
through super-majority requirements. In return, the Muslims secured the inviolability of 
the boundaries of the original republic, albeit under a weak central government. Given 
the Serb dominance and overwhelming success on the battlefield, the Muslims by this 
time had recognized that they had neither the military capability to match that of their 
rivals nor the leverage at negotiations to pressure them to abandon their demands of 
ethnic partition.   
The fundamental question behind map negotiations now was whether the location 
of the units should respect the pre-war geographic distribution of the three groups or 
reflect the demographic changes that have taken place since early 1992, mostly through 
massacres and forced displacements. Legitimizing and institutionalizing the fruits of 
ethnic cleansing, whose primary target in Bosnia was the Muslim population, would have  
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Figure 3.5 Map for the Vance-Owen Plan, 1993 
 
                               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                Provinces 1, 5, 7, 9: Muslim majority/plurality. 
                                    Provinces 2, 4, 6: Croat majority/plurality. 
                                    Provinces 3, 8, 10: Serb majority/plurality. 
 
Copied from Burg and Shoup (1999, 223). 
 
been very costly for Izetbegović. Giving up at the negotiation table what they gained on 
the battlefield, on the other hand, was unacceptable for the Serbs.  
The map produced by Vance and Owen in January 1993 consisted of 10 provinces 
(see figure 3.5). Based on 1991 census figures, three of these would be of Muslim 
majority, two would be of Serb majority, and one would be Croat majority; two of the 
remaining provinces would have Croat plurality, one would have Muslim plurality, and 
one would have Serb plurality (Burg and Shoup 1999, 119). The map was later revised to 
make the whole plan more appealing for Bosnian Serbs, who had initially rejected the 
constitutional principles because BiH was declared to be a decentralized state with 
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substantial autonomy but not international legal character endowed upon the provinces.36 
Even after these revisions, which drew criticism for rewarding ethnic cleansing, the Serbs 
would have had to withdraw from nearly 40 percent of the land they held at the time; they 
had seized control of close to 70 percent of Bosnia by early 1993 and the Vance-Owen 
plan would have reduced their control to about 43 percent of total territory (Owen 1995, 
91).37  
Mate Boban, representing the Bosnian Croats, was the only player who accepted 
this map. President Izetbegović, representing the Muslim-dominated Bosnian 
government, refused by arguing that “it had the effect of rewarding the ethnic cleansing.” 
The Serb delegation led by Karadžić, on the other hand, stated it was ready to accept the 
map only if “the populations in certain areas would be democratically consulted.” Vance 
and Owen declared this condition unacceptable “since there had been massive 
displacements of populations largely as a result of deliberate ethnic cleansing in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, [hence] consultations with the populations involved could not be 
carried out fairly under the prevailing circumstances” (UN Doc. S/25221, 3).  
Negotiations nevertheless continued for the next couple months around the 
Vance-Owen plan, while the mediators brought to table revised versions of the map—
revisions that were mostly in line with Muslim territorial demands (Burg and Shoup 
1999, 234). On 3 March 1993 Croat and Muslim delegates signed an agreement that 
confirmed commitment to the previously agreed constitutional principles and included 
                                                 
36 Both Karadžić and other Serb delegates argued they had made a big enough concession by agreeing to 
preserve the external boundaries of Bosnia; in return, they demanded their own “state within a state”—“ the 
Serbian people do not surrender or retreat from the stand regarding the preservation of their statehood, 
nationality and state personality” said a Serb declaration. They also added that “If the U.N. does not accept 
this, we will fight to the end” (Sjeklocha 1993). 
37 The map proposed by the Bosnian Serbs themselves at this time laid claim to about 75 percent of the 
whole territory—everything except the Bihać region in the west and a chunk of land in central Bosnia 
(Burg and Shoup 1999, 222).  
 71
  
arrangements on the interim government (UN Doc. S/25362, Annex), the details of which 
were further articulated in another agreement on March 25 (UN Doc. S/25479, Annex I). 
Karadžić later did sign the plan, including the “provisional provincial map” (UN Doc. 
S/25709). However, attached to his agreement came a condition that the plan would have 
to be approved by the Assembly of Republika Srpska (Annex V). By referring the final 
decision to the people through referenda or to the legislature, Karadžić could avoid 
accountability and political costs associated with appearing either too weak (to his own 
constituency) or too uncompromising (to the international community).  The plan was 
first rejected in the parliament and then by the Bosnian Serb population in a referendum. 
The declaration by the assembly read: 
To accept the [Vance-Owen] proposals would be a complete political and military defeat. 
If we (the Serbs) are divided into provinces, it would be as if we were to divide into 
separate pastures, never to be united. . . . The parliament does not allow the breaking up 
of the Serbian people into several provinces without geographical continuity and does not 
accept the Serbian people to be part of any new nation (Sjeklocha 1993).  
 
Given their success on the battlefield at that point, no Serb leader could justify giving up 
territory, especially if that would leave Serb-controlled areas as an enclave disconnected 
from Serbia.   
The Vance-Owen plan not only failed to settle the conflict but arguably it even 
made the situation worse by inciting fighting between the Bosnian Croat Army (HVO) 
and Bosnian government forces. Following the publication of the map in January, the 
minister of defense for BiH, who happened to be a Bosnian Croat at the time, ordered 
Croat forces to take control of provinces which the map declared as Croat-majority 
territories; Muslims opposed the move and the Bosnian army fought back (Burg and 
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Shoup 1999, 134). The Croat-Muslim agreement of March 1993 did not bring fighting on 
this front to an end either as neither party was willing to withdraw from areas that would 
fall under the other’s control according to the agreed map (241). The agreement of March 
25 called for joint deployment of HVO and government forces in four of the provinces 
“under arrangements agreed between them” (UN Doc. S/25479, Annex I). Further 
negotiations on this point and to enhance military cooperation by integrating the two 
armies under a single command structure ended with no agreement (Burg and Shoup 
1999, 241). It would be another year before the two players can truly form a join front 
against the Serbs, in a move that would change the direction of the war.   
  
Solomon’s Proposal 
 
If the two wise men of the West walk into the marble hall of the Palais des Nations in 
Geneva today to meet the irascible warlords of feuding Bosnia, they will be pushing a 
plan similar to Solomon's proposal to split a baby in half to test which alleged mother 
loved it more. … Two of the would-be mothers, Serbia and Croatia, would be happy to 
get their severed chunk, but the third, representing the Muslim community headed by 
Alija Izetbegović, the nominal president, claims to want the baby whole and alive or not 
at all. … Izetbegović argues that its attempt to consolidate ethnic frontiers amounts to a 
legalization of ethnic cleansing. The others will prevaricate, knowing that they have less 
to lose and have both time and military force on their side (Millar 1993).  
 
Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg, Vance’s successor as co-Chairmen of the ICFY, 
met with Milošević, Tuđman, Bulatović (then the President of Montenegro), Izetbegović, 
Karadžić, and Boban in June 1993 in Geneva, where a new approach to negotiations 
started to take shape. By that time it was clear to the mediators and the parties involved  
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Figure 3.6 Areas of Control, June 1993 
 
 
Copied from Burg and Shoup (1999, 136). 
 
that given the status of the battlefield “there was no longer any talk, or hope, of reversing 
ethnic cleansing” (Owen 1995, 184). The Serb offensives in the spring had reduced 
Muslim control in eastern Bosnia into a number of small enclaves, disconnected from 
each other and from the Muslim stronghold in central Bosnia (see Map 6). The Serbs 
would not settle for anything but a contiguous territory under their exclusive control. On 
the table was “a three-part division” that would make up a loose confederation—Union of 
Three Republics. Milošević had already presented the mediators with a proposed map, 
which Tuđman had also agreed to (190). 
In Owen’s words to the press corps at the end of those meetings, “time moves on 
and sadly as it does so the situation deteriorates. We have seen the provincial map torn up 
in front of our eyes by all three sides in the last few months. … We’ve got to stand up to 
the bloody realities of the situation” (Owen 1995, 190-191). President Izetbegović was 
 74
  
aware of those realities too. All along he had stood against the idea of ethnic partition and 
institutionalization of the ethnic cleansing that had been going on; changing his position 
on that, given the suffering his constituency had been enduring, carried political costs. 
Nevertheless, when Owen sent him a letter in early July, detailing the shape a Union of 
Three Republics would take, Izetbegović responded by agreeing to continue negotiations 
on those terms, thereby accepting that partition could no longer be avoided. 
He was worried that the stronger and louder elements in his public opinion were not 
ready to face the unfortunate fact that partition had taken place on the ground, and were 
against ethnic partition. Yet he himself had grasped the reality that the face of Bosnia had 
changed (194-195).  
 
When Owen met with parties separately in early July, a Serb offensive had 
encircled Sarajevo—the capital and a stronghold of government forces—and 
humanitarian relief convoys were unable reach the city, which was without electricity, 
water, or fuel; the fall of Sarajevo seemed to be a matter of time (Burg and Shoup 1999, 
142). President Izetbegović was reluctant to negotiate while being shelled; he could not 
appear to be surrendering at the table. Instead, he was hoping for sympathy and military 
support from the international community, who seemed to be responding. It was by the 
end of July that  
The United States has secured broad approval from Britain and France for allied air 
strikes if necessary, to break the Serbian stranglehold on Sarajevo and hasten a ''viable 
and reasonable'' conclusion to the current Geneva negotiations on Bosnia which would 
preserve at least the rump of a Muslim state. … The new initiative would carry Western 
intervention significantly beyond the existing commitment under last May's United 
Nations Resolution 836 to use allied airpower to protect UN peace-keepers in Bosnia, 
who have come under fire during the recent Bosnian Serb shelling of Sarajevo (Cornwell 
1993). 
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It was also within this context that Owen convinced Milošević and Tuđman to produce 
another map, one that would give the Muslim republic about 30 percent of the territory, 
as opposed to the 23 percent they had proposed originally. With that the mediators felt 
they were closer to offering the Muslims “something serious,” a face-saving compromise 
Izetbegović could take back to his people (Owen 1995, 195). 
When multi-party negotiations resumed in Geneva on July 27, parties reached an 
agreement to “divide the republic into three separate but loosely linked states in a 
breakthrough deal which could end 16 months of the most savage fighting seen in Europe 
since the Second World War” (Traynor 1993). The war on the ground, however, was still 
in full force. The “strangulation” of Sarajevo was underway, with the Serbs taking-over 
Mt. Igman above the city, leading to threats by Izetbegović that he would withdraw from 
the talks (Owen 1995, 206). Neither threats of NATO air strikes nor attempts by the 
mediators and Milošević were enough to stop the advance of Serb forces under General 
Mladić. The crisis was alleviated for the time being when the Serbs agreed to withdraw, 
only to turn control over to UNPROFOR forces, thereby “using the UN to do what they 
could not do on their own: deny this strategic ground to the Muslims” (Burg and Shoup 
1999, 143). 
The focus of negotiations at the end of July and the beginning of August was the 
future of Sarajevo and the details of the map for the Union of Republics, the 
constitutional fundamentals for which were agreed upon by Izetbegović, Karadžić, and 
Boban without much dispute (UN Doc. S/26233, Annex II). After long deliberations, on 
20 August 1993 parties were sent back to their respective constituencies to get 
parliamentary approvals for a comprehensive plan which the mediators prepared as a 
 76
  
“take-it-or-leave-it” proposal (Burg and Shoup 1999, 275; UN Doc. S/26233, Annex II; 
UN Doc. S/26395, Annex). The institutional structure was identical to that of the Vance-
Owen plan, with only minimal changes. The map ended up giving Muslims 30 percent of 
the total territory, requiring the Serbs to withdraw from about 24 percent of the land 
currently under their control (which was less than they would have had to give up under 
the Vance-Owen plan) (Owen 1995, 212). Muslims got the access they wanted to the 
Sava River; what they could not get was a contiguous territory that would connect the 
three enclaves in eastern Bosnia—Srebrenica, Žepa, and Goražde (see Map 7). 
Temporarily Sarajevo would be placed under UN control, and Mostar—a highly 
contentious city for Muslims and Croats—would be under an EC administration. 
While the Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Serb parliaments approved the whole plan, 
the Muslim-majority Bosnian Parliament voted only to continue the negotiations. 
Izetbegović had recommended that his parliament not approve the package, primarily 
because of the map; he wanted a number of previously Muslim-majority towns to be 
included in the Muslim entity (which would effectively reverse some of the ethnic 
cleansing that had taken place). He finally conceded that partition was inevitable: “We 
could not defend the integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the meantime, we have to 
divide. We have to do it at the negotiating table or on the battlefield. I think it is better to 
do it at the negotiating table” (Traynor et al. 1993). Unlike the mediators, however, his 
still insisted that ethnic cleansing should not be rewarded. Stating that he was merely 
asking for the return of territories where the Muslim population had been subject to 
genocide,38 he maintained that the map on the table did not meet the critical threshold 
                                                 
38 These territories he demanded would have awarded the Muslims an additional 4 percent of the total 
territory (Williams and Maass 1993).   
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that would lead him to choose peace over continued fighting: “The solution offered to us 
in Geneva is below the bottom line that we can go. That solution is far worse than war” 
(Agence France Presse September 10,1993).  
Izetbegović’s assessment reflected not only the political costs agreeing to the plan 
would carry but also his expectations from the battlefield, which was largely a function of 
the Muslim anticipation of a major US/NATO involvement on their behalf (see Chapter 
2, Equation 13). Right after the break in talks in Geneva, he was en route to Washington 
to solicit support: President Clinton backed Muslim territorial demands, warning Serbs 
and Croats that “the NATO military option is very much alive” and reiterating his support 
for the lifting of the UN arms embargo against the Bosnian government. Izetbegović also 
got signals of support from Secretary of State Warren Christopher, who sent messages to 
Milošević and Tuđman “urging them and their Serb and Croat allies in Bosnia-
Herzegovina to accede to Muslim demands for two more parcels of territory in the 
partition plan under negotiation” (Williams and Maass 1993). Izetbegović was reportedly 
told by Clinton that congressional approval would be required before he could commit 
military presence (Holmes 1993) and was advised by the House Foreign Relations 
Committee “not to expect any military support from the United States that might turn the 
tide of war and help his bargaining position” (quoted in Burg and Shoup 1999, 278). 
Either not appreciating the hurdle the Congress could pose, or simply believing in the 
capabilities of his own troops on the field (and/or seeing the Geneva plan as politically 
unacceptable irregardless), Izetbegović remained defiant.  
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Figure 3.7 Owen-Stoltenberg Partition Map, August 1993 
 
Copied from Burg and Shoup (1999, 275). 
 
 
One final attempt to salvage the plan was made when all six parties and the 
mediators met on HMS Invincible, a Royal Navy aircraft carrier on September 20. 
President Izetbegović flew back to Sarajevo with a slightly revised map, which still fell 
short of fulfilling Muslim demands. He was reportedly told by Bosnian military leaders 
that they wanted to continue fighting, especially against the Croats around Mostar. Before 
the meeting of the Bosnian Parliament, a group of influential Bosnian Muslims in effect 
also rejected the plan by announcing that they would accept if “all territories taken by 
force” were returned. The parliament followed up by once again rejecting the proposal 
(Owen 1995, 220).39
                                                 
39 One split within the Muslim camp, which ended up not having much effect on negotiations, occurred 
with the declaration of autonomy by Fikret Abdić (a member of the Bosnian presidency at the time), a long-
time rival of Izetbegović who had also been accused of an attempt to overthrow the President in 1992, in 
Bihać in northwestern Bosnia. Government troops reclaimed control of the area in August 1994 (Ramet 
 79
  
As hopes of achieving any kind of settlement under the ICFY framework faded, 
Milošević and Tuđman met to negotiate a new map that would be more acceptable to the 
Muslims as suggested by a joint French-German initiative. They agreed to increase the 
Muslim share to 33.5 percent, while giving the Serbs 51 percent and the Croats 17.5 
percent. Although the Bosnian Serbs initially resisted, they did advance a very similar 
map, which became the basis for negotiations in January 1994 (Burg and Shoup 1999, 
284). Meanwhile, the Muslims were getting even more reluctant to concede as the 
Bosnian army scored victories against the Croats in central Bosnia. According to Owen, 
the Bosnian President had a “resolve to fight almost regardless of consequences, 
something which I had never heard Izetbegović express before. He was confident of 
taking more land from the Croatian army” (Owen 1995, 246). Negotiations nevertheless 
continued on the basis of a 49:51 division, where the Serb republic would end up with 49 
percent of the territory and the Croats and Muslims would share the rest—with 33.3 
percent widely recognized as the baseline for the Muslim republic. However, even when 
                                                                                                                                                 
2006, 438-9). Abdić claimed he was responding to Izetbegović’s failure to agree with the peace deal. 
Following is an excerpt from a letter published by the committee responsible for the declaration: “In the 
historic moments for Bosnia-Hercegovina, when the day of the final decision on the division of our country 
into the Serb, Croat and Muslim states is getting nearer, the people of Western Bosnia have of their own 
free will and with full responsibility decided to create a separate constituent unit within the Union of the 
Republics of Bosnia-Hercegovina. Such a democratic decision has been caused primarily by the 
disagreement of the citizens of Western Bosnia with the unitarist policy of Alija Izetbegovic and the central 
authorities in Sarajevo. We also do not want to bear the burden of historic failures for conducting our 
country's internal and foreign policy, which has since the beginning of the war presented Bosnia-
Hercegovina to the domestic public and international community solely as the victim of aggression, and not 
as an equitable party in the peace negotiations and a UN member with full rights. The result of such a 
policy is the misconception among the people of Bosnia-Hercegovina that military intervention by the USA 
or NATO is sure to come and is only a question of the right moment. Refusing to take part in such political 
failures and cardinal mistakes, of which we have warned at the appropriate time, the people of Krajina and 
representatives of the local and regional authorities, including the undisputed moral and political leader of 
the western Krajina, Fikret Abdic, have opted to create our own future” (“Abdic appeal” 1993). Croatia, 
Serbia, as well as the international mediators were accused of supporting the move: “International 
observers and European Community and United Nations sources say Lord Owen and the influential French 
UN peacekeeping troops deployed in the region have supported the secessionists as part of an effort to 
undermine Mr. Izetbegovic's authority and pressure him to sign a peace plan” (Pitter 1993).  
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“it seemed to be a matter of 1 percent separating the parties” they failed to come to an 
agreement (241).  
 
Breakthrough: the Muslim-Croat Federation  
 
The turning point in the war came with a US-brokered ceasefire agreement between 
Muslim and Croat forces in February 1994. The Americans used the promise of economic 
aid and guarantees for Croatia’s territorial integrity,40 as well as the threat of economic 
sanctions, to convince Croatia to get the Bosnian Croats on board. According to the U.S. 
special envoy for the Bosnian Federation, Daniel Serwer, there was “no love lost” 
between the Croats and the Muslims, but they were still convinced to form a joint front: 
The Croats wanted to end the fighting because they were losing. The HVO was not then 
or later an impressive fighting force, though it was good at frightening civilian 
populations and ethnic cleansing. The Muslims wanted to end the fighting because they 
could not win their war against the Serbs while fighting the Croats. … Under intense 
pressure from Washington—which wanted to simplify the equation before trying to 
resolve the Serb/Muslim conflict—they agreed to set up the Bosnian Federation (Serwer 
1999, 551).  
 
The ceasefire was followed in March by the Washington Agreement, which resolved—or 
avoided—competing territorial ambitions of Muslims and Croats in central Bosnia41 by 
establishing a joint Muslim-Croat entity in the territories that were under Muslim or 
                                                 
40 The Republic of Srpska Krajina, proclaimed by Croatian Serbs living in the region in 1991, stood in the 
middle of Croatia; reclaiming control over the territory became a strong motivation that guided Tuđman’s 
dealings with Serbia and the international community. 
41 The struggle between Muslims and Croats in central Bosnia had been “in part a struggle for living 
space.” As Serb forces gained control of more and more territory, expelling the Muslim and Croat 
populations from those areas, “The former, especially, had found refuge for the most part in central Bosnia, 
which led to fundamental changes in the demographic equilibrium. The influx of Bosniacs into areas that 
had previously had a Croat majority was viewed by the political and military leadership of the HDZ as 
taking territory away from the Croats, so it committed the HVO to isolating central Bosnia” (Divjak 2001, 
174).  
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Croat control at the time. An agreement on forming a confederation between Croatia and 
the new Bosnian (Muslim-Croat) Federation was also reached (Burg and Shoup 1999, 
294-6).   
Constitutional details for the Bosnian (Muslim-Croat) Federation, which would 
have an integrated army, were soon settled and the new constitution was approved by the 
parliament of BiH (absent Serb members) before the end of the month. Only the 
Muslims—or the Bosniacs, as they were referred to in this document—and the Croats 
were identified as “constituent peoples.” The federation would cover “the territories with 
a majority of Bosniac and Croat population in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina” 
(Washington Agreement, Article 1). It would be divided into ten cantons that would have 
control over educational and cultural policies, as well as on the police. The two cantons 
which would be multiethnic (as opposed to having Croat or Muslim majorities) were to 
be further decentralized, with significant devolution of power to mono-ethnic 
municipalities (Bieber 2006, 63).42   The federation was claiming 58 percent of the whole 
republic territory— “territories held by Muslims and Croats, as well as areas in which the 
prewar population included a Muslim-Croat plurality” (Burg and Shoup 1999, 296-7). 
The implication was that the federation territory included areas currently under Serb 
control: “The actual shape and size of the new federation hinge on what amount of 
territory the Bosnian Serbs, controlling at least two-thirds of Bosnia, can be coaxed into 
handing over” (Traynor 1994).  
 The constitutional structure for the Federation of Bosnia and Hercegovina 
resembled those proposed under previous peace plans for the whole republic. The 
executive would be composed of a president and vice-president, each of whom would 
                                                 
42 These special arrangements were later abolished after the constitutional amendments of 2002. 
 82
  
represent a different constituent group and they would rotate in their positions; and a 
cabinet, composed of a prime minister, a deputy prime minister, and others ministers, 
each of whom would also have deputies representing the other constituent group. Issues 
of “vital interest” would require consensual decisions by the cabinet, thereby granting the 
two groups mutual veto powers. The lower house for the bicameral legislature would 
have its members elected with proportional representation from the whole federation as a 
single district. The upper house would have equal number of representatives from each 
group, who would be elected by cantonal legislatures, each representative by the 
delegates representing his/her respective group. Both houses would need to approve 
legislation; “vital interest” issues would require majorities of both groups separately in 
the upper house, and constitutional changes would call for a two thirds majority in the 
lower house in addition to separate majorities in the upper house. In other words, the 
foundations were laid for an ethnically partitioned and highly decentralized Bosnia with 
extensive veto opportunities.  
 This cooperation between Muslims and Croats ended up having significant 
consequences on the battlefield. “Although never fully implemented, the agreements 
between the Muslims and Croats brokered by the Americans in spring 1994 did end 
Muslim-Croat fighting and made it possible to establish a common Muslim-Croatian 
military effort against the Serbs” (Burg and Shoup 1999, 298). Hoping for the lifting of 
sanctions against their country, Serbian officials would also start putting pressure on 
Bosnian Serbs to give up territory and settle. Owen was adamant about linking the lifting 
of sanctions with Serb cooperation in Bosnia: “Reduction or removal of the sanctions 
against Yugoslavia is in close connection with the signing of a cease-fire accord as well 
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as the withdrawal of Serb troops from the agreed Bosnian” (Xinhua News Agency May 
17, 1994). Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanović of the FRY soon called the union of a 
Serb republic with the newly formed federation with a 49:51 territorial distribution “the 
only realistic way” to resolve the conflict (Ottoway 1994). With prospects of losing 
Serbian support and facing a stronger joint Muslim-Croat front, fortunes on the battlefield 
would start to shift significantly for Bosnian Serbs, forcing them to reassess their 
strategies.  
 
The Contact Group: Mediation with Leverage? 
 
One of the highly publicized events of the war was the shelling of the Markala 
marketplace in Sarajevo in February 1994, resulting in ultimatums by the EU and the 
NATO for the Serbs to withdraw, in addition to catalyzing a more direct involvement by 
the U.S. The next such event was the Serb attack on the eastern Muslim-enclave of 
Goražde in April, triggering another NATO ultimatum with the threat of air strikes.43 If 
the Serbs were planning on overrunning the town, they were deterred from doing so; 
attacks on the town stopped before the deadline was up (Chazan et al. 1994). These 
events, however, brought the volatility of the situation and the humanitarian crises 
involved to the forefront. It was within this context that the Co-Chairmen of the ICFY 
proposed establishing a “Contact Group,” composed of U.S., Russian, French, German, 
                                                 
43 In accordance with the UN Security Council Resolution 836 of 4 June 1993, NATO air strikes required 
UN approval and the latter refused to approve NATO’s request to stage strikes that would “crush the 
besieging Bosnian Serb military units and force the Serb leadership back to the negotiating table” (quoted 
in Burg and Shoup 1999, 149). Instead the attacks were limited to specific targets within the exclusion zone 
that was setup around the town and from which the Serbs were required to withdraw in an ultimatum issued 
by NATO.  
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and British delegates, with the goal of finding a settlement that would have the backing of 
those parties who would need to be on board for effective enforcement.  
Not surprisingly, coming up with a map was the priority for the Contact Group as 
it engaged in bilateral meetings with the players. The map that was presented to the 
parties in July divided territories between the Muslim-Croat Federation and the Serbs on 
a 51-49 percent basis (UN Doc. S1994/1081). That gave the federation less than the 58 
percent it had claimed following the Washington Agreement; it expanded the territories 
offered to the Muslims and Croats under the Owen-Stoltenberg plan but fell short of what 
they were offered under the Vance-Owen plan (Burg and Shoup 1999, 303). The map 
won a “clear and unconditional acceptance” from the Federation assembly, while the 
Serbs responded by agreeing to consider it as “a basis for further negotiations” only 
(Owen 1995, 286). According to Karadžić, the map was so unacceptable that it had to 
have been purposely drawn “so the Serbs would reject [it] and be blamed for the 
continuation of the war” (quoted in Burg and Shoup 1999, 303). 
The members of the Contact Group could not agree among themselves on the next 
course of action to pressure the Serbs into accepting the plan on the table. According to 
Owen, the key was using military intervention to change players’ calculations regarding 
continued fighting: 
I fear that, just as in May 1993, my plea for using air power actually to implement a 
peace settlement was too much for these five governments to accept. They preferred to 
rest on the need for all-party agreement and on ad hoc threats of air strikes reacting to 
circumstances [such as the siege of Sarajevo and the attacks on Goražde], a far more 
unstable and dangerous strategy. As it turned out they were prepared to leave their own 
Contact Group map on the table for over a year without even negotiating on it. The 
disastrous consequences of that strategy were seen in July 1994 when, with the fall of 
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[the eastern Muslim-enclaves of] Srebrenica and Žepa, the Bosnian Serbs in effect tore up 
the Contact Group map (Owen 1995, 283). 
 
Even pressure by Milošević was insufficient to convince the Serbs to stop fighting 
in the summer of 1994. He publicly defended the Contact Group plan and demanded that 
the Bosnian Serbs concede for the good of all Serbians:  
The Contact Group proposals—which legalize the Bosnian Serb Republic and give it half 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina—is not anti-Serbian … In the interest of all citizens of FRY 
[the Former Republic of Yugoslavia], RSK [Republika Srpske Krajine] and the Bosnian 
Serb Republic, peace must be the choice. That means accepting the Contact Group 
proposals and allowing the peace process to continue (quoted in Owen 1995, 296). 
 
In August 1994 Milošević took action by ordering his government to break off relations 
with Republika Srpska and close its border to all but humanitarian transfers (297). 
Although this did not prove sufficient to break the resistance of Bosnian Serbs, it did win 
the FRY partial lifting of sanctions after a civilian monitoring mission organized by the 
ICFY confirmed the termination of cross-border non-humanitarian transfers (Burg and 
Shoup 1999, 309-310). 
American attempts to threaten the Serbs with a UN resolution that would lift the 
arms embargo against the Bosnian government failed also as the Russians declared they 
would use their veto power in the Security Council to oppose such a move (Burg and 
Shoup 1999, 307). There were repeated reports, however, that the U.S. nevertheless took 
that route by tolerating, if not facilitating, covert arms transfers to Bosnian Muslims. 
European military observers stationed with the UN forces in Bosnia were reporting 
seeing unauthorized C-130 cargo planes landing near Tuzla and delivering M-16 rifles 
and American-made uniforms to Muslim soldiers. U.S. officials were responding by 
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stating that “whether certain American allies in the Muslim world decide to trans-ship 
American materiel to the Bosnian Muslims is their business and not that of the 
administration” (Drozdiak and Ottaway 1995). 
By November, fighting had escalated particularly in the Bihać pocket in 
northwestern Bosnia as the Serbs launched attacks from the Serb-held Krajina region of 
Croatia. Bihać was one of the “safe areas” which NATO had the authority to protect. 
Once again NATO air strikes that were launched remained very limited and did not have 
a major effect on Serb military capabilities (Burg and Shoup 1999, 156-8). Nevertheless, 
Karadžić publicly signaled willingness to cease fighting and to accept mediation by 
Jimmy Carter; the former U.S. President succeeded in securing a four-month ceasefire—
“or longer if both sides desire”—as 1994 came to an end, providing a window of 
opportunity to induce Bosnian Serbs to choose some kind of peace over renewed fighting.  
According to the document signed by both Karadžić and Mladić on December 19, 
Bosnian Serbs agreed to “reach a comprehensive peace agreement during the cessation of 
hostilities, and the contact group's proposal will be the basis for negotiations on all 
issues.” They also committed to allow “unhindered passage” to aid envoys and to open 
the Sarajevo airport for the delivery of humanitarian aid (text quoted in BBC Summary of 
World Broadcasts December 28, 1994). The Bosnian Serb parliament also endorsed the 
agreement, informing “the Contact Group and the international community of the 
readiness on the part of Republika Srpska to enter peace negotiations on the basis of 
agreement with Carter” (Brand 1994). Perhaps they were simply trying to buy time now 
as the same entity, as well as the Bosnian Serb public in a referendum, had rejected the 
Contact Group plan in August. The president of the assembly had declared that the 
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Bosnian Serb leadership believed that “the only real solution is to create one Serbia for 
all of us…what is involved in our case is not two states [of Serbia and Republika Srpska], 
but one people who can only live in a unitary state without borders or special autonomous 
state entities” (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts August 31, 1994). 
As the ICFY Co-Chairmen tried to jumpstart negotiations on the Contact Group 
map, fighting resumed, with the potential consequence of rendering the territorial 
arrangements proposed irrelevant or unrealistic. The key was that the parties, particularly 
the Serbs, perceived continued fighting still as an effective strategy to impose the 
territorial division they preferred. Owen would later reflect on the developments of 1995 
with the clarity of hindsight: 
Stoltenberg and I were trying, as it turned out to no avail, to start negotiations on the 
Contact Group map before the Bosnian Muslims broke the ceasefire and the Bosnian 
Serbs decided to make changes by force of arms, as we were quite certain they would do 
some time in the summer. … It was four months before the Bosnian Serbs seized 
Srebrenica and Žepa and the Contact Group was unilaterally changed. At any time during 
those months it would have been possible to negotiate swaps whereby these enclaves 
would have been given up in return for land which the Muslims wanted around Sarajevo 
(Owen 1995, 316). 
 
May-October 1995: the Battlefield is Transformed 
 
By March 1995, the Bosnian army was on the offensive in violation of the Carter 
ceasefire agreement, including in the exclusion zone around Goražde. This was followed 
by attacks on the enclaves of Srebrenica and Žepa by Bosnian Serbs, who succeeded in 
taking control of Srebrenica by July, in the process slaughtering thousands of Muslims 
who were supposed to be protected in the “safe area.” Amidst threats of air strikes, they 
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moved on to overrun Žepa as well—military threats by third parties lacked any 
credibility. The Serbs saw their recent military advances as further leverage against the 
Contact Group plan: According to a high-level Bosnian Serb official, the plan “was 
designed for the sole purpose of meeting Muslim demands, it aimed at fragmenting our 
territory. Now that Žepa and Srebrenica fell, our land is a more compact entity” 
(Pandurević 1995). However, the tide would soon turn. 
Attacks against Muslim enclaves isolated within Serb-controlled territories and 
another deadly market shelling in Sarajevo at the end of August led the NATO to respond 
with major aerial attacks against Serb targets around Sarajevo, Tuzla, Goražde, Mostar, 
and Pale (Economist September 2, 1995). According to Assistant Secretary of State 
Richard Holbrooke, the primary U.S. envoy to Bosnia during 1995 negotiations, 
 In an action that combined brutality and stupidity, the Bosnian Serbs had slammed a 
mortar shell into the marketplace in Sarajevo on August 28, killing thirty-seven people 
and wounding more than eighty others. The attack angered President Clinton, and he told 
the United Nations and our NATO allies that we would wait no longer; it was time to ‘hit 
the Bosnian Serbs hard.’ His determination led to the start of the massive NATO air 
campaign (Holbrooke 1999, 337). 
 
The air campaign was accompanied by ground attacks on Serb forces around 
Sarajevo by UNPROFOR rapid reaction units, which were created at the beginning of the 
summer to “ensure the security of the United Nations Peace Forces (UNPF)/UNPROFOR 
and its freedom of movement for the accomplishment of all its missions” (UN Doc. 
S/RES/998 1995). Air strikes targeted Serb military facilities across Bosnia, crippling its 
communication capabilities. And while the air campaign continued, Croatian and Muslim 
forces launched successful operations, regaining control over much of central and 
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western Bosnia (Burg and Shoup 1999, 354). The balance of power had changed. 
“Instead of the Serbs having the capacity to redeploy rapidly and reinforce at will, it was 
the Croatian and Bosnian Muslim forces with indirect access to US satellite intelligence 
who now had the over-the horizon capacity and the ability to react quickly” (Owen 1995, 
336). 
It was also at this time that Croatian troops launched major offensives against the 
Serbs first in Western Slavonia and then in Krajina—UN-protected areas—and 
established control within days. 
The Bosnian Serbs cannot achieve a military victory, now that NATO is guaranteeing the 
principal Muslim cities. The collapse of their allies in Krajina, a traditionally Serb-
populated fringe of Croatia, has left them vulnerable. NATO's bombardment must have 
inflicted significant damage on their army: they had been keeping a third of their artillery 
pieces around Sarajevo. If the Bosnian Serbs, with an army of 64,000, fight on against the 
Bosnian Croats and Muslims, who have 150,000 troops, they are more likely to lose than 
gain territory. That kind of analysis may have led Momcilo Krajisnik, the leader of the 
Bosnian Serb parliament, to say on the evening of August 30th that peace negotiations 
should continue, despite NATO's attacks (Economist September 2, 1995). 
 
With the prospects of military victory or territorial advances looking grimmer than ever, 
Bosnian Serbs were reassessing what they considered to be a minimally acceptable 
arrangement to settle off the battlefield. “Bosnia's Serbs, weakened by the loss of support 
from their compatriots across the border in Croatia and facing a more vigorous Bosnian 
government army, might have been softened up enough to negotiate on the basis of the 
51-49 plan” (Lippman 1995).  
The war in the summer of 1995 had completely changed the terrain and the 
standing of the parties in Bosnia. Within a couple months, areas of control on the field 
had been altered (see Maps 8 and 9).  
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Like the earlier Serb takeovers of Srebrenica and Žepa, the Croatian victory in Krajina 
solved a heretofore intractable territorial issue. While NATO conducted air strikes against 
the Serbs in late August, the Croatian army proceeded to mount offensive operations in 
western Bosnia in September, in cooperation with the Bosnian army, routing the Serbs 
from Cazinska Krajina (the Bihać region) and much of Bosanska Krajina (western 
Bosnia). … [T]hese developments produced a radical redistribution of the territories 
under Croat, Muslim, and Serb control, bringing them more closely in line with the 
formulas that had been under negotiation since 1994 and shifting the military and 
political balance decisively in favor of the Croatian-Bosnian Muslim-Croat alliance (Burg 
and Shoup 1999, 331). 
 
U.S. mediators had in fact adopted the deliberate strategy of letting the parties 
work out their competing territorial claims on the battlefield as much as possible. 
Holbrooke would later report that they were delaying the commencement of multilateral 
negotiations “in order to give the Croat-Muslim offensive time to gain more ground 
against the Bosnian Serbs” (Holbrooke 1999, 338). In a letter he sent to Secretary of State 
Warren Christopher in September 1995, Holbrooke was stating his position in very clear 
terms: 
Contrary to many press reports and other impressions, the Federation military offensive 
has so far helped the peace process. The basic truth is perhaps not something we can say 
publicly right now….In fact, the map negotiation, which always seemed to me to be our 
most daunting challenge, is taking place right now on the battlefield, and so far, in a 
manner beneficial to the map. In only a few weeks, the famous 70%-30% division of the 
country has gone to around 50-50, obviously making our task easier (Holbrooke 1998, 
168). 
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Figure 3.8 Areas of Control, May 1995 
 
Copied from Burg and Shoup (1999, 332) 
 
 
Figure 3.9 Changes in Areas of Control, May-October 1995 
 
Copied from Burg and Shoup (1999, 333). 
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Unlike previous plans and negotiations, any settlement negotiated would no longer 
require that the Serbs withdraw from substantial amounts of territory under their control, 
thereby reducing political costs they would attach to settling.  
 
The Road to Dayton44
 
Richard Holbrooke finally brought together the adversaries with the Contact Group on 
September 8 in Geneva. In accordance with an earlier agreement, Bosnian Serbs were 
represented by the FRY delegation.45 The result was a consensus on three “Agreed Basic 
Principles,” according to which Bosnia and Hercegovina would retain its present borders; 
it would consist of two entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Hercegovina as established 
by the Washington Agreement, and the Republika Srpska; and territories would be 
allocated based on a 51-49 percent division (Owen 1995, 333). Following that, on 
September 14, Holbrooke secured a unilateral commitment by the Serbs to lift the four-
year siege, withdraw all heavy weapons, and “cease all offensive operations” around 
Sarajevo. What the Serbs got in return was Holbrooke’s word that he would 
“recommend” to the commander of UN forces on the ground that the UN/NATO 
                                                 
44 Unless otherwise specified, information on the negotiations leading up to and at Dayton presented in this 
section is compiled from Holbrooke’s (1998) accounts.  
45 “On August 30th Serbia's government said that henceforth it would form a joint team with the Bosnian 
Serbs to conduct peace negotiations. If the two halves of the team disagreed, Mr Milosevic would have the 
casting vote” (“NATO declares war” 1995). “Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke said the key 
to a possible Balkan peace was found when Bosnian-Serb leader Radovan Karadzic and his top military 
aide Gen. Ratko Mladic signed an agreement last month that gave Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic 
the power to negotiate on their behalf. Milosevic will assume that role during peace talks later this month in 
the United States with Presidents Alija Izetbegovic of Bosnia- Herzegovina and Franjo Tudjman of Croatia. 
Holbrooke said he was hopeful Milosevic, who has armed and supplied his proxies waging war in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, will be able to strike a deal in the negotiations. If the Bosnian Serbs refuse to accept it, 
Holbrooke said that moment will be the beginning of the end for them. NATO will resume an air campaign 
against the Bosnian Serbs that is widely credited with weakening them to the point where negotiations 
became the only alternative, Holbrooke said, and Milosevic will feel so betrayed that he will cut off all 
support” (Balman 1995). 
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operation stop (Holbrooke 1998, 151-152). To the dismay of Izetbegović and Tuđman, 
General Janvier of the UN agreed to “pause” bombings as long the Serbs complied with 
the agreement.  
In the following weeks, mediators continued to meet with the parties separately as 
preparation for comprehensive negotiations which would need to take place eventually. 
They did not seem to be in a hurry to convene those negotiations or even to pressure for a 
ceasefire. On the contrary, as late as on October 1, Holbrooke and his delegation were 
urging Croatian and Federation forces to continue their struggles on the battlefield “in the 
next week or so” since “this might be the federation’s last change to capture them before 
we started negotiating” (191). At a joint meeting with Izetbegović and Tuđman on 
September 19, Holbrooke had already given clear directions in terms of the territorial 
distribution he wanted to see on the field before starting negotiations:  
Nothing we said today should be construed to mean that we want you to stop the rest of 
the offensive, other than Banja Luka. Speed is important. We can’t say so publicly, but 
please take Sanski Most, Prijedor, and Bosanski Novi. And do it quickly, before the Serbs 
regroup! (166) 
 
Within the first week of October, however, the American team conceded that they 
“feared that the Croat-Muslim offensive would soon run out of steam” and were further 
“concerned by the growing friction between Zagreb and Sarajevo, which had caused 
Zagreb to halt its advance and threatened what had already been achieved” (193). It was 
time to move the struggle from the battlefield to the negotiation table. Although 
Izetbegović was still being pressured by his military officers to continue fighting, 
Holbrooke convinced him on October 5 to sign the ceasefire plan which was prepared in 
accordance with the conditions previously advanced by Izetbegović himself; Milošević 
 94
  
had already agreed to the ceasefire and its terms, including the return of gas and 
electricity to Sarajevo and the opening of the road to Goražde before peace negotiations 
could start (196-8). 
 President Clinton announced the same day that a general ceasefire was to take 
effect in Bosnia in five days, provided gas and electricity were restored to Sarajevo; 
Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian Presidents would follow this up by meeting for peace 
talks in the US. As Clinton made his announcement, Holbrooke’s team was in Zagreb to 
urge Tuđman to continue the military advance for the next five days, telling him “what 
you don’t win on the battlefield will be hard to gain at the peace talks. Don’t waste these 
last days” (199). The ceasefire did go into effect at the scheduled time in most of Bosnia.  
By the time the talks finally convened on 1 November 1995 in Dayton, the mediators 
were already well informed of the priorities each president was coming to the table with. 
For Tuđman, it was the re-integration of eastern Slavonia (territory along Croatia’s 
border with Serbia), where the substantial Serb minority had formed an SAO after 
Croatia’s declaration of independence. For Milošević, who was representing the joint 
Yugoslav-Bosnian Serb delegation, it was the lifting of sanctions.46 For Izetbegović, it 
was the reconstruction of the Federation government (in addition to negotiations on the 
new state which would have the Federation as one of its entities). The mediators had 
decided not to introduce the issue of the map into the negotiations until progress was 
made on other matters (236-240). 
                                                 
46 After the Bosnian Serb members showed unwillingness, if not strong resistance, to cooperate in the first 
few days at Dayton, they were “essentially isolated. … Dark and brooding, they hovered on the edge of the 
conference” (243). Although Bosnian Serbs were present in the delegation, neither Karadžić nor Mladić 
were there as they had already been indicted by the UN War Crimes Tribunal at the Hague. 
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As negotiations went along, it became apparent once again that the map would be 
the most contentious issue, with the status of Sarajevo, specifics of the Serb-controlled 
Posavina Corridor near Brčko, and the linking of Goražde with Sarajevo taking the center 
stage.  
The table in Dayton [was] strewn with maps. Just about everyone agrees that the Bosnian 
Serbs should have 49% of the country and a federation of Muslims and Croats 51%, but 
not who gets which bits. Helpfully, the current division of land is about half-and-half. But 
the mainly Muslim government of Bosnia wants Sarajevo for the federation, while the 
Bosnian Serbs would divide it. The Muslims want a corridor of land to link Goražde, an 
enclave in eastern Bosnia, to the rest of their territory, while the Serbs want to widen the 
corridor that connects the two halves of their domain. Neither agrees to the other's 
demand (Economist November 4, 1995).  
 
The first meeting of the parties to discuss the map was a “disaster,” as Izetbegović 
demanded a unified Sarajevo (which would become a Federation territory) and the 
Bosnian Serb delegation vehemently objected (Holbrooke 1998, 255). Tuđman also 
intensified his pressure on the issue of eastern Slavonia by moving his troops closer to the 
area. When negotiations entered their second week, however, positive developments 
started to take place: an agreement on the Federation was announced on November 10, 
and the issue of eastern Slavonia was settled the next day—a 12-month UN transitional 
administration, with the possibility of extension for up to another year, before being 
turned over to Croatia. By the 18th, the map (with the exception of Goražde), the status of 
Sarajevo, and the issue of whether refugees would be able to vote by absentee registration 
in their pre-war locations seemed to be the remaining sticking points (289-91). 
 An unexpected—and hard to explain—breakthrough occurred when Milošević 
announced to the mediators that he was ready to give up Sarajevo even though multiple 
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proposals of joint-control were on the table. His condition was that the position he was 
taking not be revealed to the Serb delegation until the issue was conclusively settled. 
Meeting with his team afterwards, Holbrooke would later ask “Why did Milošević do 
this? … And, can he actually make it happen? Has he decided to abandon the Bosnian 
Serbs? Can he really force the Bosnian Serbs to give up their parts of the city?” (292). 
Milošević’s own explanation was that “Izetbegović has earned Sarajevo by not 
abandoning it. He’s one tough guy. It’s his” (291).  Soon thereafter, he compromised on 
Goražde and that issue was settled also.  
All of his agreements, however, were contingent on going back to the 51:49 
percent division, which had become a hot issue once Milošević realized that the result 
now was more like 55:45 (298). “Give me anything,” he told the mediators, “rocks, 
swamps, hills—anything, as long as gets us to 49:51” (302). This was the minimum he 
could take back to Serbia and Bosnian Serbs without appearing like he had surrendered 
without a fight. The discrepancy was settled after Tuđman agreed to give back Croat-
controlled territory to make up 75 percent of the area that would need to be conceded; the 
originally agreed distribution was reestablished by “shaving the map by 1 percent”—
taking from the “theoretical land” given to the Muslims through the negotiations, not 
currently under their control (303, 308). 
 
 
 
 
 97
  
The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Hercegovina47
 
The final agreement, which came to be also known as the Dayton Peace Accord (DPA), 
was initialed by the three parties in Dayton on 21 November 199548 and signed in Paris 
on 14 December 1995 (see Map 10). Credibility of commitments was established with 
provisions for unprecedented levels of third party enforcement. A multinational 
(primarily NATO) military Implementation Force—IFOR—would enforce the territorial 
and military components of the agreement.49 A High Representative (HR), with no 
authority over IFOR, would be responsible for the implementation of the civilian 
aspects—“to facilitate the Parties' own efforts and to mobilize and, as appropriate, 
coordinate the activities of the organizations and agencies involved in the civilian aspects 
of the peace settlement” (Annex 10, Article 1). A UN International Police Task Force—
IPTF—would also be present to assist the parties with civilian law enforcement; its own 
enforcement capability would be limited. 
In accordance with earlier agreements, the DPA transformed the Republic of 
Bosnia and Hercegovina into a loose federation—Bosnia and Hercegovina (BiH)—
composed of two entities, the Federation of Bosnia-Hercegovina (FBiH) and the 
Republika Srpska (RS). Extensive decentralization, guaranteed power-sharing along 
ethnic lines, and a high dose of veto points would characterize the political systems of   
                                                 
47 Unless otherwise specified, all information provided in this section comes directly from the document 
“The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Hercegovina,” which can be found at 
www.ohr.int/dpa/default.asp?content_id=380 (accessed on April 1, 2007). The annexes referenced in the 
section refer to those that complemented the main document. 
48 Milošević delivered the signatures of the Bosnian Serb leaders to the mediators the next day (Holbrooke 
1998, 310). 
49 IFOR had a one-year mandate, after which it was replaced by the NATO-led Stabilization Force—SFOR. 
The latter was replaced by an EU force—EUFOR—in December 2004.  
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Figure 3.10 The Final Map: Dayton Peace Accord 
 
Copied from Burg and Shoup (1999, 365) 
 
BiH and FBiH. The result of Dayton was a de facto partition into highly ethnically 
homogenized entities, with minimal powers at the central level.50  
 
Institutions of BiH 
 
The constitution for BiH as designed in Dayton recognized Bosniacs, Serbs, and Croats 
as its constituent peoples, guaranteeing them equal representation and veto powers in 
                                                 
50 The entities even kept their separate armies and defense ministries until 2005 (Bieber 2006, 47). Even 
within the Muslim-Croat Federation separate Muslim and Croat controlled territories continued to exist for 
years after its foundation in 1994. Croats at times boycotted the federation parliament and even maintained 
parallel institutions in areas under their control (Bieber 2006 49, 65; ICG 1997; ICG 2001). 
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central government institutions.51 The bicameral Parliamentary Assembly was to be 
composed a House of Representatives, with two-thirds of its 42 members directly elected 
from the Federation and the rest from RS (with no ethnic quotas per se), and a House of 
Peoples, with 10 members from the FBiH and 5 from RS. 5 members of each group 
would be present in the House of Peoples; those representing the Federation (5 Bosniacs 
and 5 Croats) would be selected by the delegates of their respective groups in the upper 
house of the FBiH, and the Serb members would be selected by the National Assembly of 
the RS. All legislation would need to be approved by both houses with the simple 
majority of those present and voting; while at least 3 members of each group would need 
to be present for a quorum in the House of Peoples, simply majority of the members 
would constitute a quorum in the House of Representatives.  
Perhaps most importantly, any legislation could be declared as “destructive of a 
vital interest of the Bosniac, Croat, or Serb people by a majority of, as appropriate, the 
Bosniac, Croat, or Serb Delegates” in the upper house (Annex 4, Article IV(3)(e)). In 
other words, three members of any group could veto legislation in the House of Peoples. 
Separate majority support from the three different groups would then be required to 
overturn such a veto, which means that at least one member who invoked the veto in the 
first place would need change his/her position.  
Veto powers were also invested in the members of the Presidency, which was to 
be composed of three-members: a Bosniac and a Croat, each directly elected from the 
Federation, and one Serb directly elected from the RS. The members were required only 
                                                 
51 In terms of civil service appointments in general, “Officials appointed to positions in the institutions of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be generally representative of the peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina,” 
which suggests approximate proportional representation (Annex 4, Article IX(3)). 
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to “endeavor to adapt all presidential decisions by consensus,” 52 and the approval of two 
members would be sufficient in case a consensus could not be reached (Annex 4, Article 
V(2)(c)). Each member of the Presidency could, however, invoke a veto by declaring a 
presidential decision “destructive of a vital interest” of the entity s/he represents. 
Overturning this veto would require two-thirds vote of the National Assembly of the RS 
if the veto was invoked by the Serb member of the Presidency, of the Bosniac members 
of the upper house of the FBiH if it was invoked by the Bosniac member, and of the 
Croat members of the upper house of the FBiH if it was invoked by the Croat member. 
The highest court of the state, the Constitutional Court, was to be composed of 
nine members: four judges selected by the lower house of the FBiH, two by the Assembly 
of the RS, and three by the President of the European Court of Human Rights. In addition 
to the regular appellate powers, it would also have jurisdiction to rule on disputes 
between the entities and between an entity and the central government. The foreign High 
Representative (HR), however, would in fact have the final say over fundamental issues 
as s/he is “the final authority in theater regarding interpretation of this Agreement on the 
civilian implementation of the peace settlement” (Annex 10, Article IV). Given the 
inefficiency of the veto-rich political system, the HR in fact became the primary source 
of important laws, as well as constitutional amendments, especially after its power was 
beefed up at the conference of the multi-national Peace Implementation Council in Bonn 
on December 1997: the HR was given extensive executive and legislative authority— 
“Bonn powers”—to remove officials if they fail to comply with the DPA and impose 
necessary laws when local legislative bodies fail to do so (Bieber 2006, 84).  
 
                                                 
52 Emphasis added by author.  
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Institutions of the Federation53
 
As discussed earlier, the Federation of Bosnia and Hercegovina was created by the 
Washington Agreement in 1994. The political structure of the FBiH largely mirrored that 
of BiH in terms of its decentralization and guaranteed power sharing, with the exclusion 
of the Serbs; only the Bosniacs and the Croats were originally identified as constituent 
peoples of this entity. The upper house (House of Peoples) for the bicameral legislature 
would have equal number of members representing constituent groups (to be elected by 
cantonal legislatures) and Federation-wide proportional representation elections would be 
used to allocate lower house seats (House of Representatives), provided that each 
constituent group occupies a minimum number of seats (Articles IV(A)(1) and IV(A)(2)). 
Legislative vetoes could be invoked by a majority of either the Bosniac or the Croat 
members in the House of Peoples by declaring an issue to be of “vital interest,” after 
which approval would require majority support of both groups separately (Article 
IV(A)(6)).54 Constitutional changes would require separate majorities in the upper house, 
as well as a two-thirds majority in the lower house (Article VIII). 
 Although the principle of parity was maintained for the executive in the FBiH, its 
structure differed from that of BiH. The President, who is the head of state, would be 
accompanied by a Vice-President; they would each need to represent a different 
constituent group and the two nominees would need to be jointly approved by majority in 
both houses, including the majority of both caucuses in the upper house. The Prime 
Minister, who would be the head of government, a Deputy Prime Minister, other 
                                                 
53 The constitution (with all the amendments indicated) is available on the website for the Office of High 
Representative at www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/legal/oth-legist/doc/fbih-constitution.doc (accessed on January 27, 
2007). 
54 Later, amendments made it more difficult to invoke “vital interests.” 
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ministers and their deputies would make up the cabinet; no minister (or Prime Minister) 
would represent the same constituent group as his/her deputy; the cabinet would be 
approved by majority in the House of Representatives (Article IV(B)).    
As one of the entities making up the state of Bosnia and Hercegovina, the Federation 
exercised authority over issues other than those reserved for the central government, 
which were foreign policy, international trade, customs, inter-entity interactions, 
immigration, communication, and air traffic. Power at the federation level, however, is 
devolved further not only to the cantons but also further down to municipalities. The 
constitution required that each canton delegate its authority over education, culture, 
tourism, and media to “those Municipalities whose majority population is other than that 
of the Canton as a whole” (Article V(1)). Moreover, the ethnically mixed cantons of 
Srednja Bosna and Neretva were identified as “special cantons,”55 with extensive power-
sharing guarantees and veto powers very similar to those provided at the Federation level. 
The status of the city of Mostar, which had been the scene of intense fighting during the 
war, was even more complicated: it was divided into six municipalities with power-
sharing arrangements similar to those at higher levels of the government. “The 
competences of the city government were minimal,” and the Croat-controlled West 
Mostar and the Muslim-dominated East Mostar practically functioned as two separate 
municipalities that made up the city (Bieber 2005, 420).56
 
Institutions of Republika Srpska 
 
In great contrast to the governmental structures of BiH and the FBiH, the Republika 
Srpska was designed as an explicitly “Serb” and highly centralized republic, with no 
recognition of other ethnic groups and no guarantees of power sharing. It was a war-time 
construction. While in 1991 the area now making up the RS had a slight Serb majority of 
                                                 
55 These special regimes were later abolished. 
56 Mostar was under EU administration until January 1997. The high level of decentralization was 
eliminated in 2004 when the HR imposed—after local parties refused—the unification of the city under a 
single municipality. “Vital interests” were still protected with super-majority requirements (Bieber 2005, 
424).  
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54 percent, after the systematic ethnic cleansing that took place during the war it became 
an almost mono-ethnic territory, with the share of Serb population increasing to nearly 97 
percent (Bieber 2006, 76). The majoritarian nature of the post-war political system 
further served to discourage the return of refugees once the war was over: “Even under its 
more moderate governments after 1998, returnees have been obstructed from returning to 
a considerable degree, with the clear intent of preventing a reversal of the population 
structure to a more diverse society where Serbs could lose their political, social, and 
economic dominance” (113).57 Under its original constitution, the RS had a 
parliamentary system with a unicameral legislature and a largely symbolic president as 
the head of state. There were no guarantees for the representation of different ethnic 
groups, and hence also no veto rights, in any of the entity’s institutions (Bose 2002, 68-
73). The Muslims were, nevertheless, able to occupy about 20 percent of legislative seats 
as a result of the DPA’s provision that refugees can vote in territories where they 
originally resided (Bieber 2006, 80).  
 
Brčko  
 
The town of Brčko, and the municipality surrounding it, is located on the Posavino 
Corridor, which links the Serb-controlled territory in the west to that in the east and to 
Serbia. Muslims made up the majority of the population in the town and plurality in the 
municipality (Bieber 2006, 134). Hence, it was one of the highly contested territories 
                                                 
57 Problems with minority returns—return of refugees back to their homes where they would now be 
minorities—were not specific only to RS. Schooling, for instance, has been a major obstacle since power 
over education issues was mostly devolved to mono-ethnic political entities—to RS and to the cantons and 
sometimes municipalities in the Federation; this created problems in terms which alphabet is used 
(Muslims and Croats use Latin, while Serbs use Cyrillic) and how sensitive subjects, such as history, are 
taught (Bieber 2006, 112). 
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during the war. It was also one of the issues that could not be settled during Dayton 
negotiations; it was left to be arbitrated, with the process commencing within six months 
of the DPA’s signing (Annex II). After being placed under international supervision for 
three years, with requirements that the RS facilitates refugee returns and creates a 
multiethnic administration, Brčko’s final status was arbitrated in 1999, whereby it 
became a separate district under international administration: 
[Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia-Hercegovina] shall be deemed to have 
delegated all of its powers of governance within the pre-war Brčko Opština to a new 
institution, a new multi-ethnic democratic government to be known as "The Brčko 
District of Bosnia and Herzegovina" under the exclusive sovereignty of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. The legal effect will be permanently to suspend all of the legal authority of 
both entities within the Opština and to recreate it as a single administrative unit. As an 
institution existing under the sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the new District 
government will be subject to the powers of the common institutions of BiH as those 
powers are enumerated in the BiH Constitution (Brčko Arbitral Tribunal 1999, Articles 
9-10).58  
The powers of the Supervisor would also be “expanded” and “augmented” (Article 37). 
Brčko has in effect become a third entity under BiH. Residents do not have 
separate citizenships but of one of the entities and of BiH. While they can vote in the 
elections for their respective entities, these governments have no authority over them 
(Bieber 2006, 136). The district has a mayor as the head of executive and a district 
legislature, which was given the responsibility to elect the mayor. The international 
supervisor, however, ended up exercising the ultimate power until 2004, including the 
naming of the mayor and members of the parliament, and imposing laws. As safeguards 
against tyranny of majority (i.e. permanent Serb majority), the Statute of the District 
                                                 
58 Relevant documents are available at www.ohr.int/ohr-offices/brcko/default.asp?content_id=5356 
(accessed March 1, 2007).
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(Article 34) required super-majorities for important legislation and for amendments to the 
statute, thereby indirectly providing veto opportunities to the different groups without 
mentioning ethnicity. While the original statute proposed by the Arbitral Tribunal did not 
require any guaranteed representation for the different groups in the legislature, an 
electoral law adopted later did provide for three reserved seats for each of the constituent 
peoples (Bieber 2006, 137).  
 
Post-Dayton: Re-Negotiating the Rules of the Game59
 
The Dayton agreement reflected the interests of the US administration in bringing the 
fighting to a halt, rather than the readiness of the three warring parties to settle their 
political differences. Thus, it produced an unstable peace under which the parties 
continued their pursuit of fundamentally incompatible goals by other than military means, 
while they prepared for what appeared to be an inevitable resumption of fighting (Burg 
and Shoup 1999, 318). 
 
Major institutional changes have indeed been pursued and implemented in post-Dayton 
Bosnia. This is by no means a sign of the instability of peace, however. To the contrary, it 
is a sign of consolidation that the players have chosen to stay off the battlefield and 
utilize legitimate channels to vie for change. 
  The most fundamental set of institutional reforms were introduced in 2002 after a 
monumental decision of the Constitutional Court. The whole process started when the 
Serb Civic Council, a non-governmental organization which had remained loyal to the 
Bosnian state during the war (in opposition to SDS), demanded that the Federation 
                                                 
59 Evolution of electoral laws in BiH  is also a very good example of how institutions continue to be 
(re)negotiated after the initial settlement. See the next chapter for a comparison of the development of 
electoral institutions in BiH and Macedonia. 
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change its constitution to declare all three groups as constituent peoples. Although the 
initiative did not result in a change at that point, it led Izetbegović to bring the issue to the 
Constitutional Court. He challenged a number of articles in both entity constitutions, 
which he argued contradicted the state constitution’s fundamental principle of the 
equality of three constituent groups. The primary question in front of the court was  
whether the list of Bosnia’s constituent peoples in the preamble to the state constitution 
meant that all three nations (and the “others”) were “constituent” throughout Bosnia & 
Herzegovina or whether they were equal only at the level of the state. If it were the latter, 
then Serbs were entitled to their privileged status in the RS, and Croats and Bosniacs to 
theirs in the Federation (ICG 2002, 3). 
 
In a set of divided decisions in 2000, the Court found a number of articles in both 
entity constitutions to be unconstitutional (Case no. U-5/98). While the three international 
and the two Bosniac judges voted in favor of Izetbegović’s case, the two Croat and the 
two Serb judges dissented.60 Primarily, the provision in the RS Constitution declaring the 
entity “a state of the Serb people” and that in the FBiH Constitution recognizing Bosniacs 
and Croats as “constituent peoples” were found to violate the constitution of BiH. 
Consequently, all other provisions that gave the Bosniacs and the Croats reserved rights 
(e.g. presidency seats) with the exclusion of the Serbs were also unconstitutional: 
The constitutional principle of collective equality of constituent peoples following from 
the designation of Bosniacs, Croats and Serbs as constituent peoples prohibits any special 
privilege for one or two of these peoples, any domination in governmental structures, or 
any ethnic homogenisation through segregation based on territorial separation (Case no. 
U-5/98 III, Articles 60). 
                                                 
60 One of these Serb judges later went as far as saying publicly that “if the decision of the Constitutional 
Court of BiH on the constituent peoples in Republika Srpska and in the Federation is implemented, then the 
survival of the structures defined in the BiH constitution will be called into question” (quoted in ICG 2002, 
7). 
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The fact that the RS Constitution did not explicitly provide guaranteed 
representation in government institutions for all three groups was also found to be in 
violation of the state constitution. The Court ruled that although “the Constitution of RS 
does not prima facie provide for any ethnic distinction in the composition of 
governmental bodies,” provision of equal individual rights does not suffice: 
The equality of groups is not the same as the equality of individuals through non-
discrimination. Equality of three constituent peoples requires equality of groups as such, 
whereas the mixture of the ethnic principle with the non-ethnic citizen principle in the 
compromise formula should avoid special collective rights that violate individual rights 
by definition. It thus follows that individual non-discrimination does not substitute for 
equality of groups (Articles 70-71). 
 
As the Court could not propose or impose alternative constitutional provisions, 
the next phase involved intense negotiations over competing amendment proposals. The 
HR created a constitutional committee for each entity, containing an equal number of 
Serb, Croat, and Bosniac representatives.61 A fundamental point of contention emerged 
even before the parties from both entities started to negotiate: Main parties in the FBiH 
argued that the RS would need to make such amendments that the two entities will have 
“symmetrical” institutions and similar arrangements of power-sharing. Those in the RS, 
on the other hand, strongly objected and supported weaker and less expansive guarantees 
for minorities in their entity. The HR’s stance was somewhere in the middle. He argued 
that the key was not that “the mechanisms for protecting the rights of the constituent 
peoples should be identical,” but that “they should ensure identical levels of protection in 
both entities” (ICG 2002, 6). 
                                                 
61 Although all major political parties were involved in the process, HDZ was not since it had withdrawn 
from all Federation institutions in March 2001in favor of self-government using institutions left from 
Herceg-Bosna—the war-time Croat republic (Bieber 2006, 65) .   
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After heated negotiations during January and February 2002, representatives of 
the Federation and of the RS agreed to a set of amendments (which came to be known as 
the Sarajevo Agreement), the latter with some reservations. While all major parties had 
initially entered the talks, the SDA and the HDZ remained opposed to the agreement; on 
the other hand, members of the then-ruling Alliance of Change in the FBiH—composed 
of moderate and non-nationalist parties—made concessions by agreeing to less extensive 
amendments in the RS compared to those that would be instituted in their own entity 
(ICG 2002, 7). The next struggle was to get the amendments approved in respective 
legislatures. 
While the House of Peoples of the Federation failed to pass the amendments due 
SDA and HDZ refusal, the RS National Assembly approved them, albeit after major 
changes, whereby the end result fell short of the Sarajevo Agreement. The HR responded 
by imposing the originally agreed changes, which gave the Serbs in the FBiH all the 
guaranteed representation rights that were previously reserved for the Croats and the 
Bosniacs. Changes were more dramatic for the RS, where a new house of legislature—
Council of Peoples—that would have equal number of representatives from each of the 
three groups was established for the purpose of safeguarding “vital interests.” For both 
entities, the definition of “vital interests” and the procedures for dealing with them were 
clearly laid out. A minimum of 4 representatives from each group would also need to be 
present in the RS National Assembly, as well as in the FBiH House of Representatives. In 
addition to the prime minister and the deputy prime minister representing two different 
constituent groups, not more than two of the top official positions in the RS were to be 
represented by the same group; the cabinet would also need to have certain number of 
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ministers associated with each group (Sarajevo Agreement 2002). Power-sharing and 
veto provisions in the RS, in other words, would now resemble those in the FBiH and 
BiH.   
 
Negotiations for Further Change 
 
Constitutional amendments of 2002 were major institutional changes in line with the 
DPA’s principles of guaranteed power-sharing and veto opportunities as further 
safeguards against domination by one or two of the constituent groups. Negotiations for a 
different kind of change—towards centralization of power—started to take place in 2005. 
These talks among Bosnia’s major party leaders, however, remained secretive for a while 
due to “fears of a backlash from their own communities;” they even denied that such 
negotiations were taking place (Katana and Igrić 2005). They were able to reach 
agreement on a set of amendments in March 2005, soon after which the proposed 
package was submitted to the BiH legislature.  
The changes were aimed to increase the efficiency of decision-making and the 
effectiveness of the state government, in line with the requirements put forth by the 
Venice Commission as preconditions for the country’s EU membership (for details of the 
package see Hays and Crosby 2006; ICG 2007). Despite discussions on eliminating the 
tripartite presidency in favor of a single president to be elected by the House of 
Representatives, the parties could not agree on this point, with the objections of the Serb 
parties in particular. They did settle on changing the rules for electing the members of the 
presidency, who would be selected by the House of Representatives instead of being 
elected directly by the people in the entities. The issues that would require consensual 
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decision-making of the presidency would also be further restricted. Elections for the 
House of Peoples would also change from direct election to election by the House of 
Representatives. The functions of the upper house would be limited to “vital national 
interest” issues, which was a compromise since parties discussed but could not agree on 
eliminating one of the houses. Finally, the powers of the central government would be 
enhanced by adding new cabinet portfolios and increasing its authority over issues of 
defense, security, and law and order. 
In an unexpected return of events that stalled the reform process, the package 
failed to win support of two-thirds majority in the House of Representatives and was 
rejected. Members of the Party for Bosnia and Hercegovina (SBiH), supportive of the 
process earlier on, and a splinter group of the HDZ (HDZ 1990) voted against the 
proposed changes—the former because they did not believe the reforms went far enough 
to prevent deadlocks in decision-making and the latter because the amendments they 
proposed had been rejected (ICG 2007, 10). Setting themselves apart from their pro-
package counterparts could also have been a calculated strategy for the upcoming 
election: All three major parties—SDA, SDS, and HDZ—lost ground in October 2006 
elections, while SBiH ended up winning the Muslim seat of the BiH Presidency, as well 
as the second highest number of seats in the House of Representatives—with 7 seats, just 
behind SDA, which secured 8 seats. Following the elections, the future of these 
amendments, which came to be known as the April Package, began to look even more 
gloomy—not only had the rejectionist SBiH risen but the poor performance of the SDS 
had also forced changes within the party, bringing to power leaders who announced they 
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would not accept any centrist constitutional changes that would weaken the authority of 
Republika Srpska (Mustajbegović 2007).     
 
 
Conclusion 
 
A traditional peace treaty consists of a cease-fire and arms reduction and boundary 
demarcation agreements. Dayton went far beyond these goals to create a state, comprised 
of two multi-ethnic entities. Dayton's aim was to not only stop the fighting, but to reverse 
ethnic cleansing and provide a blueprint for a new, unified country. Today Bosnia and 
Herzegovina has three de facto mono-ethnic entities, three separate armies, three separate 
police forces, and a national government that exists mostly on paper and operates at the 
mercy of the entities. Indicted war criminals remain at large and political power is 
concentrated largely in the hands of hard line nationalists determined to obstruct 
international efforts to advance the peace process. In many areas, local political leaders 
have joined forces with police and local extremists to prevent refugees from returning to 
their pre-war homes. The effect has been to cement wartime ethnic cleansing and 
maintain ethnic cleansers in power within mono-ethnic political frameworks. The few 
successes of Dayton – the Central Bank, a common currency, common license plates, 
state symbols and customs reforms – are superficial and were imposed by the 
international community. Indeed, the only unqualified success has been the four-year 
absence of armed conflict (ICG 1999, 1). 
 
Despite certain implementation problems, which perhaps come naturally when groups of 
people who have been victimized and demonized during a vicious civil war are forced 
into coexistence overnight, after almost twelve years peace in Bosnia still lives on. Even 
when confronted with destabilizing regional factors (such as the war in Kosovo or the 
tensions in Macedonia), provocations by defectors (such as Ante Jelavić’s declaration of 
secession), or displeasure with the legitimate political channels, players chose not to 
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return to the battlefield. Peace has indeed become the only game in town; parties seem to 
have reached self-enforcing, power sharing peace (i.e. P1) at Dayton.  
 This case illustrates the vitality of creating a post-war system that provides every 
relevant player with vested interests in reaching and preserving peace. Given the players’ 
initial demands—what each felt they were entitled to—a decentralized state with 
guaranteed power sharing provisions and extensive veto rights was required to fulfill that 
condition in Bosnia. This was recognized by everyone involved early on, thereby making 
the option of a centralized, majoritarian system obsolete (hence, eliminating the lower 
subgames that start at A’s decision nodes in Figure 2.1). The primary question that 
remained was the location of the territories where each group would exercise autonomy. 
This proved to be a lot harder to resolve, prolonging the war for years, even after the 
players had already concurred on the fundamental structure of the new state.  
An analysis of years of arduous map negotiations in Bosnia demonstrates that 
territorial issues get resolved on the battlefield. As long as they are capable of securing 
control over additional areas, players are uncooperative at the table. This is particularly 
true if bargaining is over the map, in which case pursuing a better deal on the field is a 
real option (as opposed to fighting for certain institutional features). Furthermore, once a 
player is in control of a certain territory, giving that up becomes politically very costly 
(i.e. high PC and low EU(P) in Equation 2, Chapter 2). Unlike negotiations over details 
of political institutions, which tend to take place behind closed doors, surrendering areas 
of control is a highly public move, with direct effects on constituencies. It was for this 
reason that it was not possible to reach a mutually acceptable agreement in this case 
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before players had already secured on the battlefield the territorial distribution they each 
would be content with.  
 Finally, this case shows that there is no single formula that would be acceptable to 
settle a given civil conflict at every point in its lifespan, let alone a single formula that 
could be prescribed to settle just any conflict. The critical value of a settlement for each 
player, which was represented as ( )*. ipx Δ+  in Equation 13 in Chapter 2, is a function of 
the utility each player expects from continued war at that point and the political costs it 
attaches to the given offer. However, given the initial demands players go into the 
conflict with, certain institutions might become integral to what one or more players 
identify as the critical threshold a settlement should satisfy; capitulating to an 
arrangement devoid of those carry such political costs that the player(s) choose war over 
peace regardless of relative military capabilities. In other words, peace has to offer 
players at least what they each deem to be the absolute minimum. When a conflict 
divides a society into mutually exclusive identity groups, each of which demand a share 
in political power and state resources, devolution of power, guarantees of power sharing, 
and protection from the tyranny of the majority via mutual veto rights become the 
absolute minimums. These institutions eventually convinced all parties to leave the 
battlefield and hold onto peace, even when they disagree with this or that outcome of 
legitimate political processes.  
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4. Similar Starting Points, Different Results: Institutional Bargaining in 
Bosnia, Macedonia, and Kosovo 
 
The move by Croatia and Slovenia to declare independence from the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) fueled civil conflicts within the remaining republics, 
particularly in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Macedonia, and Kosovo, which was a formerly 
autonomous province within the boundaries of Serbia.62 The underlying cause was the 
same in all three cases: fear by minority groups of being permanently disadvantaged once 
the authoritarian power sharing mechanisms imposed under Tito were taken away. 
Institutional bargaining became center-stage in attempts to avert and stop conflict in all 
three cases; power sharing, minority veto powers, and decentralization—albeit in 
different formats and degrees—quickly emerged as critical components of any proposal 
that would even have the chance of reaching the negotiation table. The results of 
negotiations, however, differed significantly.  
In addition to the legacy of Yugoslavia, these cases shared similarities in 
structural and contextual characteristics, such as religious and ethnic diversity, problems 
with economic development, and geographic location, which exposed them to the same 
regional factors of instability. So, what explains the differences?  Why was it possible to 
forestall war in Macedonia with an agreement that was much less generous than the 
Dayton Peace Accords (DPA) to the minority, while no level of power sharing could be 
found to simultaneously satisfy both rivals in Kosovo?  
                                                 
62 Similar conflicts not studied here include the civil war between the Croatian government and the Serb 
minority in Krajina, and the Albanian insurgency in Preševo, southern Serbia.  
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The purpose of this chapter is not to establish a causal link between a given set of 
political institutions and macro political outcomes, such as war and peace. Rather, its 
function is to illustrate the validity of the theoretical argument on the microfoundations of 
post-conflict institutional design and political behavior induced thereafter. The game I 
presented in Chapter 2 was played in all three cases at different stages of conflict: In 
Bosnia multiple shots of the game were played leading up to and during the war, as the 
conditions on the battlefield, and hence the payoffs, evolved; a negotiated settlement was 
finally reached four years into the war. In case of Macedonia, institutional bargaining 
early on in the conflict was successful in averting escalation into civil war. In Kosovo, on 
the other hand, we observe multiple shots of the game ending in failure (i.e. not self-
enforcing peace) leading up to, during, and following the internationally enforced 
termination of war.  
An analysis of the dynamics of institutional bargaining in these three cases leads 
to important, theoretically and policy-relevant conclusions:  
1. There is no single blueprint that would be universally acceptable, even for 
cases that share similar contextual characteristics and underlying grievances 
or concerns.      
2. The acceptability of any given settlement plan is not independent of the 
players’ relative capabilities to pursue their demands using alternative means. 
As conditions on the battlefield evolve, so do the expected utilities players 
attach to continued fighting and, hence, the critical value that determines the 
adequacy of a negotiated settlement for each player (see Chapter 2, Equation 
13). 
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3. Initial demands players publicly espouse when they enter negotiations become 
critical factors affecting the fate of negotiations. They signal how each player 
would value any given proposal. More importantly, however, they constrain 
the set of acceptable arrangements as they become the standards by which 
each constituency assesses the value of a settlement proposal, thereby 
determining for each leader the political cost associated with that proposal 
(i.e.  in Equation 13). ( 1PPC )
The dynamics of conflict in Kosovo and Macedonia further illustrate that armed 
resistance is not an automatic response, no matter how extreme the grievances or the 
demands are. In both cases, resistance did not turn violent until less costly means were 
exhausted and certain regional factors enabled the pooling of necessary resources to 
sustain an armed insurgency. This supports the Rebel’s Dilemma (Lichbach 1995) 
arguments of the rational choice approach to social mobilization and the opportunity 
structure explanations on the onset of civil wars (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). As Jenne 
(2007) argues, the experience of Kosovar Albanians, juxtaposed with that of the 
Hungarian minority in Vojvodina, also illustrates the importance of having an external 
patron that is willing and capable to contribute to the mobilization of a minority against 
the state.  
 In this chapter, I first trace the development of institutional negotiations that took 
place in Kosovo and Macedonia as players in both cases contemplated the choice of war 
and peace in the post-SFRY era. While Macedonia is a model of success, Kosovo is just 
the opposite; no matter how the political and military conditions changed, rivals 
continued to choose fighting over any negotiated settlement. I follow these accounts with 
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a comparative overview of the three cases—Kosovo, Macedonia, and Bosnia—to draw 
inferences about factors that go into the bargaining process, influencing the propensity to 
terminate, if not prevent, civil wars in the absence of absolute military victory/defeat. 
These conclusions on processes of war termination and institutional design complement 
the survival analyses (presented in Chapter 6), which test how different political 
institutions affect the risk of failure once civil wars are terminated one way or another. 
Figure 4.1 represents a demographic map that highlights areas of ethnic Albanian 
concentration in southern Balkans. 
 
Kosovo: Irreconcilable Demands? 
Kosovo exemplifies a context under which negotiated peace seems to be unattainable 
regardless of how conditions on the battlefield and military capabilities change. Is that an 
unavoidable result of inherently irreconcilable demands, and if so, does it render my 
model of institutional bargaining irrelevant? The incompatibility of Kosovar Albanian 
and Serb preferences clearly constricted the winset of mutually acceptable settlements, 
thereby reducing the probability of reaching a negotiated self-enforcing peace. The 
relevant decisions, however, were not made in a vacuum; players took into account what 
they could expect to secure through alternative means if they were to choose not to settle 
at any given point. For example, in the early years of the conflict, ethnic Albanians chose 
to resist Serbian rule given that the latter was too preoccupied with the wars in Bosnia 
and Croatia to respond with harsh repression. Later in 1999, even in the face of NATO 
threats, Serbs chose not to settle since, I argue, they were confident of their capabilities to 
carry out a campaign—Operation Horseshoe—to ethnically cleanse Kosovo of 
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Albanians, which was a plan already in progress (Ramet 2006, 515).  This, they assumed, 
would secure Serbian sovereignty over the province. 
“No one should dare beat you!” was Milošević’s message to a crowd of Kosovar 
Serbs as they rioted against the predominantly Albanian local police on 24 April 1987 
(Auerswald and Auerswald 2000, 1). This marked the beginning of Milošević’s rise to 
power on an ultra-nationalist Kosovo platform, which would slowly drag the province 
into civil war; his propaganda would also translate into uncompromising policies from 
which he would not be able deviate without risking major political costs. As he used 
increasingly repressive tactics against Kosovar Albanians, the latter first responded with 
non-violent, pacifist forms of resistance, but they eventually turned to armed insurgency 
as the former bore no fruit.  
Regardless of whether extensive autonomy or secession was demanded by the 
Albanians going into the 1990s, compromising on those became unthinkable (i.e. 
politically too costly) after a decade of Serbian repression and ethnic cleansing. This was 
acknowledged by the Independent International Commission on Kosovo (IICK) in a 
report published in 2000:  
The origins of the crisis have to be understood in terms of a new wave of nationalism that 
led to the rise of Milošević and the official adoption of an extreme Serbian nationalist 
agenda. The revocation of Kosovo’s autonomy 1989 was followed by a Belgrade policy 
aimed at changing the ethnic composition of Kosovo and creating an apartheid-like 
society. … It is very clear that, after what the Kosovo Albanians have experienced at the 
hands of the FRY authorities, they are absolutely unwilling to accept any meaningful or 
even symbolic expression of FRY sovereignty on the province (1, 9). 
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The same finding would later shape the 2007 report of Martti Ahtisaari, the Special 
Envoy of the UN Secretary General, following numerous rounds of negotiations on the 
final status of Kosovo.  
After more than one year of direct talks, bilateral negotiations and expert consultations, it 
has become clear to me that the parties are not able to reach an agreement on Kosovo’s 
future status. … Throughout the process and on numerous occasions, both parties have 
reaffirmed their categorical, diametrically opposed positions: Belgrade demands 
Kosovo’s autonomy within Serbia, while Pristina will accept nothing short of 
independence. Even on practical issues such as decentralization, community rights, the 
protection of cultural and religious heritage and economic matters, conceptual differences 
— almost always related to the question of status — persist, and only modest progress 
could be achieved. … It is my firm view that the negotiations’ potential to produce any 
mutually agreeable outcome on Kosovo’s status is exhausted. No amount of additional 
talks, whatever the format, will overcome this impasse (UN Doc. S/2007/168, 2).  
 
What sparked the Kosovar Albanian resistance of 1990s was a set of policies 
adopted by Milošević in response to Serb concerns that they were losing control over 
Kosovo, to which the Serbian nationalist rhetoric ascribed great historical importance.63 
Under the 1974 SFRY Constitution, Tito had elevated the autonomy of Kosovo (as well 
as Vojvodina, also within the boundaries of Serbia) to a level that made it equal to the six 
republics, with equal representation and veto powers in the federal government. Changes 
in 1969 had established the Supreme Court of Kosovo and authorized the provincial 
Assembly to legislate based on Kosovo’s own “Constitutional Law” (instead of issuing 
“decrees” with Serbian laws as the basis). These translated into significant advances in 
                                                 
63 Kosovo is believed to be both the “cradle of Serbia” and the location of an 1389 battle with the Ottoman 
Army, which ended with a crashing defeat for Serbia. There is a lot of debate, however, as to how much of 
Kosovo’s historical importance is real and how much of it has been a “myth” or “legend” manufactured by 
nationalists (Daskalovski 2003; Leurdijk and Zandee 2001; Malcolm 1998).   
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the political status of Kosovar Albanians, who made up 77 percent of the population in 
1981 and close to 90 percent by mid 1980s (Ramet 2006, 297, 318, 326; Rogel 2004, 17).  
All these developments were greeted favorably by the Albanians, since their numbers had 
grown to an overwhelming majority in Kosovo and they would therefore be the prime 
beneficiaries of the changes. The Serbs, on the other hand, fumed, for their control over 
Kosovo seemed to be getting increasingly remote (Rogel 2004, 73). 
These institutional arrangements became the basis for what the Kosovar Albanians felt 
they were entitled to as a people and province, thereby shaping their institutional 
demands. They also became, however, major Serb grievances, which Milošević 
addressed as soon as he came to power.  
Milošević’s pursuit of reclaiming Kosovo began with purging the local League of 
Communists of his opponents in late 1988, leading to protests by Albanian Kosovars 
against the persecution of their party leaders. Among those were the Trepča mine 
demonstrations and strikes in the Mitrovica region; the mines carried great value as they 
produced close to 50 percent of Yugoslavia’s nickel, lead, zinc, and magnesium (Rogel 
2004, 75). In every case, they were met with severe repression by Serbian forces, leading 
the imposition of “special measures” (e.g. deploying more soldiers and police, restriction 
of constitutional rights, such as the right to strike) across the province. In March 1989, 
Kosovo’s Assembly approved constitutional amendments that abolished the autonomy of 
the province, placing Kosovo unequivocally under Serbian control. “There were tanks 
outside and many ‘guests’ inside the building, and the majority fell short of the 
prescribed two-thirds, but such details were dangerously overlooked” (Ahrens 2007, 
311). This was only the start of Belgrade’s campaign, which was meant “in the short run,  
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Figure 4.1 Locations of Albanian majority in Southern Balkans 
 
 
to reduce the Albanians to second-class citizens and, in the long run, to drive them from 
the province” (Ramet 2006, 510). 
As the Serbian legislature prepared to dissolve the Kosovo Assembly and the 
Executive Council, on 2 July 1990 Albanian delegates of the soon-to-be revoked 
Assembly unanimously proclaimed Kosovo as an “independent and equal entity within 
the framework of the Yugoslav federation (confederation) and as an equal subject with it 
counterparts in Yugoslavia” (quoted in Auerswald and Auerswald 2000, 44). The 
annulment of Kosovo’s autonomy was finalized with the adoption of a new constitution 
for all of Serbia in September 1990, to which the Kosovar Albanians responded by 
holding an independence referendum and declaring the “Republic of Kosovo” the 
following year. 
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Throughout the 1990s Serbian authorities suppressed expressions of Albanian 
ethnic identity (e.g. replacing original street and square names with Serbian ones; 
restricting the teaching of the Albanian language, history, and culture in schools); 
intimidated the Albanian population with its heavy police presence, random searches, and 
arrests; fired Albanians from their jobs and confiscated their properties, encouraging 
Serbs outside of Kosovo to take over these jobs and settle on these properties (Ramet 
2006, 510-513). Meanwhile, the Albanians resigned to “a virtual life in a virtual state,” 
by establishing parallel institutions in areas such as education and health care, even 
collecting taxes to cover for these services (Rogel 2004, 75). Overwhelmed with war 
elsewhere, Belgrade did little to prevent these activities. 
Kosovar Albanians were organized under the leadership of the Democratic 
League of Kosovo (LDK), founded in December 1989 and led by Ibrahim Rugova, a 
French-educated professor of Albanian literature. Following clandestine elections held in 
May 1992, Rugova became the president of the “virtual” government of the “Republic of 
Kosovo.” His program of pacifist resistance against Serbian authorities in the form of an 
alternative, parallel state structure would shape the state of affairs in Kosovo until 1998. 
[Rugova’s] justifications were that Kosovo was poor (in late 1989 the Serbs had 
summarily appropriated $98 million fro the Bank of Kosovo for Yugo Banka in 
Belgrade); that its people had no weapons, since Serbs had confiscated arms from 
Kosovo’s territorial defense units; and that, because the Serbs were eagerly waiting for a 
pretect to move into Kosovo to put the Albanians down, it was best not to irritate them 
(Rogel 2004, 75). 
The situation in the first half of 1990s would, however, prove to be the calm 
before the storm. While bringing the war in Bosnia to an end, the DPA brokered in 
November 1995 would have the opposite effect on Kosovo. As the international 
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mediators accepted the Serbian position that Kosovo was an internal concern of Serbia 
and had no place at the negotiation table in Dayton, Kosovar Albanians were dismayed 
and concluded that pacifism had failed: “after the Dayton Peace Accords recognized a 
Serb republic in Bosnia—carved out by force of arms—some Kosovar nationalists were 
persuaded that increased militancy might win international support” (Topping and Rubin 
1996). Although Richard Holbrooke asserts in his memoirs that they “had repeatedly 
emphasized to Milošević the need to restore the rights of Kosovo’s Albanian Muslims,” 
no real pressure was put on the Serbian leader to do so; to the contrary, the DPA provided 
for the easing of sanctions against Serbia (1998, 357). 
In as early as February 1996, an armed resistance group calling itself the Kosovo 
Liberation Army (KLA) began engaging in guerilla operations and publicly claiming 
responsibility for attacks, which it identified as “first warning” against “occupying” Serbs 
(Agence France Presse February 17, 1996; Agence France Presse May 02, 1996). While 
LDK officials initially denied the existence of such an organization (BBC Summary of 
World Broadcasts February 22, 1996), the KLA soon became too powerful to ignore, 
particularly after building up its arsenal with weaponry looted from arms depots in 
southern Albania during an uprising in early 1997 (Ramet 2006, 513). Nobody could 
overlook “the emergence of a ‘third force’ of young, educated Albanians who chafe[d] 
under repressive Serb rule and who [were] impatient with their leaders' policy of 
‘peaceful resistance’” (Peterson 1996). In the summer and fall of 1998, tens of thousands 
of Albanian students were defying Rugova’s calls to stop street demonstrations; they 
were forming connections with the KLA and participating in protests even in the face 
assaults and detentions by the Serbian police (IICK 2000, 67). 
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Relieved of the battlefronts in Croatia and Bosnia, Belgrade turned to Kosovo and 
violence escalated. At the beginning of 1998 “the powder keg, whose explosion has so 
often been predicted during the past decade, [appeared] finally to be igniting” (ICG 
1998a). As the Serbian police began attacking villages and responding to Albanian 
demonstrations with “extreme violence” (Auerswald and Auerswald 2000, 91), the result 
was backlash: The number of armed confrontations increased from 31 in 1996 and 55 in 
1997 to 66 in the first two months of 1998 (IICK 2000, 67). “If the clamp-down was 
supposed to stamp out Kosovar opposition to Belgrade rule, it is already clear that it has 
failed. Instead of destroying a separatist movement, it has boosted Kosovar determination 
to win independence and created 80 martyrs for the cause” (ICG 1998, 1). 
International efforts to mediate a solution to the conflict in Kosovo revolved 
around the recommendations of the Contact Group (Great Britain, France, Germany, 
Italy, Russia, and the US) and NATO’s threats of military involvement, particularly 
against the FRY. Given the overwhelming dominance of Serb forces on the battlefield 
and the predominant attitudes of the Serbian constituency, the international community 
recognized that making any compromise a rational strategy for Milošević would require 
the manipulation of the utility he attached to continued fighting using credible threats of 
strong military action. The Contact Group (CG) endorsed “an enhanced status for Kosovo 
within the FRY,” repeatedly stating that they would support “neither independence nor 
the maintenance of the status quo.” Similarly, in September 1998 the UN Security 
Council adopted Resolution 1199, in which it called for the cessation of hostilities and a 
“peaceful resolution of the Kosovo problem which would include an enhanced status for 
Kosovo, a substantially greater degree of autonomy, and meaningful self-administration;” 
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it also warned of unspecified “further action and additional measures” if the fighting 
parties failed to take “the concrete measures demanded in this resolution” (UN Doc. 
S/RES/1199 1998). This position was echoed in various statements by NATO, which 
eventually authorized in October 1998 air strikes to be staged against Serb forces if they 
did not withdraw from Kosovo (see NATO and CG statements reproduced in Auerswald 
and Auerswald 2000, Chapter 2). 
  Although the two leaders were convinced by US envoy Richard Holbrooke 
(representing the CG) to start unmediated negotiations in May 1998, talks quickly broke 
down without any results.64 The public position of the LDK was that Rugova would use 
these negotiations to demand “the independence of Kosovo according to the will of the 
people,” which was clearly unacceptable for Milošević. Even with this position, however, 
Rugova’s mere decision to go to the negotiation table carried political costs, as 
exemplified in the criticism of one his main political opponents: “In accepting a meeting 
with Milosevic without international mediation, at a time when the Serbian forces are 
carrying out massacres of Albanians in Kosovo, Rugova is making a fatal capitulation” 
(Dragović 1998). As a result of this political atmosphere, Rugova could not settle for 
anything short of extensive autonomy, if not independence, and Milošević would not go 
for this as long as his forces did not face outright defeat on the battlefield.  
Both sides were still optimistic about potential gains they can secure militarily. 
By late July 1998, the KLA controlled about 40 percent of the countryside (Ramet 2006, 
                                                 
64 Following “a campaign marked by xenophobia and appeals to patriotic unity,” Serbs had endorsed a 
policy of no international mediation in Kosovo in a referendum held in April. This was interpreted by 
Serbian officials as support by 95 percent of the people for their uncompromising position on Kosovo: in 
the words of a spokesperson for Milošević’s Socialist Party,  “the Serbian people showed they are united 
and have the right attitude towards defense of our freedom, independence and territorial integrity” 
(Coleman 1998). 
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514). The counteroffensive, however, was swift and effective: “The FRY military 
campaign of the summer of 1998 in Kosovo was in many ways a success. The KLA had 
been effectively uprooted as a military force and proven unable to protect civilians in all 
contested areas” (IICK 2000, 75). Furthermore, Belgrade had a plan that went beyond 
crippling the KLA—one it would more fully put into action following the onset of the 
NATO air campaign in March 1999; Milošević intended to solve the Kosovo problem by 
cleansing the province of Albanians, thereby avoiding political costs associated with any 
compromise on “Greater Serbia.”   
Following an ultimatum on 13 October 1998 by NATO that he either withdraw 
his forces within 96 hours or face air strikes, Milošević was convinced by Holbrooke to 
pull out, allow access to aid agencies, and accept 2000 civilian observers (Kosovo 
Verification Mission, KVM) to be sent by the OSCE to monitor compliance with the 
agreement. Although the agreement was never published in its entirety, a letter from the 
FRY Ambassador to the UN endorsing the agreement stated that “a political framework 
has also been worked out and agreement has been reached on the principles of a political 
solution.” According to the letter, Kosovo would have “self-governance” with “many 
responsibilities,” including the police, devolved to the local level; independence was 
ruled out, however, as the solution would have to “respect the territorial integrity and 
sovereignty and internationally recognized boundaries of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia” (reproduced in Auerswald and Auerswald 2000, 292-294). NATO’s 
activation order was not lifted, which meant that air strikes could be launched in case of 
Serb non-compliance. A report by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, dated 16 
November 1998, indicated that the FRY army and police presence in Kosovo had been 
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“significantly reduced” and the ceasefire was holding with the exception of sporadic 
incidents (UN Doc. S/1998/1068 1998, 4).  
Milošević perceived the NATO threat as credible, resulting in his reassessment of 
what he could reasonably expect to win and lose on the battlefield. The resulting 
reduction in the repressive capacity of the FRY within Kosovo led, however, to 
reassessment of the Kosovar Albanian calculations as well. KLA forces moved into areas 
from which Serb police and military had withdrawn, increasing their attacks, including on 
civilians (UN Doc. S/1998/1068 1998). By December, it was obvious that the ceasefire 
was failing.  
Kosovo Albanian paramilitary units have taken advantage of the lull in the fighting to re-
establish their control over many villages in Kosovo, as well as over some areas near 
urban centres and highways. These actions by Kosovo Albanian paramilitary units have 
only served to provoke the Serbian authorities, leading to statements that if the Kosovo 
Verification Mission cannot control these units the Government would. The local 
authorities have indicated to UNHCR that they would not allow "terrorists to take over 
Kosovo". Government officials have warned that recent incidents, particularly attempts 
by the armed groups to cross into Kosovo from Albania and killings of civilians, would 
justify a renewal of operations against Kosovo Albanian paramilitary units (UN Doc. 
S/1998/1221, 3). 
 
At that time Kosovar Albanians had no reason to stop fighting until they secured their 
original demand—their own sovereign state. Their continued military pursuit was a slap 
in the face for Milošević, who now appeared to have made a unilateral and costly 
compromise; to save face he would have to go back to war with an even more determined 
and forceful agenda.   
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The presence of Serbian military, police, and paramilitary forces in Kosovo 
increased dramatically in January 1999 in violation of the October agreement, and so did 
the level of violence (IICK 2000, 80). A letter sent by the NATO Secretary General to 
Annan on 22 January regarding the situation in Kosovo reported that  
neither side in the conflict has respected the ceasefire; and there have been a number of 
cases of kidnappings and attacks by Kosovar armed elements. The activities of the 
Yugoslav Army (VJ) and the Special Police (MUP), however, have been wholly 
disproportionate and excessive, particularly bearing in mind the operations conducted 
during the period from 10 to 16 January 1999 (reproduced in Auerswald and Auerswald 
2000, 427). 
A particular incident that generated international uproar against the Serbs and re-ignited 
the sense of emergency for some form of intervention was the massacre of more than 
forty civilians (including women and children) in the village of Račak on 15 January; the 
killings were investigated and confirmed by the OSCE mission as having been committed 
by Serbian military and police (419). After the NATO, UN, and OSCE, the Contact 
Group, in a statement dated 22 January 1999, also moved to condemn the incident as one 
which “no amount of provocation could justify” (reproduced in Auerswald and 
Auerswald 2000, 426). It called for the parties to accept negotiations and announced that 
it was working on a settlement plan.  
 
Failure at Rambouillet 
A call made by the Contact Group on January 29 to start mediated negotiations within a 
week and reach a settlement in 21 days—one that would provide “substantial autonomy” 
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for Kosovo—was accompanied with NATO threats against non-cooperation. In a 
statement issued the next day, the North Atlantic Council declared: 
NATO is ready to take whatever measures are necessary in the light of both parties’ 
compliance. … The Council has therefore agreed today that the NATO Secretary General 
may authorize air strikes against targets on FRY territory. The NATO Secretary General 
will take full account of the position and actions of the Kosovar leadership and all 
Kosovar armed elements in and around Kosovo in reaching his decision on military 
action. NATO will take all appropriate measures in case of a failure by the Kosovar 
Albanian side to comply with the demands of the international community (reproduced in  
Auerswald and Auerswald 2000, 477-8).     
Talks commenced on February 6 in Rambouillet, France, amidst what seemed to be 
credible threats (or promises) of immediate NATO strikes.  
Negotiations started with a set of “non-negotiable” basic principles, including the 
territorial integrity of the FRY, and an interim agreement that would determine how 
Kosovo would be governed for the following three years. At the end of this period,  
an international meeting shall be convened to determine a mechanism for a final 
settlement for Kosovo, on the basis of the will of the people, opinions of relevant 
authorities, each Party’s efforts regarding the implementation of this Agreement, and the 
Helsinki Final Act, and to undertake a comprehensive assessment of the implementation 
of this Agreement and to consider proposals by any Party for additional measures 
(Interim Agreement 1999, Chapter 8/Article I). 
For the next three years Kosovo would be awarded substantial autonomy and the FRY 
would technically be able to keep its present borders. To appease concerns of the Serb 
minority within Kosovo, they would be given guaranteed representation in legislative and 
administrative bodies, and power would be largely devolved to the communes, thus 
creating an autonomous entity that would itself be highly decentralized. A majority of the 
Serb representatives in the legislatures would also be able to veto legislation by invoking 
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a “vital interest” objection (Chapter 1/Article II). To enforce compliance with the 
agreement,  
NATO will establish and deploy a force (hereinafter “KFOR”) which may be composed 
of ground, air, and maritime units from NATO and non-NATO nations, operating under 
the authority and subject to the direction and the political control of the North Atlantic 
Council (NAC) through the NATO chain of command (Interim Agreement 1999, Chapter 
7/Article I). 
Although they initially objected to the basic principles, the Kosovar Albanian 
delegation signed the agreement on March 18; it was headed by Hashim Thaçi, the 
political leader of the KLA, whose endorsement was crucial to make the signature 
credible (given the fate of the Holbrooke-Milošević agreement of October 1998). Despite 
proclaiming the inviolability of FRY’s borders, by avoiding the question of final status 
and not explicitly ruling out independence after the interim period, the proposal enabled 
Kosovar Albanian leaders to accept without appearing as if they were compromising on 
their ultimate goal. Furthermore, their signature, they correctly anticipated, would 
provide the pretext for NATO attacks against the FRY in case the latter failed to 
reciprocate.  
The KLA had transformed itself “from a motley band of armed villagers into a 
well disciplined military force, the command structure of which increasingly dictates 
events on the ground” (ICG 1999, 2). Its capabilities, however, were still not compatible 
with those of its rival; the only way it could secure independence for Kosovo was either 
at the negotiation table, which for Milošević would have amounted to political suicide, or 
with such military support that would dramatically alter the (im)balance of power on the 
battlefield. The KLA had an even more urgent incentive to cooperate: Throughout the 
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negotiations, Milošević was amassing troops in and around Kosovo, leading General 
Wesley Clark of the NATO to conclude that the Serbs were “prepared to resume the 
conflict on a very large scale.” There were already reports of Serb forces ethnically 
cleansing villages along Kosovo’s border with Macedonia (Facts on File World News 
Digest March 18, 1999). Kosovar Albanians did not hide the fact that they had signed the 
deal expecting to secure NATO’s military support in return; soon after the signing, the 
top military commander of the KLA called for NATO to do its part and start air strikes 
against the Serbs, indicating that “If we did not trust them we would not have signed the 
peace deal” (Gall 1999).  
Both the international community and the KLA seemed to have incorrectly 
assumed that threats of NATO strikes would motivate Milošević to cooperate. KLA top 
commander’s anticipation was that “if they see NATO is serious, they are going to accept 
everything in the end” (Daly 1999). Either not taking the threats to be credible or 
believing in the capacity of FRY forces, the Serb delegation remained defiant on the issue 
of allowing the deployment of foreign troops in Kosovo and refused to sign the 
agreement. Instead, as foreign monitors (KVM) pulled out in expectation of possible 
NATO strikes, Serb forces launched a “heavy offensive” and secured a “horseshoe 
encirclement of Kosovo from the north to the south,” reaching Drenica, the stronghold of 
the KLA (Perlez 1999). It would later be revealed that this was part of a well-planned 
strategy—Operation Horseshoe—to encircle and force mass expulsion of ethnic 
Albanians from the province. Meanwhile, the state-run Serbian television station was 
running a new jingle illustrative of Milošević’s public, uncompromising stand: “What are 
we without you, our holy ground? I'm not giving up what's mine to anybody, even if I 
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perish with it. Even if the skies open, and even if judgment day comes, we will stay here 
where our roots are” (Economist March 20, 1999).  
NATO Secretary General Javier Solana announced the start of Operation Allied 
Force on 24 March 1999: “Clear responsibility for the air strikes lies with President 
Milošević who has refused to stop his violent action in Kosovo and has refused to 
negotiate in good faith. The time has now come for action.” The same day President 
Clinton further criticized Milošević for his aggression:  
He has rejected the balanced and fair peace accords that our allies and partners, including 
Russia, proposed last month—a peace agreement that Kosovo’s ethnic Albanians 
courageously accepted. Instead, his forces have intensified their attacks, burning down 
Kosovar Albanian villages and murdering civilians. As I speak, more Serb forces are 
moving into Kosovo, and more people are fleeing their homes—60,000 in just the last 
five weeks, a quarter of a million altogether.65  
According to Clinton, NATO strikes had three objectives:  
First, to demonstrate the seriousness of NATO’s opposition to aggression and its support 
for peace. Second, to deter President Milošević from continuing and escalating his attacks 
on helpless civilians by imposing a price for those attacks. And, third, if necessary, to 
damage Serbia’s capacity to wage war against Kosovo in the future by seriously 
diminishing its military capabilities (statements reproduced in Auerswald and Auerswald 
2000, 719-20). 
Milošević proved too determined to be deterred—a function of high confidence in his 
military capabilities and/or high political costs he associated with any kind of 
compromise; it took 78 days of a gradually intensified and expanded air campaign to 
sufficiently weaken his military capabilities to convince him to capitulate. 
                                                 
65 Clinton’s figures seem to have downplayed the extent of displacements according to UNHCR official 
figures, which estimated the number of Albanians to have been driven from their homes by the 
commencement of NATO attacks at 459,000 (260,000 displaced within Kosovo and 199,000 outside) 
(Ramet 2006, 516). 
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The FRY announced on May 29 that it was accepting the general principles 
adopted by the G-8 at its May 6 meeting. In addition to requiring the withdrawal of all 
Serb forces from Kosovo (military, police, and paramilitary), the return of all refugees 
and displaced persons, and the establishment of an interim system based on “a substantial 
self-government for Kosovo,” these principles also included face-saving provisions for 
the Serbian leadership: the solution to the conflict would need to take into account  “the 
principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
and the other countries of the region, and the demilitarization of the KLA” (G-8 
Chairman’s statement reproduced in Auerswald and Auerswald 2000, 944). Milošević 
was finally conceding defeat, albeit a face-saving one, after leading the expulsion of more 
than 848,000 Albanians from Kosovo and the killing of between 10,000 and 12,000 
civilians (Ramet 2006, 517; Rogel 2004, 80).66
The Military Technical Agreement signed by the representatives of NATO, the 
FRY, and the Serbian Republic on 9 June 1999 provided for KFOR to enforce the 
withdrawal of all Serb forces from Kosovo, which would become an international 
protectorate under UN auspices. NATO first suspended its air campaign and then 
announced its official end on June 20 when the withdrawal of Serb forces was finalized. 
With Resolution 1244, the UN Security Council had already authorized the establishment 
of a Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK):  
an international civil presence in Kosovo in order to provide an interim administration for 
Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the 
                                                 
66 Given the failure in Bosnia to live up to the DPA’s very clear goal of refugee returns, Milošević perhaps 
made a major miscalculation regarding the willingness of Albanian refugees to quickly return to Kosovo 
and the determination of the international community to facilitate that. If they had not returned as they did 
right after the cessation of hostilities, Milošević would have succeeded in reducing the hold of ethnic 
Albanians on Kosovo by changing the demographics.  
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Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and which will provide transitional administration while 
establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing 
institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of  
Kosovo (UN Doc. S/RES/1244 1999, 3). 
In determining the form of government, the mission would take into account principles 
endorsed at Rambouillet. 
 
Back to the Start: De-facto Partition of Kosovo and Failed Negotiations 
The primary task of UNMIK, under the leadership of the Secretary General’s Special 
Representative (SGSR), was to normalize inter-ethnic relations and prepare the province 
for eventual final status negotiations. Despite the SGSR’s “agenda of coexistence” (IICK 
2000, 260) and his efforts to promote power sharing, what emerged out of this regime 
was an entity partitioned along ethnic lines: 
Although legally in charge of the entire territory, UNMIK has proven incapable of ending 
Belgrade’s de facto control of three and a half northern municipalities in Kosovo, which 
are contiguous with Serbia proper, as well as several enclaves in central and eastern 
Kosovo. This inability to control all of Kosovo’s territory has led to the creation of a dual 
system in almost every aspect of political and economic life in Kosovo. … 
Ethnoterritorial separation in Kosovo is already a fact, one that would require 
considerable effort to change (Serwer amd Bajraktari 2006, 3). 
While most Albanian refugees had returned home by the end of 1999 (Rogel 2004, 83), 
this was accompanied with the exodus of Kosovar Serbs. According to the UNHCR, 
during the seven weeks following the withdrawal of Serb forces and the deployment of 
KFOR, 164,000 Serbs left Kosovo and many others moved into KFOR-protected 
enclaves, particularly in Mitrovica, to the south of the Ibar River. Those who did not flee 
were subject to systematic harassment, intimidation, and violence, including beatings, 
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kidnappings, and murders  (HRW 1999).  It was, therefore, not surprising that the Serbs 
sought the safety of enclaves and chose to establish parallel institutions instead of 
participating in common institutions established by UNMIK.67  
If the interim period had any effect on the positions of the players regarding final 
status, it was to harden Kosovar Serb resistance against independence. When time came 
to discuss final status, they demanded their own practically autonomous municipalities 
within Kosovo if the latter was even to retain its autonomy within Serbia. As the Serb 
National Council representing the Serbs of northern Kosovo made very clear, 
independence was not even debatable: “We said that Kosovo’s independence and the 
survival of the Serbian community are two completely opposite realities; the two ideas 
are incompatible” (quoted in Serwer and Bajraktari 2006, 5).  
Final status negotiations commenced in February 2006. To promote the 
integration of Kosovar Serbs into the Albanian-dominated institutions, UNMIK had 
adopted the policy of “standards before status” and published Standards for Kosovo in 
December 2003. After assessing the situation in Kosovo based on these standards, UN 
Secretary General’s Special Envoy concluded in October 2005 that even though there still 
were problems with standards implementation in some areas (such as in the dismantling 
of parallel institutions), it was time to move along with the political process to determine 
the entity’s permanent status. The Contact Group endorsed the recommendation and 
announced ten guiding principles that became the basis for 2006 negotiations. Among 
those were the creation of “effective local self-government … through the 
                                                 
67 On 15 May 2001 the SRSG announced the “Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government” 
which would shape the political system in Kosovo until the final status of the province is determined 
(UNMIK/REG/2001/9). 
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decentralization process,” which was meant to appeal to the Serb delegation, as well as 
the provision that there would be “no partition of Kosovo and no union of Kosovo with 
any country or part of any country,” which was supposed to appease the Albanians.68  
Negotiations continued under the mediation of Special Envoy Ahtisaari and his 
deputy, Albert Rohan, into the fall of 2006. After many rounds of fruitless bargaining on 
the issue of decentralization, Rohan announced in September that the chance of progress 
was “increasingly slim” and indicated that it might be time for the UN Security Council 
to impose a solution: “We're approaching a moment where by talking alone we won't 
accomplish the goal. We could talk for another 10 years and not change anything.” The 
same month the Contact Group asked Ahtisaari to prepare a comprehensive plan that 
would dictate the future of Kosovo (South East Times December 15, 2006). 
In his report to the Secretary General in March 2007, Ahtisaari recommended 
“independence, supervised by the international community” for Kosovo (UN Doc. 
S/2007/168/Add. 1). The status would have to be externally imposed and enforced as the 
players could not reach a mutually acceptable, self-enforcing settlement: “It is my firm 
view that the negotiations’ potential to produce any mutually agreeable outcome on 
Kosovo’s status is exhausted. No amount of additional talks, whatever the format, will 
overcome this impasse,” Ahtisaari argued. His Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo 
Status Settlement provided for a highly decentralized entity, with veto powers and 
guaranteed power sharing for non-Albanian communities. While Kosovar Albanians 
endorsed the Ahtisaari Plan, Serbian officials rejected it, proposing instead to grant 
Kosovo a status that would amount to “more than autonomy but less than independence” 
                                                 
68 All documents relevant to this process are available on the website for the UN Office of the Special 
Envoy for Kosovo, at http://www.unosek.org/unosek/en/docref.html.  
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(Dempsey 2007). The next step would be for the UN Security Council to pass a 
resolution that would make the plan binding, thereby dictating the final status of 
Kosovo.69
 
 
Macedonia: A Success Story 
The Framework Agreement (FA) signed on 13 August 2001 in Ohrid between major 
Macedonian and ethnic Albanian parties ended the Albanian insurgency, which had 
brought the country to the brink of civil war. Although the National Liberation Army 
(NLA) leading the armed resistance was not part of the negotiations, its support for the 
deal was secured in a separate NATO-brokered agreement, which included provisions for 
the group’s disarmament and demobilization (Ahrens 2007, 460). Although similar 
grievances drove both movements, Albanian insurgencies in Kosovo and Macedonia 
differed significantly in terms of their demands. From the very start, the NLA ruled out 
ethnic partition, autonomy, or secession; all they demanded were constitutional changes 
that would officially recognize the Albanian language, culture, and national symbols, and 
provide the Albanian minority with equitable representation in administrative bodies.  
The relatively modest nature of minority demands, however, is not sufficient to explain 
the success in reaching a negotiated settlement in Macedonia; proposals identical to the 
FA were repeatedly dismissed by one or more of the players for years before conditions 
on the ground changed in a way that motivated them, particularly the majority 
government, to settle. 
                                                 
69 The relevant resolution was introduced in the Security Council on May 11; Russia is calling for 
continued negotiations and is threatening to veto.  
 138
  
 Not unlike the KLA in Kosovo, at the root of the NLA movement was 
institutional changes that disadvantaged the Albanian minority: the republic’s 
constitution was amended in 1989 to define the republic as a “nation-state of Macedonian 
people,” whereas previously it was defined “a state of the Macedonian people and the 
Albanian and Turkish minorities” (Phillips 2004, 46). The exclusion of Albanians, which 
made up close to 20 percent of the republic’s population in 1981 and were estimated to 
constitute at least 25 percent by early 1990s, was further institutionalized in the 1991 
constitution of the newly independent Macedonia, which eliminated the rights of 
minorities to proportional representation on state bodies (65). Previous constitutions had 
recognized Albanians and Turks as nationalities70 and contained provisions to guarantee 
the “equality of nationalities.” Namely, it was required that “Municipalities and the 
Republic ensure that the nationalities by proportionally represented in the municipal 
assemblies and the Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia, and be adequately 
represented in their bodies.” Furthermore, the languages of nationalities were given equal 
status with the Macedonian language in municipalities inhabited by members of these 
nationalities (Caca 1999, 150-3). Just like the importance of the 1974 Constitution in the 
case of Kosovo, these rights became the basis of what the Albanian minority in 
Macedonia felt they were entitled to and, therefore, demanded. 
Although some extremist elements, such as the Assembly for Political-Territorial 
Autonomy of Ethnic Albanians in Macedonia, were present among the Albanians of 
Macedonia, they were effectively sidelined by the moderates. At the forefront until the 
conflict flared up were the Party for Democratic Prosperity (PDP) and the Democratic 
                                                 
70 See my discussion on nation vs. nationality in the context of Yugoslavia, footnote 5 in Chapter 5.   
 139
  
Party of Albanians (DPA), which was an offshoot of the former. Both parties participated 
in different coalition governments throughout the 1990s as part of informal power sharing 
efforts. These were to a large extent attempts to coopt the Albanian leadership with 
“tokenistic positions, often as ‘Assistant Ministers,’ without offices or staff … and never 
involving posts in the Defense or Foreign Ministries, or, above all, in the key Interior 
Ministry which most independent observers see as the source of real power in FYROM” 
(Pettifer 1999, 141).  
 The declaration issued by the PDP members of the parliament during the 
constitution debates in 1991 laid down the demands which the Albanian minority 
continued to evoke in the following years: 
(1) Decisions affecting Albanians shall be consensual, not by majority rule, 
(2) The Albanian language shall be official where Albanians live,  
(3) There shall be equal and proportional participation in public affairs, and 
(4) Albanians shall have the right to maintain their national characteristics, culture and  
symbols (Ahrens 2007, 398). 
 
Negotiations between the Albanian minority and the Macedonian government took place 
during 1992-1995 under the mediation of the Human Rights and Minorities Working 
Group (WG) established by the EC Conference on Yugoslavia.71 The aforementioned 
demands shaped these negotiations and the few plans that the parties came very close to 
endorsing.  
A document both parties agreed to in June 1992, for instance, not only reflected 
these demands but also foreshadowed the provisions of the FA of 2001 (both negotiated 
at Ohrid incidentally).  In the 1992 document (reproduced in Ahrens 2007, 418-412),  
                                                 
71 Geert-Hinrich Ahrens, who is frequently cited here, was the chairman of the WG.  
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With regard to the constitutional position of the Albanians in the Republic of Macedonia, 
both sides agreed to base their discussions on the model of a citizens’ state … and not on 
the model of one or more constituent nations plus one or more ethnic groups or 
minorities. The group set itself the task of investigating: 
- How the Constitution of 1991 will have to be adapted to the basic of model of a 
citizens state. 
- Which protective structures will have to be set up, particularly in order to deal with 
the danger of majorization of ethnic groups by other groups. For instance, models of 
proportional representation might be introduced. 
 
More specifically, the agreement called for, among other things, 
(1) Amending the constitution so not to identify Macedonia as a “nation-state of 
Macedonian people;”  
(2) Albanian to be considered an official language in municipalities where Albanians 
formed at least 10 percent of the population;  
(3) Albanians to have the right and be given the means by the state to have university 
level education in their own language;72 
(4)  The constitution to guarantee the “proportional representation of nationalities at 
all levels of state institutions;” and 
(5) Expanding the competencies of local governments.   
Neither this 1992 document nor others negotiated in the following years became anything 
more than “working” papers or minutes.   
However, the Macedonian government in August 2001 agreed to, and soon 
thereafter implemented, provisions that were very similar to those negotiated throughout 
the previous decade. Why was it possible to reach the equilibrium point of peace in 
                                                 
72 Demands for a state-funded university with Albanian as the language of instruction was prevalent 
throughout the conflict.    
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Macedonia in 2001 but not in 1992? Consenting to institutional changes that would 
elevate the status of the Albanian minority carried obvious political costs for Macedonian 
parties (reducing the value of ( )ipx Δ+ .  and amplifying ( )iPPC 1  in Condition 12, 
Chapter 2); with no immediate threat of an effective armed insurgency (i.e. high value for 
, the right hand-side in Condition 12), the government had no incentive to move 
away from the majoritarian system. Once the NLA entered the picture, however, it had to 
reconsider its assessment of what it could expect to secure through a settlement as 
opposed to facing continued resistance.  
( )iWEU
The emergence of the NLA occurred against the backdrop of close to a decade of 
failure on the part of legitimate Albanian parties to bring about change that would 
improve the status of the minority: “When reforms promised by the Democratic Party of 
Albanians (DPA) before it took office were slow to materialize, Macedonian Albanians 
who had been active in the Kosovo Liberation Army led by Ali Ahmeti, a KLA founder, 
made plans for an ethnic insurrection in western Macedonia” (Phillips 2004, 80). The 
NLA stated in March 2001, as they battled Macedonian forces to take control of the city 
of Tetovo, “We appeal to all political and non-political Albanian figures not to delude 
themselves that our rights would be granted by this government” (87). However, 
disappointment with regular political mechanisms is not sufficient to mobilize an armed 
insurgency; in the case of Macedonia, regional events enabled the pooling of necessary 
resources and increased inter-ethnic tensions, catalyzing the surge of violence.  
Two events that became instrumental in the development of the NLA armed 
insurgency were the 1997 instability in Albania and the war in Kosovo. When a pyramid 
banking scheme collapsed in Albania and many people lost their investments, breakdown 
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of the government as well as other state structures followed. About 600,000 weapons, 
including antitank artillery and rockets, were stolen from army barracks and most of these 
weapons made their way across the border into Macedonia and Kosovo. The war in 
Kosovo in the following years further contributed to the instability of Macedonia—first 
because of the influx of 300,000 Kosovar Albanian refugees into the country and then as 
the remnants of the KLA became potential fighters for the Albanian cause in Macedonia 
(Ahrens 2007, 454-5; Phillips 2005, 70-5). Without these incidents, it is unlikely that the 
disgruntled Albanian minority would have acquired the means, including the rebels, to 
commence an effective armed resistance at that time.   
The NLA appeared on the scene in early 2001 when it claimed responsibility for 
an attack on a police station. Communique No. 4, as the statement was titled, read: 
On 22 January a special unit of the National Liberation Army supported by a group of 
observers with automatic guns and hand grenade launchers attacked a Macedonian police 
station. In the attack the opponent forces were quickly paralyzed and they did not resist 
while other Macedonian forces from other directions did not approach the location. The 
attack was limited and was a warning to the Macedonian occupiers and their 
Albanophone collaborators. The uniforms of the Macedonian occupiers will continue to 
be attacked until the Albanian people are liberated. The policemen are called upon to 
return to their families and not sacrifice their lives in vain for the illusory Macedonian  
plans to dominate the Albanian majority (ICG 2001, 3). 
 
Particular demands were further articulated in a letter with no particular 
addressee, signed by NLA’s leader, Ali Ahmeti. Among those were changes in the 
constitution that would include the following elements: 
1) FYROM will be a state of two peoples: a Macedonian-Albanian state or an Albanian-
Macedonian state; 
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2) Together with the Macedonian language, the Albanian language will become the 
official language; 
3) Each community will be free to use its own national symbols;  
4) To eliminate the discrimination in the economy and in the state administration;  
5) To eliminate the discrimination in the political system, in the decision-making 
process, and gerrymandering so that the elections reflect the will of the people 
(reproduced in Rusi 2002, 21). 
The letter also stated, “the NLA is committed to the preservation of the territorial 
integrity and sovereignty of the FRYOM.” 
By March 2001 the NLA had taken control of a number of villages around Tetovo 
in northwest Macedonia, along the Kosovo border. At the end of the month, however, the 
Macedonian army launched a heavy assault on the area, reclaiming rebel positions and 
driving them from villages into the mountains (Phillips 2004, 96; Ramet 2006, 579). 
Prime Minister Ljubco Georgievski announced on March 31 that after a three-week 
offensive, the government’s “objectives have been achieved on the military and political 
levels,” adding, however, that the threat of future NLA provocations was still alive 
(Agence France Presse -- English March 31, 2001). While there was a lull in fighting 
during most of April, which is when negotiations began between the Macedonian and 
ethnic Albanian political parties, violence flared up once again at the end of the month, 
this time focusing on the area around Kumanova.  
Why did the Albanian minority resort to this military pursuit, especially if they 
did not intend to retain control over areas they overran (as they claimed to rule out any 
kind of territorial partition or autonomy)?  The Macedonian army was “poorly equipped, 
badly trained and led” as the Yugoslav Army had stripped it of “everything transportable, 
even … the electric wiring out of its abandoned barracks” (Phillips 2004, 110-1; also see 
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Ramet 2006, 580); this weakness not only made it easier to mobilize rebels (due to the 
low risk of repression) but also minimized the costs Albanian leaders would have 
associated with the strategy of war (due to the low probability of defeat). In return, gains 
on the battlefield could translate into leverage at the negotiation table and perhaps even 
win the group international recognition and support. In the words of an NLA fighter 
interviewed in March, “in 1998 when we were in the KLA, the Americans called us a 
terrorist organization at first, but then they came around to supporting us. It'll be the same 
this time with the NLA” (Loyd 2001).  
The NLA would not signal its readiness to stop fighting until after taking control 
of the town of Aračinovo, 5 miles from the capital of Skopje, proving the vulnerability of 
the Macedonian government. Further illustrating the symbolic value of this move, 
following the failure of Macedonian troops to recapture the town themselves, the NLA 
agreed to a deal that provided for NATO troops to escort them (with their weapons) out 
of Aračinovo to a village further away from the capital (Agence France Presse -- English 
June 24, 2001; Mironski 2001; Phillips 2004, 125). Fighting continued elsewhere, 
particularly around Tetovo, throughout July, even as negotiations took place behind 
closed doors between major Macedonian and ethnic Albanian political parties.73
 
Choosing Peace at Ohrid 
Prime Minister Georgievski of the VMRO-DPMNE,74 Branko Crvenkovski of the 
SDSM,75 Arben Xhaferi of the DPA, and Imer Imeri of the PDP signed the Framework 
                                                 
73 The main sticking point in multiple rounds of negotiations throughout July was the issue of Albanian 
language (Fisher 2001; Wood 2001a). 
74 The Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian Unity. 
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Agreement on 13 August 2001 in Ohrid, Macedonia.76 Although the NLA was officially 
not part of the negotiations, NATO officials had been privately talking with Ahmeti, who 
demanded a promise of amnesty for his fighters from President Boris Trajkovski in return 
for his cooperation. Trajkovski presented a written promise of amnesty on August 12, and 
the NLA signed a technical military agreement with NATO on August 14: in what came 
to be known as Operation Essential Harvest, about 3,500 NATO troops would be 
employed in Macedonia to demobilize and disarm the rebels  (Ahrens 2007, 460; ICG 
2001, 6).  Ahmeti declared, “there is no further need to keep weapons, as long as we have 
a strong guarantee from the European Union and from the United States of America,” as 
what came out of Ohrid was what they were seeking: “It was not a territorial war. We 
want to live as equals in our land and be treated as citizens. Albanians have gained the 
rights they did not have; their language and a right to veto over issues concerning 
national causes” (Wood 2001b).  
 The FA addressed ethnic Albanian concerns and demands without overstepping 
the bottom line for Macedonians—the unitary character of the state, deviation from 
which, ethnic Macedonians feared, could lead to secession and a “Greater Albania” 
(Brown 2000). According to the agreement, the preamble of the constitution would be 
changed to remove the controversial statement that had identified Macedonia as the home 
of the “Macedonian people” exclusively. It would instead provide an overview of the 
country’s historical development, in addition to declaring a commitment on the part of all 
                                                                                                                                                 
75 The Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia. 
76 The document is available at http://faq.macedonia.org/politics/framework_agreement.pdf (last accessed 
on 21 May 2007).
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citizens to “preserve and develop everything that is valuable from the rich cultural 
inheritance and coexistence within Macedonia” (Framework Agreement, Annex A).77
Compromise solutions were reached on the two most contentious issues, language 
and police. As representatives of the DPA, PDP, and NLA had agreed to in the Prizren 
Declaration in May 2001, “unrestricted use of the Albanian language as one of the 
country’s official languages” became the ethnic Albanian demand on language in 
negotiations with the government (Rusi 2002, 26). Macedonians, on the other hand, saw 
the equalization of the status of the Albanian language with that of their own as 
“language federalization” that would threaten their national identity (ICG 2001, 1). The 
FA bridged the gap by requiring amendments to Article 7 of the Constitution so it would 
read as follows: 
(1) The Macedonian language, written using its Cyrillic alphabet, is the official language 
throughout the Republic of Macedonia and in the international relations of the Republic 
of Macedonia. 
(2) Any other language spoken by at least 20 percent of the population is also an official  
language, written using its alphabet, as specified below.    
 
Individuals using any official language other than Macedonian would be able to 
communicate in that language with the central government as well as with local 
governments in municipalities where the speakers of that language constitute at least 20 
percent of the population. In such locations, the language spoken by the minority would 
accompany Macedonian as the official language.  
                                                 
77 As part of debates and bargaining prior to the ratification of the FA by the Macedonian Parliament, the 
preamble was further changed to include the phrase “Macedonian people” as well as reference to the 
Albanian, Turkish, Serbian, and Vlach peoples (Jovanovski and Dulovi 2002, 71).  
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 Albanian representation and participation in the public sphere were to be 
enhanced based on the principle of proportional representation: 
Laws regulating employment in public administration will include measures to assure 
equitable representation of communities in all central and local public bodies and at all 
levels of employment within such bodies, while respecting the rules concerning 
competence and integrity that govern public administration. The authorities will take 
action to correct present imbalances in the composition of the public administration, in 
particular through the recruitment of members of under-represented communities. 
Particular attention will be given to ensuring as rapidly as possible that the police services 
will generally reflect the composition and distribution of the population of Macedonia, as 
specified in Annex C (Framework Agreement, Article 4.2). 
The question of the police force was particularly important for both parties. While the 
DPA and the PDP called for the creation of local police units under the jurisdiction of 
municipalities and reflecting the population shares at the local level, a centralized police 
force was integral to the preservation of the unitary character of the state for the VMRO-
DPMNE and the SDSM (Popetrevski and Latifi 2002, 54). The mutually acceptable 
solution provided for local police chiefs to be chosen by municipal councils from lists 
provided by the Ministry of the Interior; ethnic composition of the police would reflect 
the overall population, rather than that of any particular locality (Articles 3.3 and 4.2). 
Even though the FA did not provide for guaranteed representation in legislative 
and executive bodies through specific quotas, or the level of decentralization and local 
authority found in the DPA, it was very generous to the minorities in terms of veto 
powers. The article on special parliamentary procedures read: 
5.1. On the central level, certain Constitutional amendments in accordance with Annex A 
and the Law on Local Self-Government cannot be approved without a qualified majority 
of two-thirds of votes, within which there must be a majority of the votes of 
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Representatives claiming to belong to the communities not in the majority in the 
population of Macedonia. 
5.2. Laws that directly affect culture, use of language, education, personal 
documentation, and use of symbols, as well as laws on local finances, local elections, the 
city of Skopje, and boundaries of municipalities must receive a majority of votes, within 
which there must be a majority of the votes of the Representatives claiming to belong to  
the communities not in the majority in the population of Macedonia.  
The Law on Local Self-Government would need to be revised to ensure that it 
“reinforces the powers of elected local officials and enlarges substantially their 
competencies.” 
Enhanced competencies will relate principally to the areas of public services, urban and 
rural planning, environmental protection, local economic development, culture, local 
finances, education, social welfare, and health care. A law on financing of local self-
government will be adopted to ensure an adequate system of financing to enable local  
governments to fulfill all of their responsibilities (Article 3.1). 
After the completion of a new census, boundaries of municipalities and electoral 
districts would be redrawn to achieve more balanced ethnic representation.  
 Once NLA’s disarmament was pronounced complete on September 25 and the FA 
was ratified by the Macedonian legislature after long debates on November 15, given the 
given the extent and complexity of legislative changes required, it still took years for the 
implementation of the FA to be finalized. One of the significant institutional changes, 
which made up for the lack of ethnic quotas for legislative seats, created a pure 
proportional electoral system with no thresholds, as opposed to the mixed system that 
existed prior to the conflict. Redistricting of the municipalities proved to be one of the 
most contentious issues and delayed the implementation of changes to the Law on Local 
Self-Government until the end of 2004.  
 149
  
 By 2006 the implementation of the FA was “nearly complete and essential 
reforms [were] underway” (ICG 2006).  Although at times there were concerns regarding 
Macedonian paramilitary groups, such as the Vipers and the Lions (Jovanovski and 
Dulovi 2002, 66), and ethnic Albanian rebels, such as those that appeared in Kondovo 
(only a couple miles from Skopje) in 2004,78 electoral politics and parliamentary debates 
have dominated inter-ethnic relations since the signing of the FA—peace has become the 
only game in town. Even the rebel group that drove the conflict embraced the new 
political system and has been committed to working within legitimate political 
mechanisms; the NLA disbanded and formed what became the main political party 
representing the Albanian minority in Macedonia (the Democratic Union for Integration, 
DUI) under the leadership of Ali Ahmeti. 
 
No Universal Prescription  
A comparison of these three accounts reveals that there is no magic formula that one can 
apply to prevent or end civil wars, even when conflicts share similar contextual 
characteristics and emerge from comparable concerns and grievances. Acceptability or 
success of any given formula is not constant even in the lifespan of a single conflict. 
Rivals might fail to agree on a given institutional framework at one point during the 
conflict, yet move on to settle on the very same framework at another point, as their 
expectations from continued conflict change; the success of any political arrangement 
(i.e. to reach peace) is not independent of the conditions on the battlefield. This is  
                                                 
78 The group was characterized as “a ragtag mix of approximately 50 hardcore ethnic Albanian criminals, 
unemployed villagers and former Kosovo Liberation Army, and National Liberation Army combatants 
recruited from local villages, Kosovo and Serbia’s Preševo Valley” (ICG 2005, 4). 
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Table 4.1 Comparing Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia 
 
Case Players Initial Demands Proposed Institutions Bargaining Outcome
Bosnia Bosnian Muslims (44%) Unitary state, no change in Dayton Peace Accord: Settlement after 4 years of 
boundaries Highly decentralized federation/confederation, full-scale civil war
Bosnian Serbs (17%) Three independent states guaranteed representation in the legislature,
Bosnian Croats (31%) Decentralized single state guaranteed representation in the executive,
proportional representation in public sector,
veto over "vital interests" and constitutional
amendments
Kosovo 1 Kosovar Albanians (90%) Extensive autonomy Rambouillet Interim Agreement: No settlement
Serbia FRY sovereignty over Extensive autonomy ("democratic self-government"),
Kosovo, no autonomy guaranteed respresentation in the legislature,
veto over "vital interests" and constitutional
amendments
Kosovo 2 Kosovar Albanians (90%) Independence Ahtisaari Final Status Plan: No settlement
Serbia/Kosovar Serbs Autonomy within FRY, Independence, "high degree of local self-government"
autonomy for Serb within Kosovo, guaranteed representation for Serb
communes within Kosovo minority in the legislature, extensive veto rights
Macedonia Ethnic Albanians (25%) Veto over communal issues, Ohrid Framework Agreement: Settlement before escalation
proportional representation Veto over communal issues and constitutional to war
in public sector, official status amendments, proportional representation in public
for Albanian language  sector, official status for Albanian language,
Macedonia Unitary state "enhanced competencies" for municipalities
 
consistent with my theoretical model, where I envisage a strategic decision making 
process (regarding war and peace) that takes into account not only the expected payoffs 
from a given political system but also the political costs associated with compromise and 
the expected utility of continued or intensified fighting.  
 The comparison raises two substantial questions: What made it possible to avert 
war in Macedonia while a negotiated settlement could never be reached in Kosovo and 
could only be secured after four years of civil war in Bosnia? Table 6.1 presents an 
overview of the players, their underlying demands, political institutions embodied in final 
settlement proposals, and the outcome of negotiations in all three of these cases. To 
reflect the rise in the relevance of Kosovar Serbs as a player in the conflict and the slight 
change in the positions of all players involved, I list two different cases of conflict for 
Kosovo—one prior to and one following the launch of the UNMIK administration. As 
illustrated in this table, the nature of rival demands appears to be a key variable in 
determining the propensity to reach peace and the acceptability of any given framework. 
Initial demands players bring to the table not only signal how each player would value a 
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given framework but also feed into the expectations of their constituencies and, hence, 
the political costs each player would associate with any given proposal.  
 In both Kosovo cases, Albanians and Serbs appeared to hold mutually exclusive 
positions; various proposals that provided for a political system with institutionalized 
power sharing, decentralization, and minority veto powers proved insufficient to secure a 
negotiated settlement both before and after the war with NATO and the establishment of 
the UNMIK administration. In Bosnia, on the other hand, a negotiated settlement was 
reached after years of fighting in the form of the Dayton Peace Accords, which 
represented the middle ground between the two extreme positions of Bosnian Serbs and 
Muslims. In case of Macedonia, there was nothing inherently incompatible between 
Albanian demands for enhanced representation in the public sphere and a unitary state, 
which was the uncompromisable point for the Macedonian government.  
 Although the post-conflict systems endorsed with the DPA and the Ohrid 
Framework Agreement could both be identified as “consociational,” there are significant 
differences between them. Power sharing in the legislature and the executive is not 
guaranteed but rather indirectly induced through the electoral system in Macedonia, 
unlike the clearly delineated formulas and quota systems in Bosnia. The degree of 
decentralization in the latter also far surpasses the level of devolution in Macedonia, 
which is still a unitary system. Both, however, are very accommodating of minority 
concerns regarding the credibility of majority commitments to uphold the power sharing 
system once demobilization occurs; hence, extensive minority veto powers are provided 
in both Macedonia and Bosnia. Overall, the principles that characterize the two systems 
are identical; the specific institutional structures are substantially different. 
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 The obvious difference that seems to be responsible for the disparity in the level 
of decentralization in post-conflict Bosnia and Macedonia is the nature of initial 
demands. The level of autonomy demanded by the Albanian minority in Macedonia did 
not extend beyond having some local control over law enforcement; therefore, there was 
no need to even bring into the discussions the subject of decentralization beyond that. In 
the case of Bosnia, on the other hand, having full territorial autonomy, if not 
independence, was the bottom line for Bosnian Serbs from the start; they were 
determined to choose war at all costs until they received autonomy. In other words, for 
Bosnian Serbs, no settlement could reach the critical value of an acceptable arrangement 
unless it provided them with a territory of Serb majority, where they would exercise 
extensive autonomy; anything less than that would have such a low value, and it would 
carry such high political costs, that almost any level of expected utility from war would 
exceed that which they attach to consenting to that settlement. 
 The fact that a settlement could be reached in Bosnia illustrates that seemingly 
incompatible demands or even secessionist agendas, which are easy targets to blame for 
the failure in Kosovo, are not sufficient to explain the success or failure of any given set 
of institutions to reach or sustain peace. The whole analysis in fact confirms that when 
players make critical decisions that pertain to war and peace, they do not take into 
account only what they expect to get (i.e. the share of state resources) from a given 
settlement. Instead, they weigh the utility they attach to that settlement (minus the 
political costs associated with settling or capitulating) against that which they expect to 
acquire if they were to continue fighting. The failure to reach peace in case of Kosovo, 
therefore, cannot be understood in terms of only demands, political institutions, or 
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military capabilities. Anytime Kosovar Albanians and Serbia/Kosovar Serbs played the 
game of institutional bargaining, the values they each attached to accepting a settlement 
(which is a function of the value of the framework itself as well as the political costs 
associated with that settlement at that time) failed to simultaneously surpass the expected 
values they each attached to continued fighting.  
 Tracing the progression of negotiations in Bosnia and Macedonia, paying 
attention to not only those instances when a settlement was reached but also those when 
the outcome was continued fighting, provides further support for this argument. If 
(in)compatibility of demands was a determining factor on its own, the acceptability of a 
given framework for a given set of players should not have varied in the course of a 
conflict as long as the underlying preferences remained the same. In case of Bosnia, 
however, institutional frameworks provided under the Vance-Owen and Owen-
Stoltenberg Plans were almost identical with that endorsed at Dayton; even though the 
publicly espoused demands did not change, players (particularly the Serbs) chose finally 
to settle after four years of fighting on a political system that was very similar to what 
they had repeatedly rejected previously. Similarly, in case of Macedonia, in 1992 and 
1993 players dismissed plans with provisions identical to those embodied in the Ohrid 
Framework Agreement, which became acceptable to the government only after the 
opposition mobilized as an armed insurgency.      
 Nevertheless, the distance between players’ preferences constrains the range of 
mutually acceptable arrangements. In this sense, secessionist demands, which naturally 
incite absolute rejection of those demands from the other player, severely restrict the 
availability of settlements that would meet the critical value for both players at the same 
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time. Although this does not rule out the possibility of a self-enforcing settlement, as the 
case of Bosnia illustrates, the presence of secession on the agenda does diminish the 
likelihood of success. As it is clearly observed in analyzing the dynamics of conflict and 
institutional bargaining especially in Bosnia, demands for secession or even less extreme 
forms of territorial control seem to inherently amplify the attractiveness of continued 
fighting. As long as there is some chance of expanding its control on the battlefield, a 
player would be disinclined to lay down arms even if does not expect to reach absolute 
victory. As the detailed account of map negotiations in Bosnia confirm, each player can 
to a large extent expect to retain control over territories it has occupied militarily. 
Although gains on the battlefield could be a source of leverage even if territorial control 
is not the primary goal, as was the case with the NLA in Macedonia, conflicts would be 
more resistant to negotiated settlements if territorial autonomy, partition, or secession are 
on the table.   
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5. Selecting the Methods and Data 
Do political institutions commonly associated with Lijphart’s consociationalism, which 
the international community has been prescribing as a global “solution” in conflict-ridden 
societies, have a positive effect on the duration of post-civil war peace? Given the nature 
of this question and the type of data I planned to use, duration modeling quickly emerged 
as the obvious method for empirical testing. However, due to the lack of attention in the 
relevant literature to the link between specific institutions, individual political behavior, 
and macro-political phenomena (such as war and peace), I also found it necessary to 
explore the microfoundations. In Chapter 2, I developed a formal model of institutional 
bargaining among civil war rivals, specifying how and why certain political institutions 
might induce players to lay down arms and stay committed to peace (absent external 
disturbances). In Chapters 3 and 4, I demonstrated the empirical relevance of this model 
using case studies, which in turn provided crucial insights that lead me to refine my 
statistical models.    
 
Case Studies 
The already significant gap between the micro-level theories and their macro-level 
implications is magnified when the micro-macro relationships are studied solely through 
statistical analyses. Such studies often overlook information about the causal pathways 
that link individual or group behavior with the outbreak of civil war. … [B]y combining 
statistical and case study work we can better understand the political processes that lead 
societies to civil war (Sambanis 2004a, 259). 
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The same assessment holds for our understanding of what leads societies to peace. 
Hence, both as analytical narratives and as parts of a comparative case study design, the 
three cases I used complement my quantitative large-N analyses and contribute to our 
understanding of civil war terminations and post-civil war peace consolidation.  
 The comparison of the three narratives highlighted a variable—the territorial 
nature of initial demands—the importance of which had been overlooked in most existing 
works on negotiated settlements and post-civil war peace. This discovery then led me to 
modify my original statistical model; as the following chapter illustrates, this change 
produced results that warrants a re-consideration of previous predictions. This is 
consistent with the contributions Sambanis attributed to his comparative case study work, 
which revealed a number of factors (such as the contagion effect) that have been ignored 
in prominent studies of civil war. He found that “adding these variables to quantitative 
models might reduce the risk of omitted-variable bias and facilitate inductive theory 
building” (2004a, 26).  
 A common problem that afflicts most analyses that treat political institutions as 
explanatory variables is that the only arrangements that can be observed to explore their 
effects are those that have become equilibrium points. In the context of this research, we 
can only analyze the impact of political institutions that the rivals have already 
committed to at the end of the bargaining process—not what could have been if that 
process had yielded a different institutional framework. This is an inherent limitation of 
large-N studies in this area, reminiscent of Przeworski and Limongi’s (1993) discussion 
of endogenous selection in the case of statistical works that look at the effects of regime 
type on economic growth. They ask: “Unless we know what would have been the growth 
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of Brazil in 1988 had it been a dictatorship, how can we tell if it would have grown faster 
or slower than democracy? Had we observed in 1988 a Brazil that was simultaneously a 
democracy and a dictatorship, we would have the answer.” Add to this the fact that the 
two different regime types differ in their probabilities of surviving poor economic 
conditions, “we can no longer make valid inferences from the observed to the unobserved 
cases” (63). 
Endogenizing political institutions as part of the narratives provides an 
opportunity to compare institutions that were adopted with those arrangements that made 
it to the table but were dismissed along the process. This does not reveal a causal link, if 
it in fact exists, between certain institutions and political outcomes, but it does enhance 
our understanding of players’ expectations from different arrangements. A valuable 
contribution to the study of the politics of institutional design was advanced by Smith and 
Remington, who argue that “the tumultuous developments in Russia since the late 1980s 
have offered a rare opportunity to observe the creation of new legislative institutions—
not just once but through a sequence of changes” (2001, 3). As rivals find themselves 
making choices between continued fighting and settling on a new political system, the 
types of cases that are of substantial importance to my research tend also to present 
unique junctures to observe the creation (and the elimination) of new institutions. I utilize 
this opportunity with my case studies, with implications not only on our understanding of 
the specific cases but also on the formal theoretical and statistical models we use to make 
generalizable predictions, which could then translate into policy prescriptions.  
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 This component of my research also serves as a response to those critics who see 
rational choice, which I assume in developing my theoretical model, as empirically 
irrelevant.  
It is important to note that most rational choice models of empirical behavior do not 
necessarily assume that in the real world people actually act rationally. Rather, they 
construct their models on the assumption that people behave as if they were rational. The 
“as-if” assumption follows M. Friedman (1953), who emphasized the importance of 
prediction and who argued that for that purpose the descriptive accuracy of a model’s 
assumptions is a secondary consideration (Levy 2007, 206). 
While I agree with the assertion that a formal model should be judged on its logical 
consistency and not the empirical accuracy of its assumptions, the Analytical Narrative 
approach could still be used as an effective tool to illustrate the empirical validity and 
relevance of rational choice models. The accounts of settlement negotiations in the three 
Balkan cases demonstrate how the game I propose is played out in different cases with 
different actors and preferences. 
 
Duration Modeling 
How does duration spent in a particular state (e.g. as a society in peace, with a given level 
of economic development, natural resource availability, ethnic diversity, and a certain set 
of political institutions) affects the probability of transitioning into another state (e.g. into 
a state of war)? The family of duration models, or models of survival analysis, allows one 
to test the role of a set of independent variables and the role of time itself on the hazard 
rate, which is the probability of experiencing an event at any given point in time. This 
method of analysis also accommodates an inherent difficulty posed by questions of 
survival due to the right-censored nature of observations. Despite the prominence of 
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questions of political change—in policy, institutions, or macro-level phenomena—in the 
field, it has been an underutilized tool.79 However, particularly with the contributions of 
Janet Box-Steffensmeier and her colleagues within the last decade (1997, 1998, 2004), 
event history modeling is becoming less alien in mainstream political science. 
 
Survival Data and Problems with Traditional Regression Models 
Given the way dependent variables are operationalized and measured, tools of statistical 
analysis that are commonly used by political scientists are ineffective in investigating 
duration-related questions: What determines the durability of cabinets in parliamentary 
systems? What determines the time it takes for negotiation processes to end in success? 
Why do some wars last longer than others? And of particular interest to this study, what 
explains how long peace lasts or when war is likely to recur in different post-civil war 
environments? The dependent variables that relate to these and many other similar 
interesting questions are duration lengths measured in time units (e.g., days, weeks, 
months, years). They take on non-negative values only, and their distributional forms are 
most likely not Normal. More significantly, these are limited dependent variables in the 
sense that their values are not known for the entire sample; we do not know when or if an 
event would have occurred for cases that we stop observing before that potential 
occurrence.  
The linear regression model (LRM), estimated using ordinary least squares 
(OLS), is the leading method of analysis in political science, even though its appropriate 
                                                 
79 Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild (2003), Hartzell and Hoddie (2001), Bennett (1998), and Bueno de 
Mesquita and Siverson (1995) are a few exceptions.  
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usage is limited due its highly restrictive assumptions. An LRM with multiple 
independent variables has the generic form 
  ikikiii XXXY εββββ +++++= ...22110 ,               (1) 
where i indexes individuals or cases observed, X’s represent k independent variables, β ’s 
represent population parameters, and ε  refers to the error term (with conditions of 
Normal distribution, no heteroscedasticity, and no autocorrelation). Violation of 
assumptions could result in estimated that are not unbiased (i.e., E( )=βˆ β ) or efficient 
(i.e., variance of the sampling distribution of the estimator in question is smaller than that 
of any other unbiased estimator of β ). The nature of duration data poses a number of 
problems for this approach because of distribution properties and the presence of 
censored observations.  
In this particular study, the dependent variable is measured as the number of days 
between the termination of a civil war and the breakdown of peace that follows. In other 
words, cases enter the risk set when a civil war is punctuated by a military victory or a 
negotiated settlement and they fail (or “die”) when one of the following occurs: major 
resurgence in violence, another full-scale civil war, a genocide/politicide, or a military 
coup.80 Given the extent to which the distribution of this variable is right-skewed in this 
case (see Figure 5.1), it is unreasonable to assume an underlying Normal density 
function. More importantly, however, it is a limited dependent variable—the sample is 
limited by censoring as some observations on the dependent variable are missing while 
corresponding values for explanatory variables are observed.  
                                                 
80 See below for a detailed discussion on the operationalization of “failure” and see next chapter for a 
discussion on the consequences of using different coding rules. 
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While censoring can result from a variety of things, the problem with duration 
data is that observation might cease before the event or failure of interest takes place for 
some cases. Figure 2 is a generalized representation of this phenomenon. While cases i1, 
i3, and i4 fail at times that correspond to f1, f2, and f4 respectively, i2 has still not failed by 
the time observation of cases is terminated, which corresponds to the timing of i4’s failure 
in this example. Information on i2’s failure time is missing; we do not know at what 
point, if at all, it will fail.  
Although cases i2 and i4 are substantially different in that one has failed and one 
has not, we would not be able to differentiate between the two using LRM. Including 
right-censored observations in the model would be essentially the same as treating them 
as if they have failed at the last point of observation, while in fact they have not. Scott 
Long (1997, 189) illustrates how inclusion of censored observations in a model produces 
biased estimates of parameters. In his example, observations that are left-censored pull 
down the estimated regression line, leading to the underestimation of the intercept (i.e., 
α , value of the dependent variable when all independent variables equal 0) and 
overestimation of the slope (i.e., parameters β  that correspond to each independent 
variable). In case of right-censoring, he finds overestimation of the intercept and 
underestimation of the slope instead. Regardless of the direction of censoring, parameter 
estimates are clearly biased: “if the dependent variable is limited in some way, OLS 
estimates are biased, even asymptotically” (Kennedy 1998, 249). 
Truncation, which seeks to resolve the problem by excluding all cases with 
censored dependent variables, creates its own problems. The result is not only a reduction 
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Figure 5.1 The Distribution of Duration Times 
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Figure 5.2 Demonstration of Right-Censoring 
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with already limited number of cases, such as in medicine) but also selection bias as only 
those cases that were prone to fail would be included in the analysis (Box-Steffensmeier 
and Jones 1997, 1417). This would cause correlation between the error term and one or 
more explanatory variables, resulting in biased estimates and incorrect inferences (see 
Geddes 1990; King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). Long (1997, 189) demonstrates that 
using a truncated sample as opposed to a censored one only reverses the consequences; in 
case of left-censoring, for instance, truncating the sample results in overestimation of the 
intercept and underestimation of the slope. 
The tobit model, also referred to as the censored regression model, is an 
alternative method of dealing with the problem of censoring. The model uses maximum 
likelihood estimation (MLE) and incorporates the probability of getting an observation 
above (if right-censored) or below (if left-censored) a certain value on the dependent 
variable based on the assumed density function (Kennedy 1998, 251). Given that there is 
no theoretically-grounded assumption about the true distribution of post-civil war regime 
duration, this method has limited use for this study. Long shows that if Normal 
distribution is incorrectly assumed and/or there is heteroscedasticity in the error term (i.e. 
its variance is not constant across different values of independent variables X1-Xk), 
estimates produced with the Tobit would not be efficient (1997, 206).  
A number of scholars exploring post-civil war stability have dealt with the 
problem of censored observations by dichotomizing the dependent variable as post-war 
success or failure depending on whether they survived up until the end of observation or 
for a specific arbitrary period (see Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Licklider 1995; Stedman, 
Rothchild, and Cousens 2003; Walter 2002). While some of the concerns expressed 
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above apply to the former operationalization, the latter suffers from the loss of valuable 
information: With a threshold of two years, for instance, two cases, one of which failed 
after two years and the other after 42, would not be coded differently. On the other hand, 
a case that experienced relapse after 23 months would be coded as a failure, while 
another one that survived only one more month would be coded as a case of success.  
Finally, another limitation of all traditional regression-type models is the 
assumption of time-independent, linear relationships between the dependent and 
explanatory variables. This could be a particularly restrictive condition on duration 
analyses as it is highly conceivable for any variable to have an effect on survival—of a 
patient, a marriage, a war, peace, a coalition—that is not constant over time; “there may 
be a number of explanations for such change [in effect] to occur, including learning 
effects, shifts in life-course position, maturational changes, and so on” (Teachman and 
Hayward 1993, 359). As I discuss below, duration modeling, and the Cox model in 
particular, allows one to test and control for such dynamic effects.   
 
Survival Analysis 
Survival or duration modeling allows researchers to analyze the effects of one or more 
independent variables, also called covariates, and of time itself on the probability of 
experiencing an event or, in other words, transforming from a certain state at any given 
point after a case becomes at risk.  Each case or individual is assumed to have a ‘failure 
time’ Ti, either observed or censored, and the distribution of failure times is typically 
specified using one of three functions: probability density function of failure, survivor 
function, and the hazard function, which is also called the age-specific failure rate or the 
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hazard rate. The survivor function represents the cumulative probability of not failing by, 
or still being ‘alive’ at, time t. This can be expressed as 
   .       (2) )Pr()( tTtS ≥=
The probability density function of failure, which is the unconditional probability of 
failing at time t, is 
   
t
tTtttf t Δ
≥>Δ+= +→Δ )Pr(lim)( 0 ,     (3) 
while the corresponding cumulative distribution function can be written as 
∫ −== t tSduuftF
0
).(1)()(       (4) 
The hazard function  represents the conditional probability that failure occurs 
at time t, or within the interval [
( )th
]ttt Δ+,  more correctly, given that it has not occurred up 
until t. In other words, it is the instantaneous hazard rate or the risk of failure at a given 
point in time. This is the function that is typically modeled in duration studies, and has 
the form 
t
tTtTttth t Δ
≥≥>Δ+= +→Δ )|Pr(lim)( 0 .   (5) 
The relationship amongst these functions can be expressed as  
)(
)()(
tS
tfth = .       (6) 
Given that we are interested in modeling the effects of covariates on the hazard 
rate, we can rewrite it as a function of a vector of independent variables and a baseline 
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hazard rate, which reflects the shape of the hazard when all covariates are equal to 0. 
Following Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (1997, 1427),  
   
t
XtTtTttth t Δ
′≥≥>Δ+= +→Δ ),;|Pr(lim)( 0 βγ ,  (7) 
where β  is the vector of parameters to be estimated for each independent variable 
included in vector X, and γ  is the baseline hazard rate, ( )th0 , which reflects how the risk 
of failure changes as a function of time alone.81
If a theoretically-informed shape for hazard rate’s time-dependence is known, the 
baseline hazard rate can be parameterized accordingly. Exponential, Weibull, gamma, 
Gompertz, lognormal, and loglogistic distributions are forms that are currently supported 
by most statistical software. I here illustrate only the exponential and Weibull models; 
while the exponential model is the simplest and is a special case of the Weibull model, 
the latter has come to dominate the small number of duration models that have been 
developed by political scientists (Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn 1998, 19). The exponential 
model assumes a time-invariant hazard rate such that 
   λ=)(0 th ,       (8) 
where λ  is a constant. The Weibull model, on the other hand, includes an additional 
shape parameter and the model is reduced to an exponential model when this parameter 
equals 1. The Weibull model, which implies a monotonously increasing or decreasing 
hazard rate depending on the value of the shape parameter, has the following form: 
  ,              (9) 10 )(
−= αλαtth
                                                 
81 Note that X and β  do represent vectors in the rest of the chapter except when specified otherwise. 
However, I will be referring to them as if they are scalars in order to simplify the language. 
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where α  and λ  represent the shape and scale parameters respectively.  
 
Proportional Hazards 
Proportional hazard models are distinguished from other duration models by the 
multiplicative nature of interaction they allow between the baseline hazard function, 
which does change with time but not across individuals, and the function of independent 
variables. These models have the general form 
   ( ) ( ) ( )XcthXth β ′= 0; ,      (10) 
where  is any positive function, while ( ).c X  and β  represent the vectors of explanatory 
variables and corresponding parameters respectively. The most popular form of this 
function, 
   ( ) ( )XXc ββ ′=′ exp ,       (11) 
has the clear advantage of being simple in form and enabling easier interpretation of 
parameter estimates β .82 Hence the most commonly used and widely available hazard 
function has the form 
( ) ( ) ( )XthXth β ′= exp; 0 .     (12) 
 Assuming the form of proportional hazards, while potentially restrictive, has 
valuable implications. The principle of proportional hazards can be expressed as  
                                                 
82 Other viable specifications for  include ( ).c ( )Xβ ′+1  and ( )( )Xβ ′+ exp1log  (Cox and Oakes 1984, 
91). The form presented in (12), however, gained popularity over any other form, perhaps because (12) was 
the form employed by Cox (1972, 1975) in his influential work on semi-parametric duration models and 
corresponding partial likelihood estimations, in addition to the form’s obvious advantage of simplicity.  
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where i and j are different values of variable x. The ratio of the hazard of individuals for 
which x=i to those for which x=j does not depend on time t. If the difference between i 
and j is only one unit, the equation is further simplified so that,  
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which allows a straightforward interpretation of parameters. Exponentiated coefficients, 
or hazard ratios, simply indicate the effect of a unit-change in a particular variable on the 
hazard rate. These ratios, which indicate the risks of failure for individuals in a group 
relative to those in another, are constant over time: for instance, controlling for all other 
variables, if the hazard of relapsing into civil wars for countries with unitary systems is 
five times that for countries with decentralized systems at t=1, it is five times of that at 
t=10, t=50, and at all other values of t.83
 If, however, the proportionality assumption is violated by one or more covariates 
included in a proportional hazards model, the result would be biased estimates, incorrect 
standard errors, and faulty inferences (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2001). 
For covariates whose hazard ratios are non-constant over time, the power of 
corresponding tests decreases because of suboptimal weights for combining the 
information provided by the risk sets of times where failures occur (Lagakos & 
Schoenfeld, 1984). For other covariates with constant hazard ratios, testing power 
declines as a consequence of an inferior fit of the model. The relative risk for covariates 
with hazard ratios increasing over time is overestimated while for covariates with 
                                                 
83 To get an estimate for the instantaneous risk of failure at any given t, the estimated baseline hazard rate 
for t is multiplied by ( )xβexp . 
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converging hazards, perhaps the most frequent violation, the relative risk is 
underestimated (Schemper 1992, 455).  
 
Just like the effectiveness of a certain medication on patient health could diminish with 
time (as is the case in many cancer treatments), the effects of a variety of factors on 
political phenomena could also be non-constant.  Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn find, for 
instance, that a number of variables traditionally used to explain Supreme Court 
retirements (1998) and to explore the “liberal peace” argument (2001) have time-
dependent effects on the hazard rate (of retirement and or war outbreak). They illustrate 
that ignoring this violation and using proportional hazards models of duration “can have 
dramatic and detrimental effects on parameter estimates, and therefore on the conclusions 
we draw about the processes under study” (2001, 985). If nonproportionality is present, 
however, it can be controlled for by including in the model time interactions for each 
covariate that is found to have a time-varying effect on the hazard rate. 
 Two general approaches have been proposed as tests for nonproportionality, both 
in essence based on testing whether 0=γ  in the following generalized Cox model: 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]tXgXthth γβ +′= exp0 ,    (15) 
where the effect of each independent variable is allowed to change according to some 
function g(.) of time (975). One method, suggested by Schemper (1992) and Collett 
(1994), involves estimating different models for different subsets of data, stratified into as 
many periods as warranted by the nature of the data and/or theoretical expectations. The 
simplest example of this is to treat g(.) as a step-function at some point in time, taking on 
a value of 0 for all points before that and 1 after (Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn 2001, 975). 
If parameter estimates vary across the different subsets, non-proportionality is implied. 
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 The second category of tests is based on testing the interaction between the 
residuals from a model and survival times. Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn (1998; 2001) 
provide a comprehensive review of various methods that fall under this category. The one 
I employ in the next chapter is a test proposed by Grambsch and Therneau (1994), which 
involves testing for correlation between “rescaled” Schoenfeld residuals84 and the rank of 
survival time. They argue that a smoothed plot of the residuals, centered around 
parameter estimates corresponding to respective covariates, against a function of survival 
time (e.g., survival time, log of survival time, the rank of survival time) should have zero 
slope for each covariate as long as proportionality is not violated. In other words, one 
should not be able to reject the null hypotheses that the coefficient of a correlation 
between covariate-specific scaled Schoenfeld residuals and the specified function of time 
is equal to zero. They also propose a global test for the proportionality of the whole 
model, based on the aggregated (across covariates) covariance between unscaled 
Schoenfeld residuals and the rank of survival time (Box-Steffensmeier 2001, 977). 
 
The Cox Proportional Hazards Model85
 
The Cox Model—a special case of hazard models specified in Equation (12)—was 
introduced by Cox as a tool for assessing the relationship between failure time and a 
vector of explanatory variables, with no specific interest in how the hazard rate changes 
with respect to time (1972, 189). The Cox model is semi-parametric in that while the 
                                                 
84 The concept and calculation of residuals for duration models is not as straightforward as in simple 
regression models since real values of the dependent variable may be censored. Refer to Schoenfeld (1982), 
Grambsch and Therneau (1994), and Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn (1998; 2001) for more information on 
the calculation of Schoenfeld and other residuals for duration models.  
85 See Appendix 2 for information on the estimation of Cox models using partial likelihood.  
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effects of the covariates are parameterized, the baseline hazard function  is treated 
as nuisance and is left arbitrary, or unspecified. Rather than being assigned a particular 
distributional form and being estimated accordingly, the time-dependent portion of the 
hazard function is simply not estimated. Fully parametric models (such as the Weibull), 
on the other hand, not only complicate the form of the function, the estimation process, 
and interpretation, but also assume a prior knowledge of the nature of the time-
dependence of the hazard rate.  
( )th0
Specifying a fully parametric model in this study requires making an assumption 
on how the passage of time alone affects the hazard rate, or the probability of peace 
failure. Are post-civil war systems more prone to fail when they are first established? 
Does the risk of relapse go down with time? Or, does it increase as the rivals have time to 
regroup? Although there is yet no well-theorized answer to these questions, I suspect that 
the hazard is greatest when the post-war system is first established and decreases as 
investments within the existing institutional framework accumulate; once demobilization 
takes place and rebels settle back into their normal lives, remobilizing an insurgency also 
becomes more difficult. However, because the role of political institutions is my primary 
interest here, and I can analyze the relationship between any set of covariates and the 
hazard rate without making any assumptions on the role of time using the Cox model, I 
am inclined to choose that over fully parametric models.  
A comparison of the estimates I get using the Cox, Exponential, and Weibull 
models confirms that the semi-parametric model is indeed the optimal choice in this case. 
As I discuss in detail in the next chapter, I find that one of the key variables under 
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investigation has a time-varying effect on post-war stability, which adds another reason 
to choose the Cox over other models (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 1997).  
 
Cross-Sectional Data and Cases 
It has already been widely recognized in the political science community that “the cases 
you choose affect the answers you get” (Geddes 1991; also see King, Keohane, and 
Verba 1994). However, the presence and consequences of selection bias have been 
emphasized for qualitative studies, even though cross-sectional quantitative studies are 
not immune to this problem. 
Over the last few years comparative politics has had to swallow some healthy 
methodological medicine. They symptoms indicated a serious illness of selection bias. 
Researchers afflicted by this illness were seen choosing their cases as a function of the 
phenomenon they attempted to explain. … While this illness related to the selection of 
cases appears to be close to eradication, another variant of selection bias has hardly been 
addressed in comparative politics. This other variant appears frequently in cross-national 
studies when the data sets at hand are themselves afflicted by a selection process (Hug 
2003, 255-6).  
The problem raised by Hug is common in large-N studies in political science; it occurs 
because the samples we use are rarely randomly selected from the complete population of 
all relevant cases, which is, in most cases, impossible to identify. One example of this is 
how, as Fearon and Laitin demonstrated, many scholars have come to incorrectly 
conclude that “ethnic conflict and active violence are … ubiquitous”  because they have 
essentially selected on the dependent variable, focusing almost exclusively on cases with 
ethnic violence (1996, 716).    
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 In this study, I try to address major problems of case selection that have plagued 
the study of post-civil war peace. At the core are questions of definition and 
operationalization, which directly affect which cases enter the dataset and the values the 
dependent variable takes: What is a “civil war”? What is a “post-civil war”? When does a 
case enter the risk set and, hence, the dataset of post-civil war cases? What constitutes 
“failure” of post-civil war peace? Without paying attention to how the answers given to 
these questions might affect the inferences made, most scholars in the field have 
indiscriminately relied on the famous Correlates of War (COW) definition of civil war, 
according to which an armed conflict is coded as a civil war if it fits the following criteria 
(Small and Singer 1982): 
- It has caused more than one thousand battle deaths per year; 
- It represented a challenge to the sovereignty of an internationally recognized 
state; 
- It occurred within the boundaries of that state; 
- The state was one of the principal combatants; 
- The rebels mounted an organized military opposition to the state and were 
able to inflict significant casualties on the state (i.e. at least 5 percent deaths). 
This choice determines not only which cases are included in respective studies but also 
the duration values since failure has been defined almost exclusively as the outbreak of 
another civil war (Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild 2001; 
Fortna 2004; Walter 2002; 2004).   
 In a groundbreaking study, Sambanis (2004b) compares “about a dozen research 
projects [that] have produced civil war lists based on apparently divergent definitions of 
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civil war.” Most of these still depend heavily on COW, only slightly relaxing its coding 
rules (such as the annual death threshold). Sambanis shows that regressing the same 
model on these 12 different datasets, which vary only in terms of case selection, produces 
different inferences on a number of explanatory variables that have been proposed in the 
literature. I expect decisions on the definitions of civil war, post-civil, and failure or 
relapse to influence the conclusion I draw from the survival analyses. To determine 
which cases to consider for inclusion in my study, I use the civil war list compiled by 
Sambanis (2004b), which has the unique advantage of being highly transparent in its 
coding;86 it is accompanied by a detailed codebook, with a specific discussion on every 
relevant case—those included as well as those that were excluded after consideration. He 
relaxes the COW death threshold such that: 
The start year of the war is the first year that the conflict causes at least 500 to 1,000 
deaths. If the conflict has not caused 500 deaths or more in the first year, the war is coded 
as having started in that year only if cumulative deaths in the next 3 years reach 1,000. 
Throughout its duration, the conflict must be characterized by sustained violence, at least 
at the minor or intermediate level. There should be no 3-year period during which the 
conflict causes fewer than 500 deaths (829-830).87  
While I do not experiment with alternative civil war lists, I do compare results across 
datasets compiled with different coding rules for what constitutes entry into and exit from 
the risk set. I present these results in the next chapter.  
                                                 
86 Note that the dataset I use for duration analyses is not a list of civil wars but a list of post-civil war cases. 
87 This rule still retains an arbitrary threshold, albeit a less restrictive one.  Based on the number of 
casualties, this still leaves out conflicts that could have otherwise been considered civil wars (such as the 
post-independence communist insurgency in Malaysia). Also, note that Sambanis drops pre-independence 
observations, such that wars that were ongoing at the time of independence are left out. 
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I propose a specific set of coding rules based on theoretical considerations. 
Namely, a case enters the risk set and constitutes a “post-civil war” case or a “spell of 
peace,” as Fortna (2004) calls it, when one of the following takes place: 
1. A civil war is terminated through a negotiated settlement or military victory, 
or 
2. A civil war is punctuated by a negotiated agreement that contains provisions 
that deal with post-war political institutions—not just a military ceasefire 
deal—but fails to end violence for any substantial period. 
The civil war list compiled by Sambanis was the basis for coding of entries that fall into 
the first category. He uses the following criteria to code civil war termination: a peace 
treaty that produces at least 6 months of lull in violence; a military victory that produces a 
new regime; a military victory by the government that produces a 6 month period of 
peace; “a ceasefire, truce, or simply an end to fighting … if they result in at least 2 years 
of peace” (2004b, 830-831). 
 Adding the second category for choosing cases was essential to overcome a 
selection bias that has been consistently committed by scholars in this field, who have 
relied exclusively on the timing of war termination as coded in various civil war lists to 
code entrances into the risk set. This has resulted in the exclusion of negotiated 
institutional arrangements that have clearly failed to end the violence from studies of 
settlement “success.” This is analogous to excluding from a study on the effects of 
income level (on party affiliation, for instance) all individuals whose income falls below 
a certain arbitrary level. Because I suspect that this selection rule could produce biased 
estimates and incorrect inferences with respect to the role of political institutions on post-
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war stability and peace, I also included cases of “failed” settlements (as long as they 
contained some institutional provisions and were not just military promises to cease fire) 
in my dataset. The complete list, which includes all cases that fulfilled one of these 
categories between 1945 and 2004, is presented in Appendix 1.  In the next chapter, I 
discuss the different results I got using this particular list of cases and an alternate list, 
which I coded based on the first category alone. 
 I also relaxed the rule that has been traditionally used to code peace failures. 
Recurrence of civil war has so far been the exclusive criteria for coding these failures, 
even though non-commitment to the new system by one or more of the original parties to 
the conflict could manifest itself in a variety of way. The definition of civil war itself is 
highly restricted, regardless of whose definition or list one adopts; it excludes not only 
those cases of armed conflict that fall below a certain death threshold, but also cases of 
regime failure that do not produce a high level of violence (e.g. a military coup), and 
government-endorsed genocides or politicides that do not meet organized resistance. 
Going back to the formal model I presented in Chapter 2, renewed civil war is not the 
only viable manifestation of the failure of peace as a self-enforcing equilibrium, which 
requires that no player unilaterally defect.  
I take all of the following into account in coding failure: 
1. Renewed civil war among the rivals of the previous war, based on Sambanis 
(2004b). 
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2. A genocide or politicide perpetrated or endorsed by the stated, as coded in the 
Political Instability Task Force (PITF) dataset of Internal Wars and Failures 
of Governance 1955-2004 (Goldstone et al. 2000).88  
3. Renewed violence among the same rivals, if it rises to “intermediate” levels 
(between 25 and 1,000 battle deaths per year), as coded in the UCDP/PRIO 
Armed Conflict Dataset 1946-2004 (Gleditsch et al. 2002).89 If research on the 
specific case in question revealed a certain event that marked the resurge in 
violence, I used that corresponding date as the exact date of failure. If no 
further specific information could be found, I coded January 1 of the first year 
of “intermediate” violence as the date of failure. 
4.  An “adverse regime change,” such as a military coup, as coded in PITF 
(2000). 90 
5. If there was no break in violence but a negotiated agreement was signed to 
end the war, I code failure right away (i.e. the day after entry into the risk set, 
which corresponds with the day following the signature).  
The dataset I compiled is composed of all post-civil war cases during 1945-2004, 
coded according to the entry and exit criteria I listed above. Out of the 144 cases under 
observation, 77 fail at different times (with the median survival duration being 2,638 
days) and the rest are censored on 31 December 2004. Case-specific information on 
coding decisions accompanies the case list I provide in Appendix 1. The consequences of 
differences in coding rules are explored in the next chapter. 
 
                                                 
88 Different versions of the dataset can be found at http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/pitf/index.htm.   
89 Different versions of the dataset can be found at http://www.prio.no/cwp/armedconflict.  
90 Coding rules are available at http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/pitf/pitfcode.htm#30.  
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Operationalizing Explanatory Variables 
I test the effects of two sets of variables—contextual and political/institutional—on the 
duration of post-civil war peace. I rely primarily on the literature on civil war onset to 
determine the relevant control variables; Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and Fearon and 
Laitin (2003) are the leading and most widely referenced works. In addition to the level 
of economic development, natural resource dependence/availability, and ethnic diversity, 
which are included in most statistical models that seek to explain the occurrence of civil 
wars, I also take into account the mode of termination (negotiated settlement vs. military 
victor) and the presence of third-party enforces (Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Licklider 
1995; Walter 1997). Many scholars have emphasized war type—identity vs. non-
identity—as another important variable, arguing that conflicts with religious, ethnic, and 
other identity dimensions are harder to resolve. Some of these arguments are based on the 
assumption of “primordial hatreds, which cannot be reduced by outside intervention 
because they have been ingrained by long histories of inter-communal conflict” 
(Kaufmann 1996, 137). Others argue that “identity wars” are essentially different and 
difficult to resolve in that they are not fought over “malleable political or economic 
issues” (Walter 2002, 59). I argue that the distinction has more to do with the nature of 
initial demands than the presence of an ethnic component; therefore, I employ a 
dichotomous control variable that captures the territorial nature of demands.91
 In operationalizing and measuring the variables, I used real GDP/capita values (in 
US $) for the respective year each case entered the risk set as the measure of economic 
                                                 
91 As the comparison of the conflicts in Kosovo and Macedonia illustrates, although both the KLA and the 
NLA were engaged in “ethnic” fighting, their demands were significantly different; this difference was 
instrumental in shaping the divergent outcomes in these cases. 
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development. When available, I relied on information provided in Doyle and Sambanis 
(2000),92 whose sources included the World Development Indicators (World Bank) and 
the Penn World Tables; in other cases, I referred to these same databases for the 
information. Natural resource dependence/availability was also measured as an economic 
variable—as the percent share of primary commodity exports in total GDP. I used World 
Bank measures compiled by Collier and Hoeffler (2004).93 As a measure of ethnic 
diversity, I chose ethnic fractionalization—the probability that two randomly selected 
individuals in a country will be from different ethnic groups—as constructed by Fearon 
(2003) based on his compilation of ethnic groups as of early 1990s.94 In coding war 
termination, third-party enforcement, and initial demands, I relied mostly on the 
codebook that accompanied the civil war list compiled by Sambanis (2004b);95 the list I 
present in Appendix 1 contains information on other references when they were used.  
 My primary source for coding political institutions was DPI2004: Database of 
Political Institutions (Keefer 2005).96 One exception to that was a variable that 
represented whether a system could be identified as a democracy. Recognizing the 
familiar debates on the proper definition and operationalization of “democracy” (Munck 
and Verkuilen 2002), and that I did not expect this to be a key variable for this research, I 
took a simple, pragmatic approach: I took the averages of Freedom House scores for 
                                                 
92 Available at http://www.worldbank.org/research/conflict/papers/peacebuilding (last accessed on 1 June 
2007). 
93 Available at http://users.ox.ac.uk/~ball0144/research.htm (last accessed on 1 June 2007). 
94 Available at http://www.stanford.edu/~jfearon/ (last accessed on 1 June 2007). 
95 Available at http://pantheon.yale.edu/~ns237/index/research.html#Data (last accessed on 1 June 2007). 
96 Available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRES/Resources/DPI2004-no_formula_no_macro.xls 
(last accessed on 1 June 2007). 
 
 180
  
political rights and civil liberties for each country for their year of entry into the risk set, 
and coded 0 if it fell above 3.5 and 1 if it was 3.0 or smaller.  
As institutions conducive to Lijphart’s “grand coalitions,” I coded the presence of 
parliamentary systems and proportional representation electoral rules using the respective 
variables in DPI2004; if the war was terminated or punctured by a negotiated institutional 
agreement, I referred to its provisions to code these variables. For territorial 
decentralization, I created a dichotomous variable, which took the value of 1 if either 
federalism or autonomy was present, and 0 otherwise; when the relevant information was 
not available in DPI2004, I referred to Norris (2005). To code the number of veto points 
in each political system, I again relied mostly on DPI2004 for information on the number 
of political parties that made up the administration, the number of legislative chambers, 
and whether the governing party(ies) had majority support in those chambers.  
In parliamentary systems, the number of veto points equaled the number of parties 
that made up the governing coalition (which is 1 in case of single-party administrations) 
plus the number of legislative chambers where the executive did not have the support of 
the majority. In presidential systems, the president was coded as 1 veto point, and each 
legislative chamber where s/he lacked majority support constituted additional points. In 
case of semi-presidential systems, where an elected president with executive powers was 
present alongside an executive cabinet that emerged from the legislature, the president 
and the prime minister (or the cabinet) were coded as separate veto points if they 
represented different political parties; legislative chambers where neither the president’s 
nor the prime minister’s party enjoyed majority support were coded as additional veto 
points.  
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Where negotiated agreements provided guaranteed power sharing among different 
groups in form of quotas of representation in the legislature and/or the executive, those 
were taken into account in coding veto points. Hence, for instance, in the case of Bosnia 
and Hercegovina, a separate veto point was assumed for each of the three groups that 
were guaranteed seats in the presidency; given the extensive authorities it was 
empowered with, the position of the High Representative was considered to be an 
additional veto point. Although authoritarian regimes were typically single veto-point 
systems, some of the negotiated settlements did embody specific provisions for power 
sharing among the rivals (such as in Afghanistan in 1993 or in Nicaragua in 1979), which 
were considered in determining the number of veto points. I also created a dummy 
variable to account for the presence of guarantees for power sharing and representation. 
I use these different variables and alternative datasets to construct and test 
competing duration models. The results, which illustrate the significance of decisions one 
makes in choosing which data and statistical model to employ, are presented and 
discussed in the next chapter.     
 182
  
 
6. Fighting Has Stopped, Can We Make Peace Last? 
   
Once such a country stumbles into civil war, its risk of further conflict soars. Conflict 
weakens the economy and leaves a legacy of atrocities. It also creates leaders and 
organizations that have invested in skills and equipment that are only useful for violence. 
Disturbingly, while the overwhelming majority of the population in a country affected by 
civil war suffers from it, the leaders of military organizations that are actually 
perpetrating the violence often do well out of it (Collier et al. 2003, 4). 
 
Once a civil war is underway, the primary roadblock in front of an insurgency is already 
overcome: it has solved its Rebel’s Dilemma (Lichbach 1998) and organized an effective 
armed opposition against the government. Add to this the collective war-time memories 
that become available for leaders to capitalize on, societies emerge out of civil wars more 
prone to renewed violence than they ever were. Unless the war ends with the absolute 
military victory of one rival, thereby eliminating the capabilities of the other(s) to 
mobilize and fight, civil wars create a “conflict trap” as “hatred and other rebellion-
specific capital accumulate during war, making further conflict more likely” (Collier and 
Sambanis 2002, 5). The data I collected supports this argument: Out of the 144 cases of 
potential97 civil war termination since 1945, peace stood uninterrupted in only half by the 
end of 2004. Given that success is possible, however, can we identify any political 
institutions—more tractable than most other factors, such as the economic or social 
context—that induce cooperation and promote continued commitment to the post-war 
system?  
                                                 
97 I say “potential” as some of the cases fail right away and, therefore, they do not appear as war 
terminations in civil war datasets.  
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 My discussion of the results of survival analyses, in which I focus on the effects 
of power sharing institutions and veto player structure, proceeds in three sections. First, I 
present my findings from Cox Proportional Hazards Models and place them in the 
context of existing literature. Next, I compare these results with those I get from 
Exponential and Weibull duration models, and I justify my choice of the more 
parsimonious Cox model. Finally, I compare findings I arrive at using my original dataset 
and two others, which follow different rules for case selection and an alternative 
definition of what constitutes failure. The comparison raises questions about the 
robustness of some of the conclusions and highlights the importance of making well-
informed and theoretically-sound decisions in case selection and operationalization.  
 
Cox Models: Does Power Sharing Work?98
Hazard ratios estimated by Cox Proportional Hazards Models with the original set of 
cases I compiled (reproduced in Appendix 1) are presented in Table 6.1. As I have 
discussed in the previous chapter, estimation of proportional hazard models with 
covariates that violate the proportionality assumption—hazards over different covariate 
values are constant across time—results in biased and inconsistent estimates (Box-
Steffensmeier and Zorn 2001; Kalbfleisch and Prentice 1980; Schemper 1992). It was, 
therefore, imperative that I test this assumption as the first step. The Grambsch and 
Therneau (1994) test of proportionality, results of which can be found in Table 6.2, did 
indeed indicate that decentralization has a time-dependent effect on the hazard rate of  
 
                                                 
98 All tests were run using STATA 8.0. 
 184
  
Table 6.1 Cox Proportional Hazards 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Territorial Demand 0.76 0.86 0.84 0.85 0.82 
  (0.20) (0.25) (0.25) (0.26) (0.25) 
Ethnic Fractionalization 2.17* 2.25** 1.98 1.82 1.80 
  (1.02) (1.11) (0.99) (0.93) (0.93) 
Economic Development 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Primary Exports 0.13* 0.11** 0.12* 0.098** 0.11* 
  (0.14) (0.12) (0.14) (0.11) (0.13) 
War Termination 0.53** 0.50** 0.50** 0.46** 0.50** 
  (0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) 
Third Party Enforcement 0.76 0.61 0.60 0.55* 0.56 
  (0.25) (0.00) (0.21) (0.20) (0.20) 
Decentralization   0.54* 0.36** 0.38** 0.39** 
    (0.19) (0.15) (0.17) (0.17) 
Decentralization*Time     1.00** 1.00* 1.00** 
      (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Separation of Powers       0.87   
        (0.32)   
Electoral System       0.81   
        (0.24)   
Veto Points         1.16* 
          (0.10) 
Observations, N 129 126 126 123 123 
Log-likelihood, lnL -299.09 -286.76 -284.07 -273.18 -267.47 
Likelihood Ratio χ2, 9.99 13.19 18.56 17.18 22.25 
-2(lnLNull-lnLModel) (df=6) (df=7) (df=8) (df=10) (df=9) 
Prob > χ2 0.13 0.07 0.01 0.07 0.008 
* Significant at the 0.10 level. ** Significant at the 0.05 level. 
post-civil war peace.99 Therefore, in Models 3-5 I included an additional decentralization  
variable that is interacted with current values of time (Decentralization*Time) to control 
for the time effect; the significance of that variable, albeit with a negligible effect in 
terms of magnitude (i.e., deviations from hazard ratio of 1 smaller than 0.01 in all cases) ,  
further confirms that the impact of decentralization on the hazard rate is not constant over 
time.  
                                                 
99 I ran nonproportionality tests for Cox models with different specifications as well (e.g. Model 4 in Table 
6.1), no other variable exhibited nonproportionality.   
 185
  
Table 6.2 Grambsch and Therneu Tests for Proportionality 
 
  Estimated  γ χ2 Statistic Prob > χ2
Territorial Demand 0.00048   0.00 0.99 
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.017 0.02 0.88 
Economic Development -0.057 0.44 0.51 
Primary Exports -0.056 0.23 0.63 
War Termination 0.14 1.20 0.27 
Third Party Enforcement 0.12 0.93 0.33 
Decentralization 0.22 4.13 0.04 
Veto Points 0.099 0.58 0.45 
Global Test   8.64 0.37 
 
Models 4 and 5 are the primary models of interest as they include the political 
institutional variables under investigation. Models 1 through 3, on the other hand, contain 
fewer variables and their results are presented merely for comparison; as the log-
likelihood ratio tests suggest, Models 4 and 5 fit the data better than the three more 
restricted models. Because the veto player structure is an alternative method of 
categorizing political systems (Tsebelis 2002), the veto points variable is modeled 
separately (in Model 5), rather than in conjunction with the more traditional variables that 
stand for inter-branch separation of government powers and the electoral system (in 
Model 4). 
 Estimates presented in Table 6.1 are hazard ratios or relative hazards, which are 
exponentiated coefficients ( ). As Equation 14 in Chapter 5 illustrates, a hazard ratio 
denotes the effect on the hazard rate of a unit change in a particular variable. A hazard 
ratio  with the value of 1 indicates that variable x which corresponds to the coefficient 
βe
βe
β  does not interact with the baseline hazard rate to affect the overall hazard or the risk of 
death. When , an increase in the independent variable is associated with a decrease 1<βe
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in the hazard rate; when , on the other hand, the variable is found to increase the 
overall hazard rate.  
1>βe
 According to the results from Model 4, neither the separation of powers (coded 1 
if parliamentary and 0 otherwise) nor the electoral system (coded 1 if it has a proportional 
representation—PR—component and 0 otherwise) can be attributed any significant 
effects on the duration of post-civil war peace. Parliamentarism and PR electoral rules are 
the institutions that are most likely to induce the formation of coalition governments 
prescribed by Lijphart (1977) as one of the “core principles” of consociationalism; yet, 
they seem to be irrelevant for maintaining the commitment of civil war rivals to peace 
once it is established. Even the presence of power sharing guarantees through reserved 
seats or specific quotas (i.e. ex-ante guaranteed vs. institutionally-induced coalitions) 
fails to play any role in promoting consolidation.100
 The number of veto points, on the other hand, has a substantial and significant 
effect on the hazard rate. The direction of the effect, however, is counter to the 
consociationalist argument, according to which commitment to peace can be secured by 
providing mutual veto rights—veto rights for all major players involved: My analysis 
reveals a veto points hazard ratio of 1.16. In other words, every additional veto point 
increases the hazard rate by 16 percent at any given point in time (holding other things 
constant). This, in fact, confirms expectations derived from the theoretical model I 
present in Chapter 2: Players, the majority in particular, might settle for a system with 
extensive veto points if war becomes too costly and the prospects of winning more on the 
                                                 
100 I tested the effects of this variable in various models with different specifications; I found it to be 
insignificant in all. I took it out of the models presented here to minimize collinearity. The same was true 
for the variable that measured the presence of democracy.  
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battlefield seem grim at some point. Once the war is over and the immediate pressures to 
compromise and settle are removed, players could seek to modify the system—both to 
increase their shares and to make up for the political costs of capitulation they suffered. 
Because the presence of too many veto points translates into institutional rigidity, 
however, change through legitimate mechanisms becomes difficult, if not impossible, 
thereby making relapse more likely. 
 Territorial decentralization is the only power sharing institution that is found to 
reduce the hazard rate. The correlation is robust, significant, and substantial: the hazard 
ratio associated with decentralization (presence of some form of federalism or territorial 
autonomy) is near 0.40, which suggests that the risk of failure for a decentralized system 
is about 40 percent of that for a unitary system. Unlike any of the other variables 
explored here, however, the effect of decentralization is not constant over time; the 
difference just described between unitary and non-unitary systems is valid when cases 
first become at risk. Looking at the estimates for the time-interacted decentralization 
variable, which has a hazard ratio that is statistically significant yet negligibly larger than 
1, the difference in the risks of failure decreases with time, albeit very slowly. Although 
the magnitude of time-dependence is minute, a comparison of Model 2 with Models 3-5 
shows that controlling for this interaction produces a major change in hazard estimates 
associated with the original decentralization variable (i.e. hazard ratio of 0.54 vs. 0.36-
0.39). Interestingly, once I control for time-dependence, the highly negative effect of 
ethnic diversity on the stability of peace also disappears, leading to questions on the 
robustness of inferences commonly made about this variable. 
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The comparative case study I presented in Chapter 4 suggested that the presence 
or absence of territorial demands (i.e. secession or territorial autonomy) could be a 
critical factor in determining the outcomes of institutional bargaining among civil war 
rivals. I also expected this variable to be an important control on the effect of 
decentralization on post-war stability; territorial decentralization of state authority should 
be a more relevant factor in cases where the war was fought over territorial demands.  
Results in Table 6.1 indicate that this variable lacks any significant effects and 
decentralization is significant even when territorial demands (coded 1 if present, 0 
otherwise) are controlled for.101  
 When it comes to the contextual, non-political variables, natural resource 
availability/dependence and the mode of war termination are the only two variables that 
are consistently significant across the different models. As the estimates from Model 5 
illustrate, every unit increase in primary commodity exports (as percent share of GDP) is 
associated with an 11 percent reduction in the hazard rate at any given point in time. This 
is diametrically opposed to the common “resource curse” argument: the abundance of 
natural resources increases the attractiveness of civil war as a result of reduced 
opportunity costs, better rebel funding opportunities, and increased expectations of gains 
from war-time looting (Collier and Hoeffler 2004, 2005). The robustness of inferences 
made about natural resources and propensity to experience civil war, however, has been 
increasingly challenged (Lujala et al. 2005; Fearon 2005; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Ron 
2005; Ross 2004). 
                                                 
101 Further analyses, presented in Table 6.5, illustrated that adding this control variable would have 
eliminated the significance of decentralization if the time-varying effect of the latter was not 
simultaneously controlled for. A comparison of models 6 and 7 makes this point for both the Cox and the 
Weibull specifications. 
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 The mode of war termination—coded 0 for military victories and 1 for negotiated 
formal agreements and informal truces—turns out to be a key factor: estimates from all 
five models confirm that civil wars that end with unilateral victories are half as likely to 
experience relapse at any point than those that are terminated with negotiations. This is 
consistent with the general expectation in the field that peace after victories are more 
stable as the loser’s capabilities to re-mobilize are eliminated (Wagner 1993). Licklider 
(1995), on the other hand, argues that while military victories might reduce the risk of 
renewed civil war, they do increase the propensity to experience genocides, which is 
equivalent to one player unleashing a systematic campaign to eliminate another without 
the means to defend itself.  
Genocides, politicides, coerced regime changes, as well as renewed civil wars, are 
coded as failures in my original dataset. The findings regarding war termination indicate, 
therefore, that cases entering the risk set after military victories are less prone to 
experience any kind of relapse, not just civil war recurrence. In Table 6.3 I present 
estimates I acquired using two alternative datasets, one of which differs from the original 
in terms of case selection and rules for entry into the risk set (Alternative Data 1) and 
another that differs in terms of what constitutes failure (Alternative Data 2); in compiling 
the latter, I followed the norm in the field and coded only civil war recurrence as failure. 
A comparison of Model 5 war termination hazard ratios estimated using the original 
dataset (0.50) and Alternative Data 2 (0.42) confirms that the risk of any kind of regime 
failure after military victories is about half of that after negotiated settlements. If all we 
were interested in was to prevent regime failure once a civil war is terminated one way or 
another, the obvious prescription would have been ‘let them fight it out till the end.’  
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Table 6.3 Comparing Alternative Datasets 
 
 Alternative Data 1 Alternative Data 2 
  Model 4 Model 5 Model 4 Model 5 
Territorial Demand 0.89 0.79 0.83 0.82 
 (0.31) (0.28) (0.29) (0.29) 
Ethnic Fractionalization 2.69* 2.58 2.73* 2.74* 
 (1.55) (1.51) (1.64) (1.63) 
Economic Development 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Primary Exports 0.13 0.12 0.24 0.32 
 (0.18) (0.17) (0.29) (0.38) 
War Termination 0.74 0.76 0.36** 0.42** 
 (0.26) (0.27) (0.12) (0.14) 
Third Party Enforcement 0.63 0.52 0.56 0.55 
 (0.27) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) 
Decentralization 0.16** 0.15** 0.73 0.65 
 (0.11) (0.10) (0.33) (0.30) 
Decentralization*Time 1.00** 1.00** 1.00 1.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Separation of Powers 1.06   0.67  
 (0.46)   (0.29)  
Electoral System 0.91   0.75  
 (0.32)   (0.27)  
Veto Points   1.44**   1.12 
    (0.22)   (0.12) 
Observations, N 107 107 123 123 
Log-likelihood, lnL -197.03 -190.37 -208.63 -207.58 
Likelihood Ratio χ2, 16.33 23.89 13.38 14.37 
-2(lnLNull-lnLModel) (df=10) (df=9) (df=10) (df=9) 
Prob > χ2 0.09 0.00 0.20 0.11 
* Significant at the 0.10 level. ** Significant at the 0.05 level. 
These findings, however, say nothing about either the costs that would have to be 
incurred until ‘the end’ or the characteristics of “peace” that would follow. 
Third-party enforcement, which tends to follow negotiated settlements and is 
irrelevant in case of military victories, is expected to reduce the risk of failure, at least in  
the short run, by addressing problems of commitment credibility (Walter 1999). 
According to the survival analyses executed here, this relationship lacks robustness as a 
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Table 6.4 Exponential Hazards Models 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Territorial Demand 0.71 0.92 0.79 0.66 0.74 
  (0.19) (0.28) (0.25) (0.23) (0.48) 
Ethnic Fractionalization 4.06** 4.97** 5.41** 6.07** 3.93** 
  (1.95) (2.54) (2.75) (3.27) (2.15) 
Economic Development 1.00 1.00* 1.00* 1.00 1.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Primary Exports 0.15 0.09** 0.04** 0.03** 0.02** 
  (0.18) (0.11) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) 
War Termination 0.30** 0.30** 0.37** 0.33** 0.38** 
  (0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) 
Third Party Enforcement 1.12 0.83 0.69 0.54 0.48* 
  (0.38) (0.30) (0.25) (0.21) (0.19) 
Decentralization  0.39** 3.41** 11.19** 2.55 
   (0.14) (2.15) (7.82) (1.70) 
Decentralization*Time     1.00** 1.00** 1.00** 
      (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Separation of Powers     1.10  
      (0.41)  
Electoral System       0.78   
        (0.24)   
Veto Points       1.60** 
        (0.17) 
Observations, N 129 126 126 123 123 
Log-likelihood, lnL -363.72 -351.40 -342.55 -331.66 -315.51 
Likelihood Ratio χ2, 35.83 37.87 55.59 68.33 69.21 
-2(lnLNull-lnLModel) (df=6) (df=7) (df=8) (df=10) (df=9) 
Prob > χ2, 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
* Significant at the 0.10 level. ** Significant at the 0.05 level. 
  
statistical finding: the hazard ratio associated with third-party enforcement is significant 
in one Cox model (Model 4 in Table 6.1), a different exponential model (Model 5 in 
Table 6.4), and three Weibull models (Models 3-5 in Table 6.5). These suggest that 
estimates for this variable are highly sensitive to differences in model specification; it 
emerges as insignificant in all of the models tested with the alternative datasets. 
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Table 6.5 Weibull Hazards Models 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Territorial Demand 0.71 0.92 0.79 0.66 0.74 
  (0.19) (0.28) (0.25) (0.23) (0.48) 
Ethnic Fractionalization 4.06** 4.97** 5.41** 6.07** 3.93** 
  (1.95) (2.54) (2.75) (3.27) (2.15) 
Economic Development 1.00 1.00* 1.00* 1.00 1.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Primary Exports 0.15 0.09** 0.04** 0.03** 0.02** 
  (0.18) (0.11) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) 
War Termination 0.30** 0.30** 0.37** 0.33** 0.38** 
  (0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) 
Third Party Enforcement 1.12 0.83 0.69 0.54 0.48* 
  (0.38) (0.30) (0.25) (0.21) (0.19) 
Decentralization  0.39** 3.41** 11.19** 2.55 
   (0.14) (2.15) (7.82) (1.70) 
Decentralization*Time     1.00** 1.00** 1.00** 
      (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Separation of Powers     1.10  
      (0.41)  
Electoral System       0.78   
        (0.24)   
Veto Points       1.60** 
          (0.17) 
Observations, N 129 126 126 123 123 
Log-likelihood, lnL -363.72 -351.40 -342.55 -331.66 -315.51 
Likelihood Ratio χ2, 35.83 37.87 55.59 68.33 69.21 
-2(lnLNull-lnLModel) (df=6) (df=7) (df=8) (df=10) (df=9) 
Prob > χ2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  * Significant at the 0.10 level. ** Significant at the 0.05 level. 
 
Fully Parametric Models 
As I discussed in the previous chapter, the Cox model is a semi-parametric proportional 
hazards model in that while the effects of the covariates are parameterized, the baseline 
hazard function is left unspecified; rather than being assigned a particular distributional 
form and being estimated accordingly, the time-dependent portion of the hazard function 
is simply not estimated. Fully parametric models, on the other hand, assume a specific  
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distribution—such as exponential or the Weibull—for the baseline hazard function, and 
they estimate the relevant distributional parameters. This approach requires a prior 
knowledge of the nature of the time-dependence of the hazard rate. Although I am 
interested primarily in the effects of institutional variables and not of time itself, I expect 
the hazard risk to be greatest when societies first come out of civil wars, when problems 
of credible commitment and security dilemmas (Walter and Snyder 1999) are most 
pronounced. Depending on the value its shape parameter takes, the Weibull model allows 
the hazard rate to monotonously increase or decrease with time. When this parameter is 
equal to 1, it is reduced to an exponential model, which assumes a time-invariant hazard 
rate.  
 Tables 6.4 and 6.5 show estimates from the exponential and Weibull models, 
respectively. The significance indicators provided for the shape parameter in Table 6.5 
are results of the test that the log of α equals 0, which is equal to testing for α=1; in this 
case, the null hypothesis that α=1 is clearly rejected for all five models, indicating that 
exponential models assume an incorrect specification for time-dependence. The scale 
parameter of less than 1 confirms that the baseline hazard rate goes down with time. A 
comparison of results from the exponential and Weibull models indicates that assuming 
an incorrect distribution might result in faulty inferences with respect to the covariates as 
well: the role of ethnic diversity, for instance, seems to be overestimated in the 
exponential models. The most striking discrepancy involves the single covariate with 
non-proportional hazards—decentralization. Although the hazard ratio associated with 
decentralization is similar to those estimated in Cox models when its time-dependence is 
not controlled for (i.e. in Model 2), the estimates from models with time interaction are 
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simply incomprehensible. The most extreme case is the 4th Weibull Model, according to 
which decentralized systems are 11 times more likely than unitary systems to experience 
failure when they first enter the risk set.  
 Given that the exponential hazard form is clearly incorrect, I do not focus on the 
estimates I get from those models except to point out how misspecifying the role of time 
could also create biased covariate estimates. The Weibull model, on the other hand, both 
assumes a theoretically-sound distribution for the baseline hazard rate—the estimates for 
the shape parameter indicate that the risk of failure monotonically decreases with time—
and seems to fit the data well. How do I choose between the Weibull and Cox models, 
then? According to Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 
Among the models that use time-varying covariates, the Cox regression is usually the 
preferred model. … If the standard errors for the Weibull are substantially smaller than 
those for the Cox model, the Weibull model would be preferred because of efficiency. If 
the standard errors are similar, the Cox model is preferred because of its less restrictive 
assumptions (1997, 1436). 
Comparing the standard errors for the different covariates across the Cox and Weibull 
models, making the Weibull assumption does not seem to systematically produce more 
efficient estimates. Although some variables that are insigificant in certain Cox models 
do turn out to be significant in corresponding Weibull models, the opposite of this is also 
true. There is no variable the standard errors for which are systematically and 
substantially over-estimated in the semi-parametric form. Overall, the same number of 
covariate estimates (21) is significant (at the 0.05 and 0.10 levels in total) in the 5 Cox 
models and the 5 Weibull models.   
 Estimates for decentralization, on the other hand, are problematic across the 
Weibull models. Similar to what I discussed with respect to the exponential models, the 
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hazard ratio for decentralization in Weibull Model 2 (which does not include a time-
interaction variable to control for non-proportionality) is significant and theoretically 
meaningful. Once the time-interaction term is added (in Models 3-5), however, the 
direction of the effect is reversed and its significance is retained in one but lost in two of 
the models. The fact that this discrepancy is observed for the only covariate that exhibits 
a time-dependent effect on the hazard rate, and that the estimates become problematic 
once the time-varying variable is included in the models, leads me to conclude that in the 
presence of non-proportionality it is better to go with the more parsimonious Cox model 
and leave the baseline hazard rate unspecified.  
 
Comparing Different Datasets 
As I briefly discussed above, I ran Cox duration analyses on two alternative datasets—
one that differed on case selection and the rules of entry into the risk set, and another that 
differed in terms of what constitutes failure. In both cases, in other words, the 
operationalization of the dependent variable is different from what I used in compiling 
the original. A comparison of the estimates I get with the different datasets could be 
informative since these competing case selection and coding rules are traditionally used 
in the literature exclusively and without much second thought.  
    In Alternative Data 1, only those cases that experienced civil war terminations 
as coded by Sambanis (2004b) enter the risk set; negotiated settlements that fail to result 
in cessation of violence for a given—and arbitrary—length of time (which is 6 months in 
this case) to justify classification as war termination are simply ignored. As I argued in 
the previous chapter, this raises serious questions of selection bias, as only those 
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institutional arrangements that have passed a certain test are included in the study. In 
Alternative Data 2, cases enter the risk set based on the rules used in the original dataset; 
they exit, however, only if they experience another civil war (hence, lower levels of 
violence, coups, and genocides/politicides are ignored).  
Table 6.6 presents results from Cox models estimated using these two different 
datasets.  In case of the first alternative, war termination and primary exports lose their 
significance. The effects of the institutional variables, on the other hand, are magnified: 
The risk of failure for decentralized systems turns out to be about 15 percent (versus 40 
percent with the original data) of that for unitary systems when they first enter risk. The 
hazard ratio associated with veto points indicates that every unit increase in the number 
of veto players increases the hazard rate at any given point by a factor of 1.44 (as 
opposed to 1.16 with the original data). These findings suggest that the particular 
selection bias typically committed by scholars in this field might over-estimate the role of 
institutional variables and under-estimate that of some contextual factors.  
In case of Alternative Data 2, no institutional variable under investigation is found 
to have any significant effects on the hazard rate. Ethnic diversity and the mode of war 
termination emerge as the only factors that influence the risk of failure, which refers 
exclusively to civil war recurrence in this case. This could have major policy 
implications: 15 of the 64 cases that fail in the original dataset, the Democratic Republic 
of Congo (then Zaire) in 1978 for instance, survive and are right-censored in Alternative 
Data 2. Political institutions seem to be irrelevant if all that we are interested in is the 
prevention of new civil wars. If that is our only concern, two things can be done to  
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Table 6.6 Comparing Decentralization Across Different Models 
 
   Cox     Weibull   
  Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Territorial Demand 0.82 0.83  0.75 0.79   
  (0.25) (0.26)  (0.23) (2.44)   
Ethnic Fractionalization 1.80 2.02 2.04 2.11 1.94 1.96 
  (0.93) 1.80 (1.04) (1.09) (1.00) (1.00) 
Economic Development 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Primary Exports 0.11* 0.10** 0.10** 0.06** 0.08** 0.09** 
  (0.13) (0.11) (0.11) (0.07) (0.10) (0.10) 
War Termination 0.50** 0.51** 0.51** 0.58** 0.52** 0.52** 
  (0.14) (0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.15) (0.15) 
Third Party Enforcement 0.56 0.57 0.59 0.50* 0.52* 0.54* 
  (0.20) (0.21) (0.21) (0.18) (0.19) (0.19) 
Decentralization 0.39** 0.59 0.54* 1.63 0.62 0.55* 
  (0.17) (0.22) (0.18) (0.86) (0.23) (0.18) 
Decentralization*Time 1.00**    1.00**    
  (0.00)    (0.00)    
Separation of Powers          
           
Electoral System          
           
Veto Points 1.16* 1.17* 1.17* 1.22** 1.22** 1.23** 
  (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
Shape, α     0.31** 0.30** 0.30** 
        (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Observations, N 123 123 123 123 123 129 
Log-likelihood, lnL -267.47 -269.92 -270.09 -227.10 -230.00 -230.28 
Likelihood Ratio χ2, 22.25 17.35 17.02 25.26 19.45 18.90 
-2(lnLNull-lnLModel) (df=9) (df=8) (df=7) (df=9) (df=8) (df=7) 
Prob > χ2 0.008 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 
 * Significant at the 0.10 level. ** Significant at the 0.05 level. 
 
promote it—eliminate diversity (e.g. through ethnic cleansing) and/or let them fight it out 
to the end (i.e. do not attempt to mediate for a negotiated settlement). Prevention of civil 
war recurrence is obviously not our primary concern, however. If the goal is to reduce 
human suffering and political instability, regardless of whether it comes in the form of 
civil wars or genocides, then certain political arrangements should be endorsed over 
 198
  
others. As the models estimated with my original dataset suggest, decentralized political 
systems with few veto players could have the desirable effects; the dilemma is to 
reconcile this with minority demands for extensive veto rights, which are in most cases 
necessary to reach negotiated settlements in the first place.  
 Overall, my findings provide crucial insight on two fronts: Different political 
institutions associated with consociational power sharing—commonly prescribed for 
divided societies—provide rivals with contradictory incentives (see discussion in Chapter 
2) and produce opposing effects on post-civil war stability. While geographic 
decentralization of power reduces the risk of relapse, the abundance of veto points 
increases the hazard rate. As my discussion of the competing models and the alternative 
datasets illustrate, this study also highlights the importance of decisions that pertain to 
case selection and model specification, which might shed light to some of the 
discrepancies one finds in the literature on societies embroiled in civil conflicts. I derive 
my conclusions using the Cox Proportional Hazards Model—more parsimonious than the 
fully parametric alternatives—and a dataset that overcomes systematic selection biases 
typically committed by large-N studies in this field.      
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7. “High Walls Make Good Neighbors” 
 
 
Are some societies inherently trapped in a vicious cycle of violence because of certain 
economic conditions, social diversity, or political history? Can they be helped? Are there 
any political institutions that can render conflict-prone societies more conducive to 
stability, particularly following civil wars? International actors engaged in mediating, and 
in some cases imposing solutions to, civil conflicts around the world seem to adhere to an 
idea that there is a universally applicable prescription to managing conflict in such 
societies. Political institutions commonly associated with Lijphart’s principles of 
consociationalism (1969; 1977; 1999), coupled with provisions for third-party 
enforcement, have been at the core of the widely endorsed model. My findings, on the 
other hand, lend support to the argument that was conveyed to me by the now-deposed 
Turkish Cypriot veteran leader, Rauf R. Denktaş, as he vehemently defended his 
uncompromising stand: “separation brought peace in Cyprus, high walls can make good 
neighbors.”102 The results of survival analyses on all cases of civil war termination 
between 1945 and 2004 indicate that territorial decentralization is the only power sharing 
institution that reduces the hazard rate of peace after civil wars. I further find that the 
presence of extensive veto rights, which is another component of consociationalist power 
sharing, significantly increases the risk of failure.  
 
 
 
                                                 
102 Interview conducted by the author in Nicosia, Cyprus, in January 2004.  
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Exploring the Microfoundations 
Studies in this field have so far relied almost exclusively on cross-sectional patterns of 
war and peace to extrapolate the effects of particular institutions. With the game theoretic 
model I present in Chapter 2 and the case studies that illustrate its empirical applicability, 
I explore the microfoundations of decisions leaders make pertaining to intra-state conflict 
and cooperation. More specifically, I investigate whether and how the promise of 
different political institutions provides players with different incentive structures. This 
approach delivers two major substantive contributions to the literature: It unravels the 
concept of consociationalism by illustrating how it confounds two different institutions 
that provide players, particularly the majority, with divergent incentives. It also proves 
how the success of any given institutional framework to motivate rivals to agree on a 
negotiated settlement varies not only across cases but also in the course of a specific 
conflict; the acceptability of any political system as a compromise to settle off the 
battlefield depends on the power each player expects to secure with it, as well as on the 
political costs it associates with compromise and what it anticipates to achieve from 
continued fighting. 
 I also adopt an incentive-based definition of consolidation: stability of peace or its 
consolidation requires that it is “self enforcing in the sense that all actors have incentives 
to adhere to the rules” (Weingast 2002, 679). This allows me to bridge the micro-level 
game theoretic approach with the macro-level statistical analyses, where I use the 
duration of peace as a proxy for consolidation. Identifying consolidation as a self-
enforcing equilibrium, which is one of the potential outcomes of the single-round 
institutional bargaining game, is consistent with the widely accepted definition as the 
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system becoming the “only game in town” (Linz and Stepan 1996), which suggests a 
Nash equilibrium from which no player has the incentive to deviate from unilaterally, 
absent changes external to the game. 
 
Unraveling Consociationalism 
Despite the attention it has received, the concept of consociational power sharing has 
been poorly developed. The problem goes back to Lijphart, who initially introduced the 
concept as a descriptive type of democracy—“deviant cases of fragmented but stable 
democracies will be called ‘consociational democracies’” (Lijphart 1969, 211)—and 
argued that “the essential characteristic of consociational democracy is not so much any 
particular institutional arrangement as the deliberate joint effort by the elites to stabilize 
the system” (213). He further presupposed that the key to consociational power sharing 
would be “a willingness on the part of elites to cooperate” (218), in essence making the 
tautological argument that countries such as the Netherlands, Belgium, and Switzerland 
were able to establish sustainable democracies despite being fragmented because elites 
wanted to cooperate. The ultimate question is why they wanted to cooperate. My 
assertion is that institutions interact with given individual preferences, including those 
that might reflect prominent social cleavages (i.e. ethnic/religious/tribal identities), to 
determine individual behavior and social outcomes.   
This approach reveals that the formal institutions that are most closely associated 
with mutual veto and segmental autonomy, which are two of the core principles of 
consociationalism as defined by Lijphart (1977, 25-52), could in fact produce opposite 
incentives. When assessing the value of any given power sharing system, players 
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consider not only the initial shares they are promised, but also the probability that this 
arrangement could be changed in the future. Minorities are likely to demand to maximize 
their initial shares as well as their veto powers, the latter both as a specific form of power 
sharing and as a signal of credibility of the majority’s commitment to stick with the 
arrangement negotiated before demobilization is finalized. The majority player, on the 
other hand, is more likely to agree to share power ex ante if it believes it has a chance of 
changing the system to its advantage in the future; similarly, the smaller the amount of 
power it needs to concede initially, the more willing it would be to grant the minority 
veto rights. This points to a necessary tradeoff between veto rights and other forms of 
power sharing. 
  While at odds with the literature on consociationalism, as provision of mutual 
veto rights is endorsed alongside other forms of political power sharing, this finding 
concurs with the expectations I derive from my formal model of institutional bargaining 
between civil war rivals. Because of an external shock, such as a change in leadership or 
public opinion, a player might choose to go after an institutional change after the war 
ends. If the institutional framework is so rigid that the player has no chance of instituting 
this change through legitimate political channels  (i.e. the number of veto points is too 
high), the player would consider the option of unilateral change through extra-systemic 
means (e.g. armed insurgency, genocide, military coup). This creates a dilemma for 
policy makers and institutional engineers, as minorities are likely to demand veto rights 
as a condition to stop fighting. However, as my formal analysis illustrates, the provision 
of veto rights and other forms of power sharing need not be simultaneously maximized; a 
well calculated tradeoff between the two could provide the solution. Nevertheless, the 
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higher the number of veto points, which many negotiated settlements tend to embody, the 
more vulnerable the post-war system would be, thus contributing to the instability of 
negotiated settlements relative to military victories.      
 
No Universal Blueprint 
The analytical accounts of institutional bargaining in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia 
confirm the implications of my theoretical model: There is no magic formula that one can 
apply to prevent or end civil wars, even when conflicts share similar contextual 
characteristics and underlying grievances. Acceptability or success of any given formula 
is not constant even in the lifespan of a single conflict. Rivals might fail to agree on a 
given institutional framework at one point during the conflict, yet move on to settle on 
the very same framework at another point, as their expectations from continued conflict 
change. This is consistent with my model of strategic decision making (regarding war and 
peace), which takes into account not only the expected payoffs from a given political 
system but also the political costs associated with compromise and the expected utility of 
continued or intensified fighting.  
 A comparative analysis of the three cases reveals the extent of initial demands as 
a factor that might be instrumental in explaining the difference in outcomes—why it was 
possible to avert war in Macedonia, while a negotiated settlement could never be reached 
in Kosovo and could only be secured after four years of civil war in Bosnia. The demands 
each player went to war for influence the values they attach to any given proposal; as 
reflections of their constituencies’ expectations, they also determine the political costs 
players expect to incur if they were to settle for a given compromise. Furthermore, the 
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distance between players’ preferences clearly constrains the range of mutually acceptable 
arrangements. In this sense, secessionist demands, which naturally incite absolute 
rejection of those demands from the other player, severely restrict the availability of 
settlements that would meet the critical value for both players at the same time.  
 The fact that a compromise was eventually reached in Bosnia shows, on the other 
hand, that (in)compatibility of demands is not a determining factor on its own. If that was 
the case, the fate of Bosnia would not have differed from that of Kosovo, and the 
acceptability of a Dayton-like framework would not have varied in the course of the 
conflict since there is no indication that the underlying preferences of the Bosnian players 
changed. Nevertheless, they (particularly the Serbs) chose finally to settle after four years 
of fighting on a compromise with provisions almost identical to those they had repeatedly 
rejected before; the main factor behind the change was major transformations on the 
battlefield and regarding future military prospects. Similarly, in case of Macedonia, in 
1992 and 1993 players dismissed plans with provisions identical to those endorsed at 
Ohrid; they became acceptable to the government only after the opposition mobilized into 
an armed insurgency.    
 
Power Sharing vs. Majoritarian Democracy 
What makes democracy attractive as a form of government is the fact that it is a system 
of “organized uncertainty” in the sense that the winners are not predetermined, each 
player has some chance of winning at some point, and the uncertainty is bound by the 
rules of the game (Przeworski 1991, 13). When majoritarian democracy—where political 
power tends to be amassed in the hands of a single party that enjoys plurality or majority 
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of political support at a given period (determined typically by single-member district 
plurality type elections)—is installed in a society that is deeply divided between a 
majority and one or more minorities (in terms of population), outcomes are no longer 
“uncertain.” Once different identity groups are pitted against each other in a civil war, 
these identities effectively become strong determinants of political preferences, creating 
cumulative and particularly divisive social cleavages; majoritarian democracies, then, 
produce permanent majorities, leaving minorities with no incentive to agree to or comply 
with the rules of this system. 
 An effective post-conflict political system must convince the rivals to not only 
stop fighting but also stay off the battlefield and committed to peace once they 
demobilize. Consolidation of peace requires that all relevant players have a stake in its 
preservation, particularly when juxtaposed with their expectations from continued or 
renewed fighting. Power sharing institutions do just that. As I illustrate in Chapter 2, a 
majoritarian system essentially minimizes for minorities the share or amount of power 
they expect to get, while maximizing the political costs associated with accepting that 
settlement. Therefore, when a majoritarian offer is on the table, minorities’ response is 
determined almost exclusively by what they anticipate from continued fighting. Hence, 
holding other things constant, proposals with power sharing would be more likely to 
produce peace and those without would most likely end in continued war.   
 Decentralization, which turns out to be the only power sharing institution that 
increases the probability of peace consolidation, is different from other forms of power 
sharing in a significant way. It delineates separate spheres—territorial and otherwise—of 
self-rule, albeit with restrictions that depend on the level of devolution, and does not 
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necessarily require inter-group cooperation. Induced or guaranteed representation in 
coalition governments, on the other hand, oblige such cooperation. I believe, this could 
be partially responsible for the difference in the effects of different power sharing 
institutions on post-civil war peace and stability. If decentralization is territorial in nature 
and the rival groups are geographically clustered accordingly, this arrangement also has 
the advantage of separating groups who had been zealously killing each other until 
recently. I agree with the following assessment of Snyder and Jervis (1999, 17): 
The security dilemma evaporates if the best defense is not a good offense but simply a 
good defense: if so, everyone can be secure simultaneously. This can be achieved by 
making the contending groups more compact geographically, by evening out imbalances 
of power and dramatic shifts in relative power, by deploying weapons that are most 
useful in positional defense and least useful in attack … and by providing reliable 
monitoring of the military preparations of the contending groups. … At its most extreme, 
this can lead to splitting a country into separate parts; in other cases, it can solidify ethnic 
divisions and loyalties, making a state figuratively if not literally a federation. 
Given that my primary concern is whether and how peace after civil wars can be made 
more stable and how renewed violence can be prevented, the salience of sub-state 
identities in itself is not relevant. 
 
Methodological Contributions 
 
This study combines different approaches that are often utilized separately in different 
strands of political science research. With the theoretical model and the historical 
narratives that I situate around that model, I seek to bridge the gap between the 
microfoundations of political behavior and the macro-political outcomes that are readily 
observed. In doing so, I also endogenize political institutions, which provides an 
opportunity to compare institutions that were adopted with those arrangements that made 
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it to the table but were dismissed along the process. This does not reveal a causal link, if 
it in fact exists, between certain institutions and political outcomes, but it does enhance 
our understanding of players’ expectations from different arrangements. The case studies 
and the comparative case study design further led me to refine my statistical models as I 
gained crucial insights into the decision making processes of civil war rivals.   
 In the cross-sectional quantitative component of the research, in which I explore 
the effects of political institutions as exogenous variables, I introduce and employ 
duration modeling as the method of analysis. The family of duration models, or models of 
survival analysis, allows one to test the role of a set of independent variables and the role 
of time itself on the hazard rate, which is the probability of experiencing an event at any 
given point in time. This method of analysis also accommodates an inherent difficulty 
posed by questions of survival due to the right-censored nature of observations. Despite 
the prominence of the questions of political change, however, this method has remained a 
largely underutilized tool in the field. 
 Finally, I bring attention to problems of selection bias and atheoretical dependent 
variable operationalization that commonly afflict studies of post-civil war stability. I ran 
Cox duration analyses on two alternative datasets—one that differed on case selection 
and the rules of entry into the risk set, and another that differed in terms of what 
constitutes failure. In Alternative Data 1, only those cases that experienced civil war 
terminations as coded by Sambanis (2004b) enter the risk set; negotiated settlements that 
fail to result in cessation of violence for a given—and arbitrary—length of time (which is 
6 months in this case) to justify classification as war termination are simply ignored, 
raising serious questions of selection bias. In Alternative Data 2, cases enter the risk set 
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based on the rules used in the original dataset; they exit, however, only if they experience 
another civil war (hence, lower levels of violence, coups, and genocides/politicides are 
ignored as forms of failure). The differences in the estimates I get with these competing 
datasets carry substantial implications since these alternative case selection and coding 
rules are traditionally used in the literature exclusively and without much second thought.  
 
Considerations for Future Research 
This study illustrates the value of multi-method research, particularly the contributions 
attention to microfoundations or individual level incentives can make to our 
understanding of macro-level political phenomena (such as civil war and peace). The 
formal theory and analytical narratives built around it can shed light to issues that have 
been overlooked and help researcher refine their empirical models and theories. One need 
not abandon statistical analyses as a method of hypothesis testing in order to utilize these 
other approaches; they can compliment each other as I have shown.103  
In terms of the literature on civil wars and post-civil war peace, investigation of 
micro-level incentives and decision making reveals that the link between civil wars and 
other armed insurgencies should be more carefully considered. I illustrate the empirical 
applicability of my model prior to and during the progression of civil wars in Bosnia and 
Kosovo, as well as during the course of the civil conflict in Macedonia, which never rises 
to civil war levels. My findings confirm what an increasing number of scholars have 
recently recognized: civil wars are best perceived “not as a distinct phenomenon, but 
                                                 
103 One exception that I am aware of in the relevant literature where the formal theoretical and the statistical approach were jointly utilized is Mason and Fett’s 
study, “How Civil Wars End:” a major difference between their work and mine, however, is the emphasis I place on different institutions and incentive structures 
they produce, while they do not try to further specify the “utility that the actor will receive from the terms of the settlement” (1999, 548). 
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rather as one phase in a cycle of violence” (Sambanis 2004, 259; also see Lichbach, 
Davenport, and Armstrong 2004). This means that rivals in civil wars and other forms of 
civil violence juxtapose what they expect to get from settling for the present or proposed 
system with their expectations from the battlefield in a similar manner. Players, 
particularly the non-state actors or insurgents, are faced with the same hurdles of 
collective action in both cases. Hence, underlying causes of civil wars are not 
significantly different from insurgencies that, for one reason or another, have failed to 
sustain systematic violent opposition at civil-war levels. A major implication of this is 
that the literature on civil wars and conflict management could potentially gain a lot of 
insight from the contentious politics literature, which has paid more direct attention to 
understanding the microfoundations of dissent and repression. 
 I also show that the estimates for many variables that are often explored in studies 
of post-civil war stability are not robust over different datasets and different duration 
models, indicating the importance of decisions on model specification (especially 
regarding time-dependence), case selection, and dependent variable operationalization. I 
am not advocating a strict and universally approved definition of civil war or of post-war 
failure; it is essential, however, that researchers are aware of the implication of the 
decisions they make on these issues. Methodological convenience, for instance, does not 
suffice as a justification for using this or that operationalization of failure, any given 
statistical method without considering the validity of its assumptions, or any particular 
form of time dependence on the effect of any variable of interest on the hazard rate.  
 Finally, on a more substantive note, despite the hesitation among international 
policy makers and mediators to endorse decentralization or partition as a solution to civil 
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conflict, my findings confirm that this could be the only institution that can contribute to 
breaking the cycle of violence in many societies. Why this form of power sharing fares 
better than others is a crucial question that deserves further investigation. I strongly 
disagree with those that argue against decentralization and other provisions for power 
sharing that recognize and empower different rival groups as the building blocks of the 
society since their rejection is based on a normative assumption that one form of peace 
(i.e. a homogenous society with a single, national identity) is better than others. The 
strategy that would most likely produce that specific form of peace would be to let the 
rivals fight it out till the very end; as long as their interests as a separate group are not 
recognized and addressed, minorities would have no motivation to leave the battlefield 
before they cannot fight any longer. Some form of consociational power sharing, and 
territorial decentralization in particular, is necessary to provide all relevant players with a 
stake in peace. 
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Appendix 1 
 
 
Post-Civil War Cases, 1945-2004 
 
Country Entry Exit Comments 
Afghanistan 15-
Apr-
92 
15-
Aug-
92 
Mujahideen take control from Soviet-installed Najbullah, 
but fighting among guerillas restart; Pashtun-dominated 
Taliban fights to overthrow Burhanuddin Rabbani and his 
Tajik-dominated Jam'iyat-i-Islam Party (S2004). 
Afghanistan 8-
Mar-
93 
10-
Apr-
93 
Islamabad Accord is signed on 7 March 1993 between 
President Rabbani, Hekmatyar and many other factions 
(S2004). It calls for power sharing: Rabbani would remain 
the president, Hekmatyar would become the prime 
minister, and the cabinet would include other Mujahideen 
parties. Relapse occurs right away. Although S2004, SF, 
and Uppsala show no break in the war, I must code this 
accord as the beginning of a post-war case in order not to 
commit selection bias by omitting a fairly comprehensive 
institutional arrangement--it was not just a ceasefire--that 
failed right away. Violence intensifies again by April 10 
(http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar/chronology.asp?gro
upId=70003). 
Afghanistan 21-
May-
93 
22-
May-
93 
On 20 May 1993 another peace agreement--with more 
explicit power sharing requirements--is signed in 
Jalalabad, providing 2 cabinet portfolios for each of the 
nine major factions (S2004). Relapse occurs right away. 
Afghanistan 28-
Sep-
96 
29-
Sep-
96 
Taliban takes control of Kabul on 27 September 1996 and 
institutes a regime based strictly on Sharia. Tajiks, Uzbeks, 
and other rivals of Taliban continue to fight for control of 
the government (S2004). Uppsala codes non-stop "war" 
during 1978-2001, so I code the post-Taliban victory 
period as failing right away. 
Afghanistan 7-
Dec-
01 
1-
Jan-
03 
By 7 December 2001 Taliban is ousted after the US 
invasion in October. A coalition of anti-Taliban factions 
(representing 4 ethnic groups--Pashtun, Tajik, Uzbek and 
Hazar) under the leadership of Karzai, takes over in 
accordance with the Bonn Agreement of power sharing 
(for an interim government) signed on 5 Dec. Because 
Uppsala codes no violence during 2002, I code relapse as a 
result of fighting between Taliban supporters and the 
government (and the US) restarting at the beginning of 
2003. 
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Angola 31-
May-
91 
1-
Oct-
92 
Son Santos (MPLA, government) and Savimbi (UNITA) 
sign peace deal (Bicesse Accord--ceasefire and promise of 
separate elections for president and parliament) for 
democratic constitution, but fighting resumes following 
elections (“war” during 1975-94 according to Uppsala). 
Angola 16-
Nov-
94 
1-
Dec-
98 
MPLA government and UNITA sign Lusaka Protocol 
(some power sharing in a national unity government but 
terms unclear); fighting restarts in June 1997 and becomes 
full-scale in late 1998 despite a ceasefire agreement signed 
in January 1998. Uppsala codes no violence during 1997 
(so, casualties must have been smaller than 25) and 
according to S2004 during 1997 UNITA was still being 
incorporated into the government and large-scale fighting 
resumed in December of 1998. 
Angola 4-
Apr-
02 
RC Following Savimbi's death, government and UNITA sign 
ceasefire deal in Luanda, demobilizing and transforming 
UNITA into a political party--institutional arrangements 
under Lusaka would still apply. 
Argentina 20-
Sep-
55 
1-
Mar-
75 
Anti-Peron revolt flares up after Peron tries to suppress the 
influence of the Catholic Church in April 1955; it is 
crushed fast but violence restarts and a coup ousts Peron in 
September. He flees on September 19 (S2004). Starting 
with the electoral victory of the Peronists in 1973, terror 
engulfs the country. Uppsala codes only "minor" violence 
between the government on the one hand and the 
ERP/PRT and Montoneros on the other during 1973-74; 
violence rises to civil "war" levels in 1975. The military 
steps in in March 1976, stops the guerrilla activities but 
unleashes the "Dirty War" and the infamous 
"disappearances" (S2004, Uppsala, SF). Following 
Uppsala and S2004, I code the war as restarting at the 
beginning of 1975. 
Argentina 25-
Mar-
76 
26-
Mar-
76 
I code the military take-over of 1976 as potentially ending 
the previous war; it in fact does crash guerrilla activities. 
However, given that it is followed by the "Dirty War" that 
is marked by government/military atrocities against all 
types of opposition, I code this post-war case as failing 
right away. Uppsala codes both 1976 and 1977 as 
"intermediate" violence, which provides further support for 
this coding. Because the "Dirty War" is technically not a 
civil war (no active and effective armed opposition), I do 
not code another post-war case following the ending of this 
period in 1983--it's a period of politicide. 
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Azerbaijan 12-
May-
94 
RC War follows the declaration of independence by Nagorno-
Karabakh (end of 1991), ends with a ceasefire deal, 
creating de-facto ethnic Armenian control (continues to 
hold elections etc., acting as an independent republic). 
Uppsala shows no related violence after 1994. 
Bangladesh 1-
Sep-
92 
RC Santi Bahini (armed wing of PCJSS), which represents the 
Chittagong Hills people ("Jumma"), first becomes active 
upon army’s attempts to make room for the settlement of 
Muslim Bengalis in Hill Tracts (in 1971) and then starts 
fighting for secession (1974/5) (S2004). A formal peace 
agreement is signed in 1997, providing for autonomy, but 
violence stops with the ceasefire declaration of Santi 
Bahini in August 1992 following the establishment of three 
elected regional councils with some administrative and 
supervisory authority--limited autonomy 
(http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGASA13001200
0?open). No more violence thereafter (Uppsala). 
Bolivia 16-
Apr-
52 
RC S2004 codes the 1952 MNR coup as a civil war, even 
though some other sources (such as Uppsala) code less 
than 1000 related casualties. S2004 cites a number of other 
sources that report 1000-3000 deaths. Even though there 
are insurgencies in 1952 and 1967, casualties do not 
warrant coding a failure. SF does not code any wars or 
genocides/politicides. 
Bosnia-
Hercegovina 
21-
Nov-
95 
RC Dayton Peace Accord is signed on 14 December 1995. 
Burma-Karen 1-
Jan-
51 
2-
Jan-
51 
S2004 codes the first Karen war for independence starting 
in 1948 and ending in 1950/51; COW2 concurs, but many 
others code one single war from 1948 on (e.g. SF, which 
combines the wars waged by different non-Burmese 
communities). In 1950 "Burmese government forces 
recaptured much of central Burma from Karen insurgents, 
as the Karen War of Independence failed, becoming a long 
guerrilla insurgency" 
(http://www.onwar.com/aced/nation/bat/burma/fburma194
8.htm). However, the end point in 1950 or 1951 is not 
clear. Therefore, I code 1 January 1951 as the end date but 
it relapses right away (Uppsala codes "intermediate" 
violence for 1950-91). 
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Burma-Karen 28-
Jan-
95 
1-
Jan-
97 
S2004 codes the second war starting in 1991 (or 1993, 
unclear). Minorities At Risk reports a major government 
offensive against Karen camps in April 1991, which leads 
to resurgence in violence. In January 1995, "Myanmar's 
army won an important victory when it overran KNU's 
headquarters at Manerplaw on January 27. It was the first 
time Manerplaw had been captured since the guerrillas 
began fighting for independence more than 40 years ago" 
(http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar/chronology.asp?gro
upId=77504). Although the violence seemed to have 
intensified in 1997 and onward, whether it is up to civil-
war levels--particularly whether there are significant 
casualties on both sides--is unclear. There was a 
"provisional truce" between the KNU and the military 
government in January 2004. Overall, based on Uppsala's 
coding on levels of violence, I code the beginning of 1997 
as the failure of peace.  
Burma-Kachin 1-
Jan-
76 
2-
Jan-
76 
S2004 codes the Kachin war for its independence during 
1961-1975. However, violence continues at "intermediate" 
levels during 1976-92 (Uppsala), so I code the war as 
ending at the beginning of 1976 but failure occurring right 
away. There was some kind of ceasefire deal signed 
between the KIO and the government in January 1993, 
after which violence seems to have stopped. However, 
because the period 1976-92 is technically not a war 
(although it counts as a failure of peace for my purposes) I 
do not code post-93 as another post-war period. 
Burma-Shan 1-
Jan-
71 
1-
Jan-
76 
S2004's coding is unclear. Uppsala codes "war" during 
1964-70 and "intermediate" violence during 1976-88 and 
1993. I code the beginning of 1971 as the start of peace 
and the beginning of 1976 as the failure. Note that this is 
very imprecise.  
Burma-CPB 1-
Jan-
54 
2-
Jan-
54 
The Communist Party of Burma fought to get rid of the 
existing regime since 1948, reaching levels of war during 
1948-53 and 1968-78 and "intermediate" in between 
(Uppsala). S2004 coding is unclear, so I code the 
beginning of 1954 as the start of peace, which fails right 
away. Note that this is very imprecise. 
Burma-CPB 1-
Jan-
79 
2-
Jan-
79 
Uppsala shows "intermediate" violence for 1979-88. 
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Burundi 1-
Jan-
74 
1-
Aug-
88 
Coordinated Hutu insurgencies against the government in 
the south and the east are met harshly, resulting in more 
than 100,000 people getting killed (S2004, SF). (Uppsala 
again codes no violence, hence assumes a genocide / 
politicide instead.) According to S2004 no war or massacre 
occurred again until 1988, but SF codes this genocide as 
ongoing until December 1973 (as opposed to the war, 
which is coded as ending in July 1972); I assume the 
massacres that continued until December 1973 were 
continuations of the 1972 incident, so I code the war as 
ending in Dec 1973 instead. In 1988 another massacre or 
war takes place, where thousands of Hutus are killed and 
many others are forced to flee. SF codes a genocide in 
August 1988 and an ethnic war from August 1988 on. In 
any case, massacre or war, 1988 marks the end of the post-
73 spell of peace.  
Burundi 11-
Sep-
94 
1-
Jun-
95 
Whether the 1988 incident is a short-lived one and another 
large-scale relapse occurs in 1991 (S2004), or war that 
starts in 1988 continues for years to follow (SF) is unclear. 
If I was to code August or September 1988 then the date 
for relapse is unclear. Therefore, I do not code post-1988 
as a case; instead I code 10 September 1994 as the 
beginning of "peace." According to a report of the UN 
Secretary General, warring parties reached a power sharing 
agreement on 10 September 1994, upon which 
Ntibantunganya, a Hutu, was elected by the National 
Assembly as president, a Tutsi become the prime minister, 
and a coalition of 7 parties was formed 
(http://www.un.org/docs/SG/SG-Rpt/ch4d-5.htm 
[Accessed 28 May 2006]). The same report indicates that a 
new outbreak of violence occurs in June 1995, therefore I 
code this as the date of failure. (SF codes the war as 
ongoing from 1988 and S2004 codes it as ongoing from 
1991.) A peace agreement is signed in August 2000 by the 
government and some rebels groups--not all--but it does 
not involve a ceasefire and fails to bring the war to an end. 
Because of the lack of a ceasefire and the fact that there 
were rebel groups that did not agree to be part of the 
negotiations, I do not code this as a settlement ending the 
ongoing war. Another agreement brokered in October 2003 
suffers from the same deficiencies. 
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Cambodia 18-
Apr-
75 
19-
Apr-
75 
After 5 years of civil war and violence going on since 
1967, Phonempenh falls to the control of Khmer Rouge; 
Lon Nol surrenders. Genocide--"killing fields"--ensues 
(GEN in SF) until the January 79 takeover by Vietnam. 
Unlike most other sources, S2004 codes a new war starting 
right after the victory of Khmer. Regardless of whether it 
is a new civil war or genocide/politicide, this post-war case 
fails right away. 
Cambodia 24-
Oct-
91 
25-
Oct-
91 
Paris peace agreement is signed on 23 October 1991. Even 
though no war-level violence occurs afterwards (S2004, 
SF--there is a coup in 7/97), "intermediate" violence 
continues until 1998 (Uppsala). Therefore, I code 
immediate failure. The agreement installed the UN 
Transitional Authority along with a Supreme National 
Council with members of four factions. 
Central African 
Republic 
26-
Jan-
97 
15-
Mar-
03 
Peace agreement is signed in Bangui (government of 
national unity and peacekeepers) on 25 January 1997 after 
about a year of ethnic fighting and army mutiny (S2004). 
Large-scale violence does not recur but another military 
coup on 15 March 2003 removes the coalition government, 
which was formed after the UN-mediated elections 
following the Bangui agreement (SF). I code this incident 
as failure. 
Chad 22-
Aug-
79 
23-
Aug-
79 
Most sources code a single war from 1965 until mid- or 
late 1990s (SF, S2004, Marshall). However, there was a 
settlement attempt through the Lagos Peace Accord 
(transitional unity government pending elections) in 
August 1979. Due to the ongoing war, I code this case as 
failing right away. 
Chad 1-
Nov-
94 
RC Violence subsides substantially after 1994 (after Libya's 
withdrawal). I follow SF and code 10/94 as the end of the 
war. It is unclear whether S2004 codes 1994 or the April 
1997 peace agreement between the government and FARF 
as the end. There is only "minor" violence during 1997-
2002 and Uppsala codes no violence in between. 
China 1-
Oct-
49 
15-
Mar-
59 
Mao Zedong's Communists win, proclaim the PRC, and 
drive the Nationalists to Taiwan. Repression of counter-
revolutionaries between March and December of 1959, 
totaling about 50,000 dead.  
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China 1-
Oct-
68 
2-
Oct-
68 
Cultural Revolution pits insurgents against the Red Guards 
during 1967-69. The war ends with the establishment of 
the Revolutionary Councils in Sept 1968 according to 
S2004 but in July 1969 according to SF. I code the end of 
the war as the beginning of October 1968. However, a 
genocide/politicide follows right away, hence the 
characterization of the Cultural Revolution as a 10-year 
event (1966-76). Therefore, I code failure immediately 
following the end of the war. 
China-Taiwan 1-
Apr-
47 
RC Taiwanese insurgents vs. KMT government following the 
"2-28 incident". The rebellion was put down by the end of 
March. All of the sources show violence as ending that 
same year. 
China-Tibet 24-
May-
51 
1-
Feb-
56 
As the Chinese civil war drew to a close, the Red Army 
moved into Tibet in 1949 to re-assert Chinese control over 
the territory; civil war ensued (during 1950-51). On 23 
May 1951Tibetan and Chinese delegations signed the 17-
point agreement, which recognized Tibetan autonomy. 
Relapse occurred in February/March 1956 with a rebellion 
against the Chinese, which spread and became a strong 
guerrilla movement. It is crushed by April 1959 and is 
followed by a genocide that continues until Dec 1959 (SF, 
S2004). I code the latter as the end of the war. 
China-Tibet 1-
Jan-
60 
RC The rebellion is crushed by April 1959 and is followed by 
a genocide that continues until December 1959 (SF, 
S2004). I code the latter as the end of the war. 
Colombia 21-
Jul-
57 
22-
Jul-
57 
"La Violencia" was technically punctured with the "Sitges 
Agreement" and the subsequent "San Carlos Agreement" 
(in effect until 1974), which provided for a power sharing 
arrangement with the Liberal and Conservative Parties 
ruling together as part of the National Front coalition (in 
addition to a rotating presidency, 2/3 majority requirement 
for legislation, etc.). However, D&S, SF, S2004, COW2, 
and Marshall all code a single civil war starting from late 
40s and going into 60s (Uppsala codes "war" or 
"intermediate" only after 1980s!). Because all these 
sources show the war in Colombia as still ongoing after the 
agreements, I code it as immediately failing. 
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Colombia 1-
Jan-
67 
1-
Jan-
78 
The different dates given for the end of the war between 
the Liberals and the Conservatives include December 1960 
(SF), 1962 (Marshall and D&S), 1969 (COW2), and 1966 
(S2004); there is no clear termination point. I follow S2004 
and code the beginning of 1967 as the start of the post-war 
period. Insurgencies led by groups like the M-19, FARC, 
and the ELN, who were excluded from the power sharing 
arrangement, intensified to war levels by 1978, when the 
government launched a major offensive against drug 
trafficking (S2004), and war has been ongoing ever since. 
(Some sources, such as SF, code the beginning of the war 
as 1984.) I code the date of relapse as January 1978.  
Congo 
(Brazzaville) 
15-
Oct-
97 
1-
Aug-
98 
Sassou-Nguesso of the Cobra militia seizes power from 
Lissouba in Ocboter 1997 marking the end of one war that 
has been ongoing since 1993 (S2004). SF and COW2 code 
the war as starting and ending in 1997, which is consistent 
with the Uppsala coding of only minor violence during 
1993-4 and full-scale war in 1997; in any case one civil 
war ends with the takeover. Civil war resumed in August 
1998 between the government-supported Cobra militia 
(and the military) on the one hand and the Ninja rebel 
group and supporters of the former president--the 
"Cocoye"--on the other (S2004). 
Congo 
(Brazzaville) 
31-
Dec-
99 
1-
Mar-
02 
On 29 December 1999 the government signs a peace 
agreement with the rebels, effectively ending violence until 
March 2002 when violence re-ignites (S2004). Uppsala 
codes "intermediate" violence during 2002. 
Congo 
(Kinshasa) 
26-
Nov-
65 
1-Jul-
66 
Mobutu takes over on 25 Novermber 1965, essentially 
bringing to end a number of post-independence rebellions-
-in Katanga, Kasai, Kwilu, and Eastern province. 
However, a mutiny in Kisangani (by FLNC, supporters of 
Tshombe--former president of the Katanga provincial 
government) aimed at overthrowing Mobutu occurs in July 
1966; although it is quickly crushed, it reemerges in July 
1967, this time turning into a full-scale war (S2004). I code 
the first one as marking the failure of this post-war case. 
Congo 
(Kinshasa) 
1-
Dec-
67 
1-
Nov-
77 
According to S2004, the Kisangani mutiny war ends in 
November 1967. FLNC, mostly former gendarmeries 
native to Katanga then in exile in Angola, stages two 
invasions into the Katanga (or Shaba--new name) province 
in November 1977 and then in May 1978. I code these 
invasions as the failure of the post-Kisangani mutiny case. 
(S2004 codes the two invasions as one civil war.) 
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Congo 
(Kinshasa) 
1-
Jun-
78 
2-
Jun-
78 
The May 1978 invasion attempt is put down by the end of 
the month with outside help. However, according to SF, a 
genocide/politicide ensues and continues until the end of 
1979. Therefore, I code this case as failing right away.  
Congo 
(Kinshasa) 
18-
May-
97 
1-
Aug-
98 
In April 1992, the Sovereign National Conference declares 
itself the sole legislative body of Zaire and goes on to elect 
a new prime minister (Tshisekedi), which starts a conflict 
not only with Mobutu (which intensified after the 
conference adopts a new constitution in the summer of 
1992) over who has real authority but also with the former 
prime minister (Nguza) and his supporters in 
Shaba/Katanga; the two parallel governments are merged 
in 1994 and Tshisekedi is mostly marginalized. Although 
SF codes March 1992 as the beginning of a still ongoing 
civil war, not only is there not enough casualties to code 
this period as a war (Uppsala, S2004) but the parties and 
the issues related to this 1992-4 conflict were different 
from those of the 1996-7 war. The latter pitted Hutu militia 
(Rwandan Hutus operating from refugee camps in the 
DRC) and Zairian armed forces against a coalition of 
Tutsis (AFDL) led by Kabila. According to S2004, full-
scale civil war starts in October 1996 and ends on 17 May 
1997 when rebels capture Kinshasa and Kabila replaces 
Mobutu. Anti-Kabila insurgencies flare up in August 1998 
(S2004) and instigate another civil war. 
Congo 
(Kinshasa) 
17-
Dec-
02 
RC There is a ceasefire agreement signed by the countries 
embroiled in this conflict in July 1999 in Lusaka (later also 
signed by MLC and RCD rebels); because its provisions 
deal primarily with a ceasefire (no discussion of political 
institutions or other arrangements), I do not code it as a 
potential end to the war. S2004 codes the war as 
continuing until the comprehensive peace agreement of 16 
December 2002, whereby the government (now led by 
Kabila's son after Kabila is killed) agrees to share power in 
a transitional government with the rebels. I code this latter 
agreement as the beginning of the post-war case. Although 
"sporadic armed conflict continues in outlying regions" 
(SF), it does not rise to major levels (Uppsala codes not 
even "minor" violence after 2001). 
Costa Rica 25-
Apr-
48 
RC Six-week long civil war, which starts after the National 
Republicans (of President Picado) annul the presidential 
election that would have removed their candidate; it ends 
when Figueres' forces enter San Jose after US helps cut off 
the route for help coming from Somoza/Nicaragua. 
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Croatia 15-
Dec-
95 
RC Insurgency and secession attempts by Croatian Serbs 
officially ended with the Dayton Accords. 
Cuba 2-
Jan-
59 
RC Castro finally leads his guerrilla army into Havana, forcing 
Batista to flee. 
Cyprus 16-
Aug-
74 
RC Civil war starts in December 1963 when the constitutional 
amendments imposed by Makarios prove unacceptable to 
the Turkish Cypriots. Although violence ends to a large 
extent after the deployment of UN peacekeepers in March 
1964, another major disturbance occurs in 1967 when 
Greek Cypriot troops begin patrolling Turkish Cypriot 
enclaves, which incites fighting. In response, Turkey 
threatens to invade the island on behalf of the Turkish 
Cypriots, who establish the Provisional Turkish Cypriot 
Administration in Turkish-held areas on 28 December 
1967. This starts the de-facto partitioning of the island. 
Relapse occurs when the junta in Athens supports a coup 
against Makarios, which would bring to power supporters 
of annexation with Greece (EOKA-B); Turkey 
invades/intervenes on 20 July 1974, secures the northern 
part of the island for Turkish Cypriots, reinforcing the 
partition. (The coup fails three days after Turkey's move.) 
De-facto partition has secured the lack of violence ever 
since; there have been numerous attempts at re-unification 
to no avail. Due to the lack of violence, I code the post-
invasion period as post-war. 
Djibouti 27-
Dec-
94 
RC Civil war started with the rebellion of mostly-Afar FRUD 
against the Issa-dominated government in 1991. It ended 
with an agreement, which recognized FRUD as a legal 
party, gave FRUD cabinet seats, and integrated it into the 
state army. A radical wing of FRUD had declined to settle 
and the government finally signed a deal with them in 
2000. (None of the sources show the war as continuing 
after the 1994 agreement; Uppsala codes 1999 as "minor".)
Dominican 
Republic 
1-
Sep-
65 
RC Consociationalists and Loyalists sign the "Act of 
Reconciliation," which calls for interim presidency and 
elections, on 30 August with the mediation of OAS; US 
intervened in April (SF, Uppsala, and D&S all code it as 
ending in 1965.) 
El Salvador 17-
Jan-
92 
RC FMLN and government sign UN-mediated Chapultepec 
Accord. 
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Ethiopia 21-
May-
91 
RC Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front joined 
forces with Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) and 
forced the Mengistu regime down (EPLF winning control 
of Eritrea in the mean time). 
Ethiopia-
Ogaden 
4-
Apr-
88 
RC Agreement between Mengistu and the Somalian 
government meant the removal of support for WSLF. 
While the conflict was not really resolved and the ONLF 
continued rebellion on-and-off, no major or systematic 
violence occurred (only "minor" according to Uppsala).  
Ethiopia-
Oromo 
19-
Jun-
00 
RC Rebellion by multiple ethnic Oromo groups, who were 
being supported by Eritrea (coded as war in PITF and 
Marshall but nothing coded by Uppsala, and might be out 
of date range for S2004 and D&S); diminishes with the 
ceasefire agreement between Ethiopia and Eritrea. 
Georgia-South 
Ossetia 
15-
Jul-
92 
1-
Aug-
04 
Following ceasefire on 14 July 1992 more or less no 
violence and de-facto partition, separate government. 
Violence flared up again in July-August 2004--although 
the number of casualties might not have been large 
enough, it was serious enough to be followed by a 
ceasefire. 
Georgia-
Abkhazia 
1-
Oct-
93 
RC Abkhazians defeat government army; de-facto 
autonomous/independent republic ever since. (S2004 and 
D&S code the ending as January 94 by taking into account 
the violence that resulted from the return of Gamsakhurdia 
to Georgia--they find not enough casualties to code as 
separate war; SF and Marshall code the latter as a separate 
civil war, while Uppsala code the two years corresponding 
to it as "minor". Marshall in fact codes another Abkhazian 
civil war from 1998 on but none other does and the source 
he bases it on is his prior work. My own research does not 
reveal any major incidences for that period either, so I 
don't code it as failure.) 
Greece 17-
Oct-
49 
RC Three-year civil war ends with the defeat of communists. 
Military rules until the parliamentary elections in 1952. 
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Guatemala 2-Jul-
84 
3-Jul-
84 
S2004 codes three separate civil wars for 1966-72, 1974-
84, and 1984-94, the breaking points are unclear; instead 
most accounts of the Guatemalan civil war refer to it as a 
30 some-year war ending in 1996, and Uppsala shows 
continuous "intermediate" or "war" for 1968-1995. I 
combine the first two periods and code July 1, 1984 
(election of a Constituent Assembly that would draft a 
democratic constitution, under General Oscar Humberto 
Mejia Victores) as the end of one war. I code it as re-
starting the very next day since violence continued at high 
levels. (Note re 1958 coup against Arbenz: while included 
in D&S, apparently following COW, S2004 excludes this 
case as an international war (US-led invasion by exiles); 
Marshall and Uppsala find not enough casualties to be 
coded as war; S2004 report that Fearon and Laitin (2003) 
exclude the case for this same reason.) 
Guatemala 30-
Dec-
96 
RC Following a heavily mediated peace process from 1994 to 
1996, final peace accord signed between the government 
and the URNG on 29 December; it called for reduction of 
government forces, and demobilization and incorporation 
of URNG forces. S2004 code March 1994--referring most 
likely to the signing of human rights agreements between 
the rebels and the government, and the deployment of the 
UN Verification Mission--as the end date, but Uppsala 
shows ongoing "intermediate" violence through 1995 and 
most other sources refer to the 1996 peace accord as the 
end of the war. 
Guinea 1-
Apr-
01 
RC Government forces crushed the rebellion that was being 
staged by insurgents infiltrating from borders with Sierra 
Leone and Liberia since about September 2000; the exact 
date for the entry into risk is approximate. SF codes a 
revolutionary war from 9/00 to 3/01. 
Guinea-Bissau 2-
Nov-
98 
31-
Jan-
99 
While S2004 and SF code May 1999 as the end of the war, 
I code it as 1 November 1998 since that is the date for the 
signing of the Abuja Agreement, which called for a 
ceasefire, deployment of ECOMOG troops, as well as a 
joint transitional government (with members from 
President Vieira's government and the military junta); the 
fact that violence continued in Jan 1999 after a couple of 
months of ceasefire does not mean that the war had not 
ended--it ended unsuccessfully, only to recur in a few 
months. S2004 reports 31 January 1999 as the restart of 
violence.  
Guinea-Bissau 8-
May-
RC General Mane ousts President Vieira, bringing to an end 
the civil war(s) which started with Vieira's dismissal of 
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99 Mane as the army chief of staff. 
Haiti 4-Jul-
93 
5-Jul-
93 
D&S code two wars (1991-94, 1995-96), while S2004 
combines the two and codes as the end the October 1994 
restoration of Aristide following the US-led military 
intervention. However, there was the Governor's Island 
Accord signed by Cedras (military) and Aristide, which 
called for the latter's restoration, on 3 July 1993, which 
obviously failed to accomplish what it was supposed to. 
Not coding this date as the end, I would be committing 
selection bias (just like the Abuja Agreement for Guinea-
Bissau). 
Haiti 15-
Oct-
94 
12-
Jan-
04 
On 12 January 2004 Aristide starts ruling by decree as the 
mandate of parliament runs out (since the elections that 
were due the past year were never held); this leads to 
demonstrations and rebellions, which ends in Aristide's 
exile in March. 
India-Sikh 1-
Jan-
94 
RC Sikh militants fight for the independence of "Khalistan" 
(which includes Punjab). As S2004's investigation of all 
major datasets indicates, end date is unclear; he cites 
newspaper sources indicating some form of peace (through 
victory) by the end of 1993. Uppsala also shows violence 
ending after 1993. 
India-Naxalite 1-
Jan-
72 
RC S2004 reports that "the movement declined in political 
power in 1972," yet no clear date or breaking point is 
given. SF reports that the war ended in December 1971 
when it was "overwhelmed by events surrounding 
neighboring Bangladesh's independence war in 1971." So I 
code the beginning of 1972 as the end date. According to 
www.onwar.com, Naga Underground Rebels agreed to lay 
down arms and accept the Indian constitution in November 
1975; yet there is no information to suggest that the 
conflict was going on at war-levels between 1972 and 
1975. 
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India-NE 1-
Nov-
58 
28-
Nov-
90 
According to S2004: "The “northeastern states”, which are 
the Indian states that lie east of Bangladesh, are home to 
multiple insurgencies that are best combined. Rebel groups 
in the 105 region both frequently clash and collaborate 
with one another." I follow him and code areas like Assam, 
Bodoland, Nagaland, Manipur, and Tripura together. The 
war in 1950s refers to that by the Naga separatists, which 
was put down by Indian forces in October 1958 (SF). 28 
Nov 1990 is when the Indian government established 
military rule on the state of Assam, although some minor 
violence and insurgency was going on before that. S2004 
code it as ongoing as of 1999 and there does not seem to 
be a reasonable end point since then Uppsala codes 
continuous "minor" war in Assam and Bodoland from 
1994 on. 
Indonesia-
Moluccas 
6-
Dec-
50 
19-
Jan-
99 
Indonesian government went into South Moluccas after it 
declared indepence in the summer of 1950. By 5 Dec 1950, 
government forces succeeded in forcing the Moluccan 
forces to withdraw to the island of Ceram, which S2004 
codes as the end of the war. Uppsala codes 1950 as the last 
year of any violence surrounding South Moluccas; 
however, there have been widespread reports of 
"communal conflict" between Muslims and Christian since 
January 1999. S2004 reports that about 2700-3500 
Christian Muslims were killed by June 2000. According to 
a HRW report from 29 June 2000, the overall number by 
June was about 3000 and it cites witness report to assert 
that the government forces have also been involved: 
"There have long been reports that army and police 
weapons and ammunition have found their way into the 
hands of partisans, but reports of direct participation in the 
violence by members of the armed forces are now 
increasingly common, with Christian soldiers supporting 
Christian groups and Muslim soldiers supporting the 
Muslim side" (http://www.hrw.org/press/2000/06/indo-
back0629.htm). While S2004 still codes this as 
"communal" and not civil war, and Uppsala's failure to 
show violence for this period suggests the same approach, 
it definitely points to the failure of peace at the least. An 
International Crisis Group report gives the 19 Jan 1999 as 
the start of the conflict in Ambon, spreading quickly to 
other parts of the islands 
(http://www.crisisgroup.org/text/index.cfm?id=1454&lang
=fr). 
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Indonesia-
Darul Islam 
1-
Apr-
62 
RC A rebellion to establish Muslim theocracy started in late 
1940s in West Java and was then joined by Islamist forces 
from Aceh and South Sulawesi. Uppsala shows "war" in 
1953 and nothing more until 1958. S2004 also codes two 
separate wars--1953, and 1956-60 but the breaking points 
are very unclear. Most other sources, as S2004 himself 
recognizes, code one war from 1949 to 1962 or so. The 
leader of the movement Kartosuwirjo is captured by the 
government in April 1962 (to be executed later that year), 
which weakens the organization. 
Indonesia 1-
Sep-
61 
30-
Sep-
65 
Opponents of Sukarno regime try to set up the 
Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia 
(PRRI, or Permesta) in Feb. 1958 but it is defeated in Aug 
1961 (SF). I code the coup of 1965, which led to the 
removal of Sukarno and the installment of Suharto, as the 
relapse of this conflict--both non-territory related attempts 
to win control of the state. 
Indonesia-
Aceh 
1-
Jan-
92 
31-
Aug-
98 
Free Aceh Movement (GAM) was effectively crushed by 
Indonesian government forces, which also abolished 
Aceh's special region status and declared it an Operational 
Military Zone in 1991. There is no clear exact date for 
government's victory, so I code as the beginning of 1992. 
Although the regime that followed was clearly abusive, 
there is no well-documented account of the number of 
casualties, so I do not code a relapse until the resumption 
of rebellion by GAM in August 1998, which marks the 
withdrawal of Indonesian armed forces from Aceh. (This is 
consistent with the coding of S2004 but not with SF, who 
code a single war ongoing since 9/98.) 
Indonesia-
Aceh 
10-
Dec-
02 
19-
May-
03 
A peace agreement--in fact a loose framework, the details 
for which were to be discussed in the following months--
was signed between the government and GAM; the former 
would grant Aceh autonomy, and the latter would disarm. 
However, further negotiations failed and Indonesia 
imposed martial law on Aceh on 19 May 2003. (There was 
yet another peace deal in August 2005, upon which rebels 
started disarming and government troops withdrew.) 
Iran 12-
Feb-
79 
RC The Islamist Iranian Revolution ends when the Shah's 
army stops resisting and Tehran falls into the control of 
Khomeini's forces on 11 Feb 1979. 
 239
  
Iran-Kurds 1-
Aug-
84 
12-
Jul-
89 
SF and S2004 report that the Kurdish insurgency declines 
to sporadic guerrilla activity in 1984; relying on case 
studies, S2004 gives July 1984 as the date. Although none 
of these sources code renewed war in the 1990s, they all 
recognize that there is resurgence in violence. Uppsala 
codes 1990, 1993, and 1996 as "intermediate". Because the 
date is unclear, I use 12 July 1989, which Uppsala reports 
as when "the parties again met for renewed negotiations. 
The outcome of the meeting was that one of the members 
of the Iranian representatives shot dead the KDPI 
representatives" 
(http://www.pcr.uu.se/database/conflictSummary.php?bcI
D=158). 
Iraq-Shammar 1-
May-
59 
RC Shammar tribe's attempt to take over Mosul is crushed by 
government forces. I follow SF and code April of 1959 as 
the end of that war. 
Iraq-Kurds 12-
Mar-
70 
18-
Mar-
74 
A peace agreement on 11 March 1970 between the Ba'ath 
Party and Barzani (KDP) ended the ethnic civil war that 
was going on since 1961. It promised autonomy but was 
never fully implemented. The Autonomy Law was enacted 
in 1974 to grant the autonomy, but the KDP rejected its 
imposition of limits (oilfields of Kirkuk would have also 
been left out of the autonomous area), which led to the 
relapse in March-April 1974. (Different datasets agree; the 
exact relapse date from S2004.) When Iran and Iraq sign a 
treaty in March 1975, Iran stops aiding the Kurdish 
insurgency; KDP falls apart into factions. Kurds again 
regroup and restart rebellion for autonomy taking 
advantage of the Iran-Iraq war. SF codes the new war as 
starting in September 1980 (and ending with the Al-Anfal 
campaign in March 1988), S2004 on the other hand 
follows COW2 and codes the restart as January 1985; 
Uppsala shows "intermediate" war ongoing all the way 
from 1976 to 1987, turning into "war" in 1988. 
Considering that there was no major breaking point that 
indicates the end of the war that started in 1974 anyway, I 
follow Uppsala and code the war as ongoing up until 1996. 
Iraq-Kurds 31-
Aug-
96 
RC Iraq's invasion of Irbil marks the last major clash between 
Kurds and the Iraqi army (S2004). 
Iraq-Shiite 1-
Apr-
91 
RC A Shiite rebellion in southern Iraq is crushed by Saddam's 
forces by the end of March. 
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Israel-Palestine 14-
Sep-
93 
15-
Sep-
93 
Following S2004, I code the first Intifada (in the West 
Bank and Gaza) as the first government-Palestinian civil 
war: "To be more consistent with our definition, which 
focuses on the internal aspects of the conflict and requires 
that a war against a recognized government be waged by 
an organized opposition, we recode the onset of this war to 
the start of the Intifada (uprising) in 1987. Moreover, it is 
unlikely that the sustained violence criterion is satisfied 
since 1947." The Oslo Accords, signed by Arafat and 
Rabin in Washingon on 13 September 1993, is the 
agreement that was supposed to end the conflict--it could 
not. Although S2004 codes this particular war as ending in 
1994 and another one starting with the Second Intifada in 
2000, SF codes one single war ongoing from 1987, and 
Uppsala codes continuous "intermediate" war for 1955-
2004, the framework that came out of the Oslo Declaration 
of Principles--together with follow-up negotiations--was 
supposed to settle the violent conflict. Because Uppsala 
shows ongoing violence, I code relapse as soon as the 
agreement takes place. (It is widely accepted that what led 
to the Second Intifada was the failure to implement the 
Oslo requirements, particularly Israel's withdrawal; final 
status talks that were supposed to take place within 5 years 
never took place.) (Further attempts to reach a peace 
agreement between the two sides--Camp David, Taba--
never gave fruit.) 
Ivory Coast 4-
May-
03 
25-
Mar-
04 
The war started as a coup attempt in 2002. Linas-
Marcoussis Accords, a power sharing peace deal, is signed 
on 29 January 2003 between political parties and rebels; in 
May the army and rebels sign ceasefire. As S2004 concurs 
the developments in 2004 indicated the failure of this 
peace process: deadly clashes during the repression of a 
demonstration against the President in March seems to 
escalate the conflict, leading to what a Reuters alertnet 
report calls "an all-out offensive" by the government 
against the rebels in November 2004 
(http://www.alertnet.org/thefacts/reliefresources/11199664
258.htm). Even though Uppsala shows "minor" violence 
for 2002-4, SF also codes the war as ongoing from 
September 2002. 
Jordan 1-
Aug-
71 
RC Government forces vs. Palestinian guerrillas, ends with 
government victory. SF and S2004 agree that a major 
government offensive in July 1971 marks the end of the 
conflict. 
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Kenya-Somalis 1-
Nov-
69 
RC "Shifta (bandit) war" by ethnic-Somali separatists in 
Northern Frontier District ends with government victory 
(SF, S2004). 
Kenya 1-
Oct-
93 
RC Communities aligned with the Moi regime were pitted 
against those associated with the opposition--"civil war by 
proxy" (S2004). SF and S2004 both code the end as 1993 
(September 1993). S2004 notes however that violence 
continued this period but the extent of this is unclear 
(definitely not another war or genocide). So, I code peace 
as ongoing. 
Korea, South 
(ROK) 
1-
May-
49 
RC An uprising on the island of Cheju, led primarily by the 
communist Korea Labor Party, is mostly crushed in April 
1949 by South Korean and US forces (S2004). 
Laos 22-
Feb-
73 
27-
Mar-
75 
The Vientiane agreement signed between the royalists and 
the Pathet Lao establishes a ceasefire and provides for the 
formation of a provisional government of national unity (a 
coalition). No violence between 1973 and 1975 (S2004), 
but on 27 Mar 1975 PL breaks the ceasefire, and in 
December 1975 it takes over the whole government, 
abolishes the monarchy, and creates the Lao People's 
Democratic Republic. Insurgencies by different right-
leaning groups and tribes, particularly the Hmong rebels, 
continue for decades to follow but does not rise up to the 
level of civil war (S2004). 
Lebanon 1-
Aug-
58 
13-
Apr-
75 
Attempts by President Chamoun to change the constitution 
to extend his mandate led to strong opposition and 
eventually armed rebellion; the instigating event is 
typically proclaimed to be the 8 May 1958 assassination of 
a journalist. The war turned eventually into a Muslim-
Christian war although that was not the case at the 
beginning. On 31 July 1958 General Chebab is elected the 
new president. Relapse with the war of 1975-1989. The 
instigating bus event is taken as the day of relapse: 13 
April 1975. 
Lebanon 14-
Oct-
90 
RC The Taif Accord is approved by the Lebanese parliament 
on 22 October 1989 but clashes continue and President 
Aoun, who rejects the agreement, is not ousted until Syrian 
forces attack the presidential palace on 13 October 1990. 
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Lesotho 1-
Nov-
98 
RC SF codes a Revolutionary War between August 1998-
October 1998, Marshall codes civil violence with 1000 
killed, Uppsala codes only "minor", and S2004 does not 
mention at all. I follow SF. Upon LDC's overwhelming 
electoral victory in May 1998 opposition becomes agitated, 
the government calls on Southern African Development 
Community countries to intervene; they are met with 
strong resistance from a rebel military faction. A deal 
between government and political opposition is reached in 
October to form a multiparty authority until next elections; 
order is restored and most foreign troops leave in October. 
Liberia 9-
Sep-
90 
10-
Sep-
90 
Gio- and Mano-supported NPFL, led by Charles Taylor, 
invades from Ivory Coast to take over the Krahn-
dominated central regime of Doe. By September 1990 
Taylor controlled most of the country--except Monrovia. 
In the mean time Prince Johnson split from NPFL, formed 
INPFL and executed Doe in September 90; fighting 
continued between forces loyal to Taylor (Mano) and 
Johnson (Gio), as well as with Krahns (which formed 
ULIMO under Gen. Nimblay). Following S2004, because 
the initial goal--to oust Doe--was achieved in September 
1990, a couple of ceasefire and peace agreements were 
signed in November and December, but Johnson and 
Taylor continued to fight for total control of the state, I 
code one war as ending in September 1990 and another 
one starting right away (Uppsala shows "intermediate" for 
1991 and 1993-5, and "war" for 1992.) 
Liberia 26-
Jul-
93 
1-
Apr-
94 
The Cotonou Accord between interim government of the 
time and rebel groups (IGNU, ULIMO, NPFL): ceasefire, 
ECOMOG, demobilization, as well as power-sharing 
Transitional Government (5-member Council of State to 
take unanimous decisions). Fighting resumes at least 
sometime in April 1994, if not before, leading to renewed 
ceasefires, negotiations, etc. (see UNOMIL report at 
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unomilFT
.htm). Namely, Akosombo and Abuja Agreements follow 
in 1994 and 1995 respectively. Whether new civil wars 
could be coded prior to either of these accords is unclear. 
Therefore, I only code Cotonou and code it as failing soon 
afterwards. New civil war starts in 2000. 
Liberia 13-
Sep-
94 
 Akosombo Accord modifies and builds upon the Cotonou 
Accord with one of the major changes being with regards 
to decision making in the State Council--no longer 
consensus, only majority (5 vs. 3). 
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Liberia 26-
Aug-
95 
6-
Apr-
96 
The Abuja Agreement--power sharing among rebels in a 
transitional government--becomes effective on 26 August 
1995 but violence resumes in April 1996. (SF codes the 
war as ending in 1993, marked with a precursor agreement 
to this one. S2004 states "In 1994, the signing of the 1993 
Cotonou agreements would establish a transitional 
government, but since the previous government was also a 
part of the 135 agreement and it was also an interim 
government, we do not code this as a new war, involving 
new rebel parties against a new government.") (onwar.com 
codes one war 1989-1995.) 
Liberia 19-
Jul-
97 
1-
Sep-
00 
Hostilities end upon Taylor's victory of ECOWAS-
supervised elections (onwar.com, S2004). Opposition 
culminates into LURD attacks from the bases in Guinea in 
September 2000, which starts another full-scale war (SF, 
S2004). (Attacks had started a couple months earlier but 
there is no obvious date so I code the beginning of Sept. as 
the end date.) 
Liberia 15-
Aug-
03 
RC In August 2003, Taylor is forced to flee and rebels sign a 
peace deal in Ghana (Accra Peace Agreement), providing 
for a national unity government ("all-inclusive Transitional 
Government"--mainly of three warring parties); UN 
peacekeepers are stationed soon after (SF). 
Mali 7-
Jan-
91 
26-
Mar-
91 
The Tamanrasset peace deal, which included provisions 
not only for demobilization but also for autonomy to 
northern regions, was signed between the government, the 
MPA (Touareg or Berbers), and the FIAA (Arabs) on 6 Jan 
1991. (SF and S2004 code single war from 1990 to 1995.) 
I code this peace deal as the end of one war and the coup 
against the government that signed it as its failure, after 
which violence flares up once again. "The Transitional 
Government [after the coup] failed to take any significant 
steps towards honoring the agreement of Tamanrasset. 
Instead, it started a violent repression that forced tens of 
thousands of nomads to flee to the neighboring countries" 
(Lode 1997, 
http://www.prio.no/page/Publication_details/Publication_d
etail_channel/9429/44327.html). 
Mali 12-
Apr-
92 
13-
Apr-
92 
National Pact signed in Bamako between transitional 
government and MFUA on 11 April 1992. Because civil 
war is reported as ongoing between 1990 and 1995 (SF and 
S2004), I code this case as failing right away. 
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Mali 28-
Mar-
96 
RC Various community-level, local negotiations took place 
during 1994 (the government was not involved), and by 
March 1996 major demobilization and disarmament 
occurred (also the government controlled and called back 
its troops from the North). The National Pact, which was 
agreed to in 1992 stayed in effect (S2004; Humphreys and 
ag Mohamed 2003; Lode 1997). 
Moldova 22-
Jul-
92 
RC Russian speaking Slavs living in provinces to the east of 
Dniestr wanted Russian to be reinstated as official 
language (Romanian became official language in 1989), 
and the provinces they live in to either be joined with 
Russia or be given autonomy. On 2 September 1991, 
regional leaders voted to join Russia, formed parallel 
institutions and violence escalated. The violence subsided 
with the ceasefire agreement signed between Russian 
President Yeltsin and Moldovan President Snegur on 21 
July 1992, whereby they formed a joint peacekeeping force 
in the region. In the years that followed negotiations 
between the Transdniestrian leadership and the Moldovan 
government continued, whereby the latter offered some 
form of autonomy and the former pushed for 
independence. On May 8, 1997 "Memorandum on Basic 
Principles in Relations between Moldova and 
Transdniestria" was signed; yet Dniestrian calls for 
creating a confederation composed of two sovereign states 
(SF, S2004, onwar.com). (Uppsala codes violence only 
during 1992.) 
Morocco-
W.Sahara 
7-
Sep-
91 
RC Although Western Sahara is technically an internationally 
recognized state, the war between POLISARIO and the 
Moroccon government is in fact a civil war fought between 
a group that has been fighting to win back its independence 
which Morocco violated by annexing the area in 1976: "the 
most of the violence took place after annexation, so this 
allows us to include it under our definition" (S2004). 
S2004 and onwar.com code the ceasefire of 1991--UN 
Settlement Plan, which proposed a referendum to decide 
what happens to Western Sahara--as the end of the war; 
despite other negotiations in later years, they could never 
agree on the terms of the referendum, so it was never held, 
and in 2001 US and UN proposed a "third way"--limited 
autonomy under Moroccon sovereignty--that was 
obviously rejected by POLISARIO. Uppsala codes no 
violence starting from 1990. Although the conflict remains 
unresolved, the war ended and there has been no relapse. 
Mozambique 5- RC RENAMO and the government sign the "General Peace 
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Oct-
92 
Agreement" on 4 Oct 1992. 
Nicaragua 18-
Jul-
79 
1-
Feb-
82 
On 17 July 1979 Somoza is finally forced to resign after 
the Sandinistas (FSLN) control much of the state and their 
government in exile gains widespread support. With US 
support, anti-Sandinista groups begin fighting the Contra 
war against the government in 1981 (SF, S2004). (They 
ruled under a 5-member Junta of National Reconstruction 
(later it become 3)--two Sandinistas, and three others, but 
power remained primarily in the hands of the Sandinistas.)
Nicaragua  24-
Mar-
88 
RC In March 1988, Ortega signed a ceasefire agreement 
(Sapoa) with the Contras, whereby he agreed to provide 
amnesty for all Contra rebels, hold elections, etc. 
Nicaragua-
Miskitos 
10-
Dec-
84 
RC The Miskitos people, who later join the Contras, fight 
against the Sandinistas in what turns to be an ethnic civil 
war. SF and D&S code this as a separate war. S2004 
combines this with the Contra war: "A separate onset can 
be coded in 1981 for the purposes of distinguishing 
between ethnic and non-ethnic war, though this would 
require more detailed data on deaths in 1981 to justify 
coding the Miskito violence as a separate civil war." I 
follow SF and code the end of this war as 12/84, which 
marks the signing of Bogota Accords between the 
government and a couple of indigenous groups living on 
the Atlantic Coast. It called for a ceasefire, and further 
negotiations to figure out the details of promised 
autonomy. 
Nigeria-Biafra 13-
Jan-
70 
RC Ibos in Biafra fight for secession but government 
suppresses by January 1970 (SF, S2004, onwar.com). No 
more violence afterwards (Uppsala). 
Nigeria-
Maitatsine 
1-
May-
85 
RC Maitatsine, an Islamist cult, fights government forces in 
the North from 1980 until the last major rebel attack in 
April 1985 (SF, S2004). 
Oman 1-
Apr-
76 
RC Dhofar rebellion, in which Marxist insurgents (DLF) 
fought an "an eventual combined force of Omani, Iranian, 
and British Special Forces troops" during 1964-76 
(S2004). According to SF, the dates are June 1970-March 
1976.  
Pakistan-
Baluchi 
1-
Aug-
77 
RC "Baluchi rebellion against central authority, backed by 
opposition National Awami Party is suppressed by military 
using indiscriminate violence against civilians" during 
February 1973-July 1977 (SF; S2004 concurs). 
Pakistan 13- RC Musharraf's coup reportedly ends Sindhi-Muhajir violence 
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Oct-
99 
(SF, S2004). 
Papua New 
Guinea 
24-
Jan-
98 
RC Due to continuous levels of violence the war over the 
island of Bougainville is typically coded as ongoing from 
1989 to 1997/98 (SF, S2004, onwar.com; even though 
Uppsala codes only "minor" violence). Although there 
were some agreements signed before (e.g. Honiara 
Declaration of 1991), those were merely commitments to 
solve the conflict through negotiations, which did not 
happen until 1998. Therefore, I also code the war as ending 
in January 1998 with the signing of the much more 
concrete Lincoln Agreement, which paved the way for 
further negotiations on more extensive autonomy, elections 
for the regional parliaments, etc. Final political status is 
negotiated in 2001 and implemented with the 
constitutional changes of 2002, but civil war is not ongoing 
after 1998. 
Paraguay 21-
Aug-
47 
RC Government of Morinigo--with the help of Colorados--
crushes the rebellion by a coalition of Febreristas, Liberals, 
and Communists, led by Colonel Franco (S2004, 
onwar.com). 
Peru 1-
Jan-
97 
2-
Jan-
97 
Leftist guerrillas associated primarily with the Shining 
Path fight the Peruvian government and terrorize the 
people; they are defeated by 1995/6. SF codes the end as 
April 1997 while S2004 codes it as 1996 (exact date 
unclear). Fearon and Laitin (2003) and COW2 and codes it 
as sometime in 1995. onwar.com codes it as ongoing in 
1999, while Uppsala codes war during 1988-93 and 
"intermediate" during 1994-99. I follow S2004 and code 
the war as ending at the end of 1996 but I code peace as 
failing right away due to Uppsala's records of continued 
"intermediate" violence. 
Philippines 1-
Jun-
54 
1-
Oct-
72 
Huk (Hukbong Magpapalaya ng Bayan) Rebellion--
communist uprising to gain control of the government--
seemed to have been defeated in 1954 by the Philippino 
government with the help of the US when Turac (leader of 
the rebellion) surrendered and was arrested (onwar.com, 
S2004). NPA, which was also associated with the 
Communist Party just like the Huks and was created by 
former Huk fighters, becomes active in 1972, so I code this 
peace as ending then (S2004, SF, onwar.com). 
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Philippines-
Moro 
24-
Dec-
76 
1-
Jan-
77 
Muslim Moros fight for autonomy/independence in 
southern Philippines. MNLF and the government sign the 
Tripoli Agreement for peace--providing for an autonomous 
region for the Muslims--on 23 Dec 1976. However, war 
does not end and violence continues right away 
(onwar.com, S2004, SF). Because onwar.com reports that 
"after a lull in the fighting, the truce broke down in 1977" I 
code failure as of the beginning of 1977. 
Philippines-
Moro 
19-
Jul-
96 
20-
Jul-
96 
Another peace agreement, again with provisions for the 
implementation of the Tripoli agreement, is signed by 
MNLF and the government on 18 July 1996. While this 
agreement "led the MNLF to become largely integrated 
into the government forces" (S2004, 185), splinter groups 
such as MILF continue to fight for the same causes 
(MNLF also breaks the ceasefire in following years). 
According to Uppsala, "war" in 2000 and "intermediate" 
during 1993-99 and 2001-04. Therefore, I code the post-
agreement period as failing right away.  
Russia-
Chechnya 
1-
Sep-
96 
1-
Aug-
99 
The Khasavyurt Agreement is signed on 31 August 1996; 
it defers the issue of Chechnya's political status until later. 
Relapse occurs in "9/99 with the bombings in Moscow in 
September 1999 and the following Moscow offensive in 
Chechnya" (S2004). According to SF, "attempts by 
Chechen fighters to extend control to neighboring 
Dagestan in August 1999 trigger new war in Chechnya as 
Russian forces attempt to impose central athority over the 
autonomous province." The war has been ongoing since 
(Uppsala, SF, S2004).  
Rwanda 1-
Dec-
66 
1-
Sep-
90 
The Tutsi uprising that starts in 1962/3 is crushed by Hutus 
by November 1966 (SF). The period of calm is broken 
with the incursion of Tutsi RPF rebels from Uganda, which 
prompts intense inter-ethnic fighting, in 
September/October 1990 (SF, S2004).  
Rwanda 5-
Aug-
93 
6-
Apr-
94 
Arusha Accords (with power sharing quotas) signed 
between the RPF and the Hutu-dominated government on 
4 August 1993 put a halt to the war for a while. Giving up 
power (e.g. control of the military) as part of Arusha's 
implementation angered Hutu extremists, which led to the 
systematic massacre of Tutsis by Hutu extremists and parts 
of the Rwandan military starting in April 1994. Whether 
the post-genocide violence (which continues up until the 
end of 1998--see Uppsala, SF) constitutes another civil war 
is unclear, so I do not code the end of 1998 as another 
post-civil war case. 
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Rwanda 01-
Aug-
2001 
2-
Aug-
01 
Hutu militias (Interahamwe) launch major attacks from the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, where they were driven to 
by 1998, in May 2001 but it is crushed by the Rwandan 
army in about two months (SF). However, Uppsala codes 
"intermediate" violence between these groups during 2002 
(and "war" during 2001), so I code this case as failing right 
away. 
Senegal 31-
Dec-
04 
RC Rebels (MFDC) fighting for the independence of the 
Casamance region, which is geographically and ethnically 
distinct from the rest of the country and happens to be the 
most fertile region in Senegal, and the government sign a 
peace deal on 30 December 2004. Although a ceasefire 
was agreed upon in December 1999, which leads to SF's 
coding of the war as ending in that period, it did not 
address political status and was not a comprehensive 
agreement; furthermore, Uppsala codes that "intermediate" 
violence continued during 1999-2001 and 2003. Therefore, 
I code the war as ending only at the end of 2004 
(http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/vol19no1/191
senegal.htm). 
Sierra Leone 1-
Dec-
96 
25-
May-
97 
The Abidjan Agreement signed on 30 November 1996 
ends the violence between the RUF and the government 
temporarily. Mutinous soldiers (AFRC) join RUF rebels, 
however, and overthrow President Kabbah in May 1997 
(SF, S2004). 
Sierra Leone 1-
Jun-
01 
RC Lome Agreement (with provisions for a national unity 
government that would incorporate RUF as a political 
party) signed on 7 July 1999. Although "intermediate" 
violence continued through 2000 and, according to S2004, 
"the end-date of this war is 5/2001 (when the Lome 
accords actually began to be implemented)" (195) I code 
the end date also as May 2001, thereby not coding any 
failure associated with the Lome Accords. (SF codes 
March 2002, which marks the lifting of state of 
emergency, as the end.) 
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Somalia 28-
Jan-
91 
18-
May-
91 
"Siad Barre regime [which causes large-scale civilian 
deaths through repression and anti-insurgency operations 
starting from 1988] is increasingly challenged by 
rebellions of Somali National Movement, based on 
northern Issaq clan, and United Somali Congress, based on 
southern Hawiye clan. Barre regime collapses [on 27 
January 1991] but chronic violence among clan-based 
warlards in south prevents establishment of effective 
central government" (SF). I code the first war as ending 
with Barre's overthrow and, following S2004, I code the 
declaration of Somaliland's independence in May 1991 as 
the start of the new war. Uppsala shows continued war 
through 1992 and "intermediate" violence during 1993-96. 
Many datasets show was as ongoing still in 2004; Uppsala 
shows nothing for 2002 and 2004, but this might be 
because it considers the violence to be amongst different 
rebel groups and not between them and a given 
government. Although there were a couple of declarations 
and agreements during 1997-99, these were not signed by 
the majority of rebels (S2004, 197), so I do not code them 
as ending the ongoing war. 
Somalia 30-
Jan-
04 
1-
May-
04 
An agreement is reached in Kenya among many rebel 
leaders and the existing transitional central government to 
stop fighting and form a Transitional Federal Government. 
Because violence in Mogadishu and elsewhere continues 
and the questions of Somaliland and Puntland have still not 
been resolved (i.e. the government lacks control of areas it 
claims), I follow SF and code this war as ongoing and the 
peace that started with the agreement in Kenya as failing in 
May. (BBC reports upsurge of fighting which kills more 
than 100 people in May/June 2004, see 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/country_profiles/1072611
.stm). 
South Africa 28-
Apr-
94 
RC 27 April 1994 marks the day of the first democratic 
elections, which leads to the formation of the Government 
of National Unity under the interim constitution. 
(Apartheid laws are abolished in 1991 but fighting beween 
ANC and Inkatha ensues until 1994.) (S2004) 
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Sri Lanka 1-Jul-
71 
1-
Jan-
89 
Marxist JVP attempts to takeover the government from the 
hands of a more moderate coalition led by Bandaranaike in 
April/May 1971; it is crushed by mid-June 1971 
(onwar.com; consistent with S2004 and Uppsala). In 
1988/89 JVP utilizes the Sinhalese objections to the 
government's negotiations with the Tamils (LTTE) and 
starts another insurgency, which incites another civil war. 
The exact date is unclear, so given that Uppsala codes no 
violence during 1988 and "war" during 1989, I code failure
at the beginning of 1989. 
Sri Lanka-
Tamils 
30-
Jul-
87 
31-
Jul-
87 
Tamil insurgency, led primarily by the LTTE, against the 
predominantly Sinhalese Sri Lankan government started in 
1983. On 29 July 1987 an agreement signed between Sri 
Lanka and India--many refugees were going into the 
Indian state of Tamil Nadu--provided for an autonomous 
region in Sri Lanka for the Tamils and Indian 
peacekeeping forces (IPKF) to be stationed (S2004, 
onwar.com). Reportedly demobilization failed to occur and 
the agreement was never implemented, hence the coding of 
a single war by most datasets (SF, S2004). However, it 
would be selection bias to exclude this failed arrangement, 
so I code it as ending the war, with another one starting 
right after. (Uppsala codes "intermediate" violence during 
1985-88 and "war" during 1989-2001). 
Sri Lanka-
Tamils 
1-
Mar-
02 
1-
Jan-
03 
In February 2002, Tamil Tigers and the government sign a 
permanent ceasefire deal. In December 2002, after the 
Tamil rebels drop demands for their own state, they agree 
to power sharing and a federal structure (see comments of 
leaders and the body of the agreement at 
http://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=13&artid=7937). 
At least sporadic violence seem to continue and large areas 
continue to be held under rebel control, and no agreements 
can be reached regarding the form of power-sharing and 
decentralization that is supposed to take place. Because 
Uppsala codes "intermediate" violence in 2003, I code 
peace as failing at the beginning of that year. (Violence 
intensifies in 2005 and the two sides reassert their 
commitment to the 2002 ceasefire in 2006.) 
Sudan-South 1-
Apr-
72 
1-Jul-
83 
Non-Muslims of southern Sudan (Anya-Nya) start fighting 
for independence in 1950s; the war ends with the Addis 
Ababa peace agreement signed in March 1972, providing 
for regional autonomy and power sharing in the central 
government (S2004, 208). Southern rebellion resumes 
under SPLM/SPLA leadership when the Muslim 
government violates the previous agreement in 1983 (SF). 
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Sudan-South 1-
Nov-
02 
RC While SPLA and the Muslim government sign the 
Machakos Protocol on 20 July 2002, it provides the 
general framework for solution--South would have the 
right to seek self-determination in 6 years and North will 
able to institute sharia. Parties agree in October 2002 to 
respect the ceasefire as negotiations on the particulars 
continue (S2004, SF). This effectively ends the violence in 
southern Sudan (further agreements, particularly regarding 
power sharing, are signed in 2005), while another rebellion 
starts in Darfur in 2003, which turns into a genocide of 
non-Arabs in the region by government supported Arab 
Janjaweed militias (SF). (In May 2006 a peace agreement 
is signed between main rebel groups in Darfur and the 
central government.)  
Syria 1-
Mar-
82 
RC SF codes the 1982 Muslim Brotherhood uprising and its 
defeat as a genocide/politicide. However, after a careful 
case study S2004 concludes that this was in fact a civil war 
since "the Muslim Brotherhood was an armed insurgent 
group intent on overthrowing the Syrian government" and 
there were significant casualties on both sides (though it 
was a lot more on the side of the insurgents) (212, 213). 
The revolt, centered in the cities of Hama and Aleppo, was 
crushed in February 1982 (SF). 
Tajikistan 28-
Jun-
97 
RC On 27 June 1997 the government and the UTO sign the 
General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and 
National Accord, which provides for power sharing in a 
coalition government and also in the National 
Reconciliation Commission that is supposed to enforce the 
implementation of the agreement (SF, S2004). Uppsala 
codes no violence during 1997 and only "minor" during 
1998. 
Thailand 1-
Jan-
84 
RC Maoist guerrillas rise up against the Thai government in 
mid to late 1960s until the insurgency collapses with mass 
defections in late 1983 (SF).  
Turkey 1-
Mar-
00 
1-
Jun-
04 
PKK vs. the Turkish government from 1984 until Ocalan's 
capture in 1999. The war technically ends with the 
unilateral declaration of ceasefire by the PKK in Feb 2000. 
In May 2004 PKK (or Kongra-Gel) announces it will end 
the ceasefire and violence in the southeast re-escalates 
(even though it probably does not rise to the level of 
another civil war). 
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Uganda-
Baganda 
1-
Jun-
66 
RC In 1966 President Obote (after ousting Mutesa--leader of 
the Baganda people) suspends the constitution, creates a 
one-party state, and takes away regional autonomy, 
centralizing power, which sets off a civil war with 
Baganda rebels. The government quickly and brutally 
establishes control (SF, S2004). (Uppsala codes no 
violence at all related to this incident.) 
Uganda 11-
Apr-
79 
1-
Dec-
80 
Amin's regime vs. UNLA (with Tanzania support) during 
1971-79. On 10 April 1979 the rebels and Tanzanian 
forces take over Campala, ousting Amin. Obote is 
reinstated, Amin's supporters rebel and are "slaughtered on 
massive scale" during 1980-86 (SF). I code relapse in 
December 1980 (SF, S2004). SF codes this as genocide, 
S2004 codes it as another war. 
Uganda 1-
Feb-
86 
2-
Feb-
86 
NRA (under Museveni) fights the Obote government from 
1980 on. Obote is overthrown by General Okello and a 
group of UNLA soldiers on 27 July 1985; former Amin 
supporters are invited back to Uganda to help fight against 
NRA. NRA takes over Kampala in January 1986, after 
which many Acholi groups formed the Uganda People’s 
Defense Army and fought the military. Although S2004 
codes the new war as starting in 1990, Uppsala codes 
continued "war" during 1981-89, "intermediate" in 1990 
and "war" again in 1991, so I code the post-war case 
following Museveni's takeover as failing right away. 
United 
Kingdom 
10-
Apr-
98 
RC Following S2004 (though recognizing that this is an 
ambiguous case "as the sustained violence criterion is not 
clearly satisfied throughout the period and there is no 
single year with more than 500 deaths"), I code the war as 
ending with the Good Friday Accord of 10 April 1998.  
USSR-
Lithuania 
1-
Jan-
53 
1-
Jan-
91 
Lithuania fights against the Soviet occupation and rule; it 
is crushed by 1952 (S2004; exact date not clear). I code the 
declaration of independence from USSR as relapse. 
USSR-Latvia 1-
Jan-
48 
1-
May-
90 
Latvia's fight against Soviet rule is crushed by 1947 
(S2004). I code the declaration of independence from 
USSR as relapse. 
USSR-Ukraine 1-
Jan-
51 
24-
Aug-
91 
Soviet forces crush the Ukranian insurgency by 1950 
(S2004). I code the declaration of independence from 
USSR as relapse. 
USSR-Estonia 1-
Jan-
49 
20-
Aug-
91 
The Estonian insurgency is crushed by 1948 (S2004). I 
code the declaration of independence from USSR as 
relapse. 
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Vietnam 1-
May-
75 
RC Communists of South Vietnam (Viet Cong), supported by 
North Vietnam, start fighting the South Vietnam's Diem 
regime in 1960. The war becomes internationalized in 
1965, finally coming to an end on 30 April 1975 when 
Saigon falls, President Minh surrenders, and the Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam is soon proclaimed (SF, S2004). 
Yemen 1-
Apr-
48 
26-
Sep-
62 
Imam Yahya is assassinated and reformers take over in 
Feb 1948, but by March Yahya's son (Ahmad) defeats the 
coup and restores the old regime with him on the top. On 
26 September 1962 another coup forces the new king 
(Ahmad's son) to flee and establishes the Yemen Arab 
Republic in North Yemen. 
Yemen-North 1-
Jan-
70 
RC Civil war between royalists and those loyal to the YAR 
continues until early 1970 (SF, S2004).  
Yemen-South 1-
Feb-
86 
RC Rival factions of the Yemen Socialist Party fight for 
control of the government and lasts only a couple of days. 
It began on 13 January 1986 and is over by the beginning 
of February (SF, S2004). 
Yemen 1-
Aug-
94 
RC In May 1990, the former Yemen Arab Republic (YAR-
north Yemen) and the former People’s Democratic 
Republic of Yemen (PDRY-south Yemen) formally 
reunify to form the Republic of Yemen. However, relations 
are strained due to disagreements over power-sharing. In 
1994 the South tries to secede and full-scale civil war 
ensues in April/May 1994. It ends when when northern 
forces capture Aden in July 1994.  
Yugoslavia-
Kosovo 
1-Jul-
99 
RC Federal Republic of Yugoslavia revokes Kosovo's 
autonomous status and the Democratic League of Kosovo 
under Ibrahim Rugova declares independence and 
established a parallel government in 1990. KLA is formed 
in 1996 and fighting escalates in 1998. After NATO gets 
involved in March 1999, the war ends in June 1999. 
Although there was renewed instability in 2004, it does not 
constitute relapse. After the end of the war de-facto 
autonomy was established under interim UN civilian 
administration.  
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Zimbabwe 22-
Dec-
79 
RC ZANU/ZAPU vs. white-dominated government from 1972 
until the Lancaster House Agreement in December 1979, 
which ended white-rule, paved the way for elections, and 
promised 20% of parliamentary seats for whites (see the 
document at 
http://zwnews.com/issuefull.cfm?ArticleID=6623). A 
violent campaign is launched in 2000 to seize white-owned 
land and brutal repression of any opposition is 
commonplace but it does not rise to war--not even "minor" 
violence--or genocide/politicide levels (SF, Uppsala). 
Zimbabwe-
Ndebele 
23-
Dec-
87 
RC Ndebele people supporting ZAPU vs. the ZANU/Mugabe 
regime in Southwestern Zimbabwe (Matabeleland) from 
early 1980s until the merging of the ZAPU with ZANU 
(predominantly Shona) on 22 December 1987. This war is 
not related to the white-black conflict that was the basis of 
the first war, therefore, this does not constitute relapse for 
the first case.  
    
   RC=right-censored, takes on the value 31-Dec-04 
   S2004=Sambanis(2004) 
   SF or PITF=State Failure and Political Instability Task 
Force, 1955-2004 
   Uppsala=Gleditsch et. al (2002); updated dataset 'Armed 
Conflicts, 1946-2004' 
   D&S=Doyle and Sambanis (2001) 
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Appendix 2 
 
 
Cox Proportional Hazards Estimation Procedure 
 
The likelihood function for the Cox model is partial in that it does not make use of 
all information available, and contains fewer parameters than the full likelihood function 
characteristic of fully parametric model. 104 It has the form 
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where j indexes ordered failure times so that { }Dj ,..,2,1=  and D represents the number 
of observed failures, assuming that there are no ties (i.e., only one failure occurs at each 
failure instant);105  denotes the value of X for the individual that fails at the jth 
failure instant;  is the risk set at the jth failure instant;  refers to the value of the kth 
individual in the risk set such that 
)( jX
jR kX
{ }jNk ,...,2,1= , where  represents the number of 
individuals in the risk set  at the jth failure instant.  
jN
jR
The function that comes after the product sign is simply the factor contributed to 
the overall likelihood at each failure instant.106 To illustrate more concretely how this 
works, I follow the example I gave in Figure 2. The likelihood factor contributed by the 
second failure f2 corresponds to that by individual i3 and is represented as 
                                                 
104 Cox 1975 is the main source for this section. 
105 There are a variety of methods of dealing with ties. The “Breslow method” is used as default in STATA 
and is based on averaging across all possible sequences of failure.  
106 Individual failures are assumed to be independent of each other. 
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 What distinguishes the likelihood function expressed in Equation (1) from those 
that correspond to fully parametric models is that only the order of failure times is taken 
into account in the former. There is no need to consider the actual length of time it takes 
failures to occur, the distribution of which defines the parameterization of the baseline 
hazard function, because the baseline hazard function is left arbitrary in this model. Cox 
illustrates that MLE can be used to estimate β ’s in the partial likelihood function (1975). 
Even though the estimates are likely to be not as efficient as if a fully parametric model 
was used, the asymptotic properties of the estimates still hold true for large samples 
(273): one can expect to get unbiased parameter estimates using the partial likelihood 
function. Without estimating the nuisance parameter, that is, parameters )(0 th β  for the 
whole sample are thereby estimated by maximizing the following log-likelihood function: 
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To get parameter estimates, the first derivative of lnL with respect to β —the score 
function—is solved for β , while asymptotic standard errors are estimated by taking the 
square-roots of the inverted negative expected values of the second derivatives of lnL 
with respect to β . 
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